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 Synopsis 
The essential function of an oil and gas producing well is to transport hydrocarbons 
from the reservoir to the processing equipment in a cost effective and safe manner.  
The importance of well safety has been recognized and accepted for a long time, 
and significant improvements concerning both design and operating procedures have 
been made. In spite of these improvements, failures still occur and will probably 
continue to occur in the future. The industrial and technological development, the 
extended lifetime of wells, and recent regulations and standards imply that there is a 
need for a systematic approach towards well safety during the entire life cycle of a well. 
For a well the main risk contributor is a blowout. The acceptable mean time 
between blowouts is very long compared with the lifetime of a well. In such situations 
Rasmussen (1994) states that the risk involved in operation has to be predicted 
analytically from the first beginning and the proper defenses have to be designed from 
this prediction. Use of predictive methods in the well risk assessment is not new. 
However, descriptions and guidelines on how to apply the analysis techniques in the 
well life cycle are fragmented.  
The main objective of this thesis has been the development of procedures and 
methods for risk assessment of oil and gas wells. The work is limited to the well 
operational phase. The procedures and methods provide status of the well risk level 
during the life cycle from installation to abandonment of the well. The main focus is on 
the two main safety functions of the well: 
a. To prevent uncontrolled leakage of well fluids from the well to the environment. 
This function is usually referred to as well integrity and is a continuous safety 
function that may fail at any instant of time. 
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b. To shut in the well flow in case of a dangerous incident on the downstream side of 
the x-mas tree. The shut-in function is an on demand function activated in a random 
critical situation. 
 
In this context a systematic approach means to describe a procedure for risk 
assessment, with focus on quantitative/predictive analysis as a means to provide input to 
the assessment. The risk assessment is based on existing and new methods and 
knowledge gained during the PhD work. To arrive at such procedures and methods, it 
was necessary to: 
1. Describe the state of the art related to analysis and control of the functions 
mentioned above. 
2. Describe regulations, standards, and industry practice, giving requirements to well 
safety in the operational phase. 
3. Identify commonly accepted analysis methods applied in risk assessment of wells, 
with focus on quantitative analysis techniques. 
4. Identify input reliability data available for quantitative well safety analyses and 
discuss the quality of the data. 
5. Assess the applicability of existing well safety analysis methods and, if necessary, 
suggest improvements. 
6. Suggest improvement in application of reliability input data. 
7. Develop a systematic approach for risk assessment of oil and gas wells in the 
operational phase. In this context a systematic approach means to assess well risk 
when a well component failure occurs in the operational phase. The basis for the 
risk assessment is the quantitative analysis techniques identified.  
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The use of risk assessment methods to assess well risk in the operational phase is 
not new. However, some of the steps in the risk assessment procedure are new. Also a 
set of well risk factors (WRF) for assessing well risk in the operational phase is new. 
More explicit the following contributions from the thesis are identified: 
• A systematic approach for well risk assessment in the operational phase. A set of 
WRFs are identified that influence the total well risk. The procedure is aimed at risk 
assessment in the operational phase after a well component failure has occurred.  
• A method for constructing barrier diagrams. A barrier diagram is a structured way 
of describing a well as a barrier system. In the thesis it is shown how to calculate 
failure probability directly from the barrier diagram. Alternatively, the barrier 
diagram construction rules allows for converting the barrier diagram to a fault tree. 
• A framework for assessing well component failure causes, acceptable deviations in 
well component performance, and dependent failures.  
• A method for calculating the safety unavailability of safety functions, and a method 
for calculating the safety unavailability for different configurations of surface 
controlled subsurface safety valves. 
 
 
 

 Preface 
This thesis reports the work carried out during my PhD study at the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Department of Production and Quality 
Engineering. The research was initiated in 2000, and financed by a research scholarship 
from NTNU. The research was halted for a one year period in 2003 because of project 
work at my current employer ExproSoft AS.  
The study builds on two parts. The first part constitutes of a series of courses with 
exams. The second part is the work reported in this thesis.  
The main objective of this thesis has been the development of procedures and 
methods for risk assessment of oil and gas wells. The work is restricted to the well 
operational phase. The procedures and methods provide status of the well risk level 
during the life cycle from installation to abandonment of the well. The main focus is on 
the two main safety functions of the well: 
a. To prevent uncontrolled leakage of well fluids from the well to the environment. 
This function is usually referred to as well integrity and is a continuous safety 
function that may fail at any instant of time. 
b. To shut in the well flow in case of a dangerous incident on the downstream side of 
the x-mas tree. The well shut-in function is an on demand function activated in a 
random critical situation. 
 
This PhD work belongs to the field of applied science, meaning research aiming 
directly at practical application. The thesis is build up by a main report and a series of 
papers. The main report addresses primarily personnel involved with risk control of 
offshore wells in the operational phase. The papers describe methods primarily for 
personnel performing quantitative reliability analysis.  
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I also want to thank fellow PhD students for fruitful discussions of research 
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 1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the background and motivation for the PhD project, along with 
the objectives and the limitations. The scientific approach adapted is discussed and the 
structure of the thesis is outlined. 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The essential function of an oil and gas producing well is to transport hydrocarbons 
from the reservoir to the processing equipment in a cost effective and safe manner. 
The importance of well safety has been recognized and accepted for a long time, 
and significant improvements concerning both design and operating procedures have 
been made. In spite of these improvements, failures still occur and will most likely 
continue to occur in the future. The need for continued focus on well safety is 
exemplified by the gas blowout in 2005 on the Snorre tension leg platform operating on 
the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). According to the Petroleum Safety Authority 
(PSA) in Norway the accident1 could have resulted in a major accident with the loss of 
many lives (PSA, 2005). Two of the conclusions drawn from the investigation were: 
• Deficient assessments of overall risk.  
• Breach of the requirements to well barriers. 
 
A well barrier is an envelope of one or several dependent barrier elements 
preventing fluids or gases from flowing unintentionally from the formation into another 
formation or to surface (NORSOK D-010). The well barriers are means to reduce 
                                                 
1 Accident - An unintended event or sequence of events that causes death, injury, environmental 
or material damage (DEF-STD 00-56). 
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overall risk. How well barriers influence on well risk in the operational phase is focused 
on in this thesis.  
 
Technology trends  
The industry continues to develop new well designs for challenging reservoir 
conditions. In Norway, most of the profitable fields are in production. The industry now 
focuses on finding and developing the smaller/marginal fields in the southern part of the 
NCS. In search for new large and profitable fields, the industry moves north and into 
deeper water. This development results in production in more environmentally sensitive 
areas and in operations under more hostile weather conditions. A similar development is 
seen, e.g., in Russia where offshore fields in the Barents region are being planned.  
To develop the marginal fields it is expected that the operators of offshore fields 
will be more directed towards subsea systems and investments in new development 
concepts and technologies. An example is subsea high integrity pressure protection 
systems (HIPPS), where the pipeline is not rated for the full pressure and a safety 
instrumented system (SIS) is installed on the seafloor to close the flow if high pressure 
above acceptable level occurs. The first subsea HIPPS on the NCS is the Kristin field. 
The field started production October 2005 (Statoil, 2005).  
The trends mentioned above indicate that new technology applied in more 
challenging fields will require continued focus on well risk management2 in the future.  
 
Supply and demand 
According to Hirsch, et al (2005) the oil production will soon peak and there may be a 
mismatch between the demand for and the supply of petroleum, and this situation will 
not be temporary. Peaking will create a severe liquid fuel problem for the transportation 
sector. Peaking will result in dramatically higher oil prices, which will cause economic 
hardship in the industrial countries, and even worse problems in the developing 
countries. The study concludes that the problem of peaking of world conventional oil 
production is unlike any yet faced by modern industrial society. With the expected 
                                                 
2 Risk Management - Systematic application of management policies, procedures, and practices 
to the tasks of analyzing, evaluating and controlling risk (IEC 60300-3-9). 
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mismatch between demand and supply it is likely that there will be an increased 
pressure on safety.  
 
Increased focus on well age and life extension 
In Norway, the NORSOK D-010 standard describes well integrity requirements, where 
well integrity is “the application of technical, operational, and organizational solutions 
to reduce risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids throughout the life cycle of the 
well.” Well integrity has always been focused on in the design of new wells, but well 
integrity in the operational phase is now of increasing concern. Because of high oil 
prices, new technology for increased recovery, and government incentives, it is now 
possible and profitable to extend production beyond the assumed design life3. However, 
life extension may result in more frequent critical failures involving leakages to the 
environment. The outcome of such leaks can be catastrophic. According to Burton 
(2005) 10% of the wells on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) were shut-
in due to well integrity problems during the last five years. The article refers to a study 
based on interviews with 17 UKCS operators. Approximately 83% of these operators 
experienced well integrity problems. Other topics highlighted in Burton (2005) are: 
• Little is known about the implications of operating wells beyond their design lives, 
and UK operators found growing concern about the safety, environmental, and 
economic standards associated with well structural integrity.  
• More subsea wells will have implications on the identification and remediation of 
integrity problems.  
• 32% of UKCS completed or suspended wells are more than 20 years old, with some 
over 38 years old.  
• Well lives are being extended, older assets are being sold to smaller operators, and 
the number of subsea wells is increasing. 
• Erosion, corrosion, and fatigue problems associated with prolonged field life are 
thought to have led to more frequent well integrity problems.  
                                                 
3 Design life - Planned usage time for the total system (NORSOK O-CR-001). 
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• Some operators believe that well functionality can be maintained, regardless of age, 
through inspection, monitoring, and maintenance. Nevertheless, 87% of the 
operators questioned believe that the incidence of structural integrity problems is 
increasing and will continue to do so.  
 
It is likely that the NCS situation is comparable to the UKCS situation because there 
are many similarities in field age, type of installations, operating practice, etc. Well 
integrity is also a major concern in the United States Gulf of Mexico (US GoM). A 
study carried out on behalf of the Mineral Management Services (MMS) concludes that 
more than 8000 wells on the US GoM Outer Continental Shelf experience well 
completion leaks (Bourgoyne et al 2000).  
The increased emphasis on well integrity in the operational phase is reflected in 
recent regulations and standards. In Norway, NORSOK D-010 describes requirements 
for “Well Integrity in drilling and well operations”, while the American Petroleum 
Institute (API) currently develops a recommended practice for handling of annular 
casing pressure in the US GoM. The working title is API RP904 – Annular Casing 
Pressure Management for Offshore Wells. 
Independent of industry sector, there is a global trend towards functional 
requirements (what is to be achieved) rather than deterministic/rule based requirements 
(what to do) in high-risk industries. A main reason for this change is to enable the 
industry to cope with new technology rather than restricting the development. As a 
consequence of more functional requirements there is an increased focus on risk 
assessment methods to demonstrate acceptable risk.  
 
The well as part of a safety instrumented system (SIS) 
On offshore installations leaks or other hazardous events5 may occur that make it 
necessary to isolate the wells. In this situation the well safety function is to “shut-in the 
                                                 
4 No official version of this recommended practice (RP) is available yet 
5 Hazardous event - Event which can cause harm (IEC 60300-3-9). 
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well”. This safety function6 will reduce the consequences7 of the initiating event. The 
well shut-in function is the “protection layer” closest to the reservoir, and the 
availability8 of this function contributes significantly to reducing the total risk on the 
installation.  
The well shut-in function is part of a SIS. On offshore installations a SIS has 
traditionally been designed in accordance with ISO 10418 (or API RP14C), which gives 
rules for how to design such systems. In Norway and in the UK there has been a change 
towards the IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 standards, which describe a risk-based approach 
to determine the design, and quantitative9 reliability10 requirements for safety functions. 
Overall, it is expected that these standards will contribute to a more systematic safety 
work and increased safety in the industry. In Norway, the new IEC standards have 
resulted in a guideline for the application of the standards in the Norwegian petroleum 
industry (OLF, 2004). The guideline states a quantitative reliability requirement to 
safety functions. One of the safety functions described in OLF (2004) is the “isolation 
of well” function. The “isolation of well” function comprises the well safety valves and 
the control logic that actuates the valves. 
 
                                                 
6 Safety function - Function to be implemented by a SIS (Safety Instrumented System), other 
technological safety-related system or external risk reduction facilities which is intended to 
achieve or maintain a safe state for the process in respect to a specific hazardous event (IEC 
61511) 
7 Consequence - A possible result of an undesired event. Consequences may be expressed 
verbally or numerically to define the extent of injury to humans, or environmental or material 
damage (NS 5814). 
8 Availability - The ability of an item under combined aspects of its reliability, maintainability, 
and maintenance support) to perform its required function at a stated instant of time or over 
stated period of time (BS 4778). 
9 Quantitative - The property of anything that can be determined by measurement. The property 
of being measurable in dimensions, amounts, etc., or in extensions of these that can be 
expressed by numbers or symbols. A quantitative statement describes “how much”, while a 
qualitative statement answers the question, “what kind is it?” or “how good is it?” (Tarrants 
1980). 
10 Reliability - The ability of an item to perform a required function, under given environmental 
and operational conditions, and for a stated period of time (ISO 8402). 
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Motivation 
The industrial and technological development, the extended lifetime of wells and, the 
recent regulations and standards imply that there is a need for a systematic approach 
towards well safety during the entire life cycle of a well. 
Both well integrity and the well system11 as part of a SIS are essential to the total 
risk on an installation. Further, design and operation of the well and the SIS are 
traditionally the responsibility of organizational units with different focuses. In well 
system design the ability to contain and transport well fluids from the reservoir to the 
rest of the process system is emphasized. In SIS design the ability to close in the well 
when demanded is focused on. Traditionally well integrity and the well system as part 
of a SIS are handled separately. However, well system failures may have an effect on 
both well integrity and the ability to shut-in the well when required. 
The application of risk assessment in design of wells and of SIS is not new. 
However, descriptions and guidelines on how to control risk from a well design 
perspective are fragmented. In particular, this limitation applies to risk assessment in the 
operational phase. 
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 focus on the use of field specific reliability data. How to 
collect and include field specific reliability input data in risk assessment need to be 
focused on.  
1.2 Objectives 
The overall objective of the PhD project is to develop a systematic approach for risk 
assessment and control of offshore wells in the operational phase. The main focus is on 
the two main safety functions of the well: 
a. To prevent uncontrolled leakage of well fluids from the well to the environment. 
This function is usually referred to as well integrity and is a continuous safety 
function that may fail at any instant of time. 
                                                 
11 System - A bounded physical entity that achieves in its domain a defined objective through 
interaction of its parts (DEF-STD 00-56). 
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b. To shut in the well flow in case of a dangerous incident on the downstream side of 
the x-mas tree. The shut in function is an on demand function activated in a random 
critical situation. 
 
The overall objective is split into the following sub-objectives: 
1. Describe the state of the art related to analysis and control of the functions 
mentioned above. 
2. Describe regulations, standards, and industry practice, giving requirements to well 
safety in the operational phase. 
3. Identify commonly accepted analysis12 methods applied in risk assessment of wells, 
with focus on quantitative analysis techniques. 
4. Identify input reliability data13 available for quantitative well safety analyses and 
discuss the quality of the data. 
5. Assess the applicability of existing well safety analysis methods and, if necessary, 
suggest improvements. 
6. Suggest improvement in application of reliability input data. 
7. Develop a systematic approach for risk assessment of oil and gas wells in the 
operational phase. In this context a systematic approach means to assess well risk 
when a well component failure occurs in the operational phase. The basis for the 
risk assessment is the quantitative analysis techniques identified.  
1.3 Delimitation 
The PhD work focuses on well safety. Safety is defined by IEC 61508 as “freedom from 
unacceptable risk”, while IEC 60300-3-9 defines risk as a “combination of the 
frequency, or probability, of occurrence and the consequence of a specified hazardous 
event.” The same standard defines a hazardous event as an “event which can cause 
                                                 
12 Analysis - An examination of a complex, its elements, and their relations; the use of methods 
and techniques of arranging facts to assist in deciding what additional facts are needed, establish 
consistency, validity and logic, establish necessary and sufficient events for causes, and guide 
and support inferences and judgments (Johnson 1980) 
13 Reliability data - Reliability data is meant to include data for reliability, maintainability and 
maintenance supportability. 
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harm.” A well has the potential to create hazardous events, and hence well risk must be 
acceptable. The risk should be acceptable throughout the lifetime of the well.  
For a well the main hazardous event is a blowout. The acceptable mean time 
between blowouts is very long compared with the lifetime of a well. In such situations 
Rasmussen (1994) states that the risk involved in operation has to be predicted 
analytically from the first beginning and the proper defenses have to be designed from 
this prediction. The thesis focuses on predictive analysis methods. 
The work is limited to offshore wells and the two functions described in section 1.2. 
Another limitation is that the work focuses on the operational phase of the well 
lifecycle. The operational phase typically starts after the well is handed over to 
production operations. The operational phase involves a long-term operation where 
failures may develop over time and result in unacceptable changes in risk. The well 
operations before the well is in production (i.e., drilling and completion) or operations 
to repair14 or maintain the well (i.e., workover and wireline operations) are not covered.  
Holand (1997) describes two main types of barrier situations; static and dynamic. A 
static barrier situation is a situation where the same well barrier will be available over a 
“long” period of time. In a dynamic situation the well barrier varies over time. This 
situation is typical for well drilling, workover, and completion operations. With focus 
on the operational phase, the thesis treats static barrier situations. Appropriate analysis 
techniques for dynamic well situations are discussed in Holand (1997). 
It is not within the scope to assess the effect of major modifications, e.g., to convert 
the well from a production to an injection well. Such changes are known in advance and 
may be handled as a new design.  
Risk can be related to losses comprising: 
• Loss of human life. 
• Environmental damage. 
• Material and production loss. 
 
                                                 
14 Repair - The part of corrective maintenance in which manual actions are performed on the 
entity (IEC 50(191)). 
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Severe accidents may impair the reputation of the operating company, and risk 
management is therefore important in the entire life cycle of the offshore installation. 
Through design, operation, and maintenance the aim is to minimize risk. However, risk 
is not only about losses. Effective risk management may provide a significant business 
advantage by contributing to increased business performance and reputation. This thesis 
focuses on risk related to losses with focus on loss of human life risk. The possible side-
effect that the proposed method(s) contribute to a business advantage is not treated in 
the thesis. 
The total risk will be a combination of risk from several potential hazardous events, 
where the hazardous events result from different hazards. According to EN 12100-1, 
there may be mechanical, radiation, chemical, biological or electrical hazardous energy 
sources. Even if a well may include aspects of the hazardous energy sources above, the 
release of inflammable/explosive fluids (hydrocarbons) to the surroundings is by far the 
most significant risk factor. This risk factor is focused on in the thesis.  
A blowout may be caused by a well component failure or an external event directly 
affecting the well, both situations resulting in loss of control. Well component failures 
are focused on in this thesis.  The frequencies of external events that result in well 
failure are not covered. 
The thesis is limited to the technical factors. Organisational and human factors are 
not covered. Neither is the risk associated with occupational accidents.  
The thesis focuses on the use of quantitative risk analysis methods. If existing 
methods suited for the purpose are identified, these methods are used as basis. In this 
case improvement of, e.g., input data is focused on rather than suggesting new methods.  
The well shut-in function comprises three basic parts, namely detection (sensors), 
logic actuator and actuation (the well safety valves). The thesis focuses on the well 
components that are part of the well shut-in function, but the results may serve as input 
to the design and follow-up of the entire function. 
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The need for risk acceptance criteria15 are described and discussed. However, 
explicit risk acceptance criteria are not within the scope. To establish acceptance criteria 
is seen as the responsibility of the operator. 
1.4 Scope of work and principal results 
A clear understanding of the system and the system boundaries is a key factor in any 
analysis, and consequently also in any risk analysis16. By the system understanding, 
suitable risk analysis methods and input data can be identified. The results from the risk 
analyses should provide an appropriate basis for risk evaluation17 to make decisions 
concerning risk.  
An offshore installation is a complex system. Figure 1 illustrates the system 
breakdown structure used as basis for further discussion. Three system levels are 
defined, namely installation, well, and well component level. Figure 1 illustrates the 
conceptual model18 for the design phase. This phase is a typical top-down process where 
the tasks on installation level determine the boundary conditions for the lower system 
levels. On each level typical design tasks are illustrated with boxes in greyscale. Within 
each design task a set of safety tasks are performed. The safety tasks are illustrated with 
white boxes. The focus in the thesis is on the well system level, and the safety tasks with 
letters in bold face indicate the main safety tasks performed on well system level. 
Arrows illustrate the information flow (or boundary conditions) transferred from one 
task to another. The dotted lines indicate risk results on well system level that may serve 
as input to the installation level. This feedback loop is, however, not treated specifically 
in the thesis. 
                                                 
15 Acceptance criteria - Criteria based on regulations, standards, experience and/or theoretical 
knowledge used as a basis for decisions about acceptable risk. Acceptance criteria may be 
expressed verbally or numerically (NS 5814) 
Risk criteria - A qualitative or quantitative statement of the acceptable standard of risk with 
which the assessed risk needs to be compared (The Royal Society 1992). 
16 Risk Analysis - Systematic use of available information to identify hazards and to estimate the 
risk to individual or populations, property or the environment (IEC 60300-3-9). 
17 Risk Evaluation - Process in which judgments are made on the tolerability of the risk on the 
basis of risk analysis and taking into account factors such as socio-economic and environmental 
aspects (IEC 60300-3-9). 
18 Model - Simplified representation of a phenomenon or object where some aspects are 
highlighted whereas other are left out (e.g., causal models) (Hellevik 1999). 
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Figure 1 Well risk assessment in the design phase 
 
IEC 61508, Part 4 defines equipment under control (EUC) as “equipment, 
machinery, apparatus, or plant used for manufacturing, process, transportation, medical, 
or other activities”. On offshore installations the EUC will vary from the entire 
installation to components. It is impossible to develop one risk method that covers all 
risk aspects of the installation. Risk analyses are therefore performed on various system 
levels (EUCs). 
Risk analyses (QRA) are commonly performed on the installation level. The QRA 
methods applied differ from country to country. The discussion is based on the practice 
on the NCS. However, the approach and the limitations highlighted have similarities 
with the approach used in other countries.  
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In Norway, the QRA is used to quantify the installation risk. The QRA identify a set 
of hazardous events, and model the frequency and consequence of the hazardous events. 
The QRA is a tool used to assess the layout of the installation, placement of main safety 
functions, and dimensioning accident loads. The QRA as of today tend to model the 
consequences of the hazardous events in a very detailed manner, whereas the frequency 
of the hazardous events is modeled in a very rough manner. One of the hazardous events 
included in the QRA is blowouts. Even if blowout events contribute to a high share of 
the risk on the NCS, the blowout frequencies used as input to the QRA are based on 
coarse analysis. In most cases the estimates are based on the historic occurrence of 
blowouts, where the basis is the work of Holand (1997). For the consequence of a 
blowout however, a range of models exist. The QRA is therefore a useful tool to 
identify and compare solutions aimed at reducing the consequence of a blowout. The 
QRA is not suited (and not used) for reduction of the blowout frequency for a single 
well. The thesis therefore focuses on risk analysis of single wells rather than using the 
QRA as basis for modeling well risk. 
Ideally, the QRA may be used to establish quantitative requirements to the lower 
systems levels on the installation.  It could, e.g., be possible to set a target value for the 
blowout frequency for a single well or to the well shut-in function. However, according 
to OLF (2004) “the level of detail of the QRA as it is performed today makes it more 
appropriate for evaluating conceptual options and for verification purposes, than for 
stating absolute criteria.”  The thesis therefore includes a description of other 
regulations and requirements that include criteria for wells in the operational phase. 
On installation level the first design task is to determine the field and installation 
layout, including type and number of wells. On well system level this means that the 
consequences of a hydrocarbon leak is determined too a large degree by decisions made 
on installation level and by the field properties in general (reservoir conditions). On well 
system level the role of the risk assessment is restricted to leak frequency analysis of 
alternative well designs (configurations) to select the well design with the lowest risk. 
The role of the risk evaluation is to assess if the estimated leak frequency can be 
accepted. 
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The same principle is applicable to the well shut-in function. On installation level 
the risk analysis (QRA) includes a range of hazardous events and safety functions are 
included to reduce the hazardous event risk. One of the safety functions is the well shut-
in function. In the QRA it assumed that the well is able to shut-in with a certain on-
demand probability. This probability then becomes the boundary condition for the 
designers of the well shut-in function. The safety task on well system level is to verify 
that the well shut-in function is able to function with the required on-demand 
probability. This requirement should be followed up in the operational phase. 
On well system level the component level boundary conditions are determined. 
Based on the input from the well level, the well components are selected and qualified 
for use in the specific well. Reliability input data on well component level may then be 
fed back to well system level.  
Different types of risk evaluation are made in the design phase and in the 
operational phase. In the design phase, several configurations and well component 
alternatives are evaluated. In this phase the role of the risk analysis is to present a basis 
for comparison and ranking of the alternatives. In the operational phase the well design 
is fixed, and risk control19 should be performed throughout the life of the well. The role 
of the risk analysis in this process is to illustrate changes in risk and to present 
alternatives for reducing risk. The risk evaluation should conclude whether the change 
in risk is acceptable or not.  
Figure 2 illustrates the conceptual model for the operational phase. In contrast to the 
design phase, the operational phase is a typical bottom-up process where well 
component failures influence the higher levels in the hierarchy. The PhD project 
includes a risk assessment20 method to be applied on the well system level. The method 
includes both well integrity and the well shut-in function. The basis for the risk 
assessment method is the quantitative analysis and well level requirements identified as 
suited for use in the design phase. The quantitative analysis are used to measure the 
                                                 
19 Risk Control - Process of decision-making for managing and/or reducing risk; its 
implementation, enforcement and re-evaluation from time to time, using results of risk 
assessment as one input (IEC 60300-3-9). 
20 Risk Assessment - Overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation (IEC 60300-3-9). 
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increase in well integrity risk and the well shut-in function on-demand probability as a 
result of well component failures that occur in the operational phase. 
The risk assessment method is used to control well risk in the operational phase. It 
is assumed that if the well risk is acceptable on single well level, the risk change will 
not be reflected in the QRA on installation level. A possible extension not covered in 
this thesis is to implement the method as part of a tool to update the QRA in the 
operational phase (indicated with dotted lines in Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2 Well risk assessment in the operational phase 
 
1.5 Scientific approach and verification 
This PhD project belongs to the field of applied science, meaning research aiming 
directly at practical application. Applied research can be exploratory but are often 
descriptive. Applied science is an activity of original character to gain new knowledge 
and insight, primarily to solve specific, practical problems. This means that the quality 
of the research must be considered not only from a scientific point of view, but also 
from a user point of view. Applied research “asks questions” and in this context the 
thesis objective may be stated as “how can well risk be controlled by risk assessment?”.  
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The general basis for the thesis is established through extensive literature surveys. 
These surveys represent the starting point for the research, and support all subsequent 
activities. In addition the professional experience from SINTEF and ExproSoft, input 
from my advisor Marvin Rausand, co-operation with industry representatives from 
Norsk Hydro, and co-operation with colleagues from ExproSoft and SINTEF have 
contributed to valuable input to the identification of problem areas, comments and 
subjects to be focused on. 
To prove its validity, the empirical verification of the research is one of the 
cornerstones in many scientific disciplines. However, direct verification of the full 
extent of the methodology in the thesis may be unrealistic. Due to many influencing 
factors both in the design phase and in the operational phase, a new method may 
improve safety but cannot guarantee it. Consequently, it is difficult to separate the 
effects of a certain method from other factors, or to prove afterwards that other methods 
would have led to a better result (Roozenburg and Eekels, 1995). As an alternative, 
Vatn (1996) describes some basic principles to ensure a scientific approach to the 
development of procedures and methods. The principles followed to the extent possible 
are:  
1. Defining and limiting the problem. As part of a procedure or a method, the principal 
problem it is developed for and the limitations shall be clearly defined. 
2. Stringency. Rules must be obeyed. Because most methods within applied science are 
cross-disciplinary, the rules or the scientific standards vary among the disciplines. 
For example, the predictive part of a method will often require an understanding of 
the world in terms of cause-effect models. 
3. Accuracy. The method shall be careful and exact. 
4. Correctness. Deductive reasoning shall be correct according to formal logic. If an 
argument cannot be defined from a formal logic point of view, this should be stated. 
5. Thoroughness. The method shall explore how all important aspects of a problem can 
be treated. If some aspects are left out from the analysis, this shall be stated and 
justified. A key question is “Can the method handle this and that?”. 
6. Traceability. In this context traceability means that arguments leading to the 
proposed procedure or method should be stated as part of the procedure/method, or 
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as a supplement to the method. This involves demonstrating how the method relates 
to a theoretical basis, and literature references should be made to relevant work. 
7. Order and system. The procedures and methods shall have a high degree of order 
and system to ensure that 1) critique can be raised against the method, and 2) it is 
easy to understand and use the method to solve real problems. 
8. Critique. Arguments against the procedure and methods shall also be identified and 
discussed. 
 
The thesis consists of a main report that describes a framework for use of well risk 
assessment in the operational phase. A set of papers is included as appendixes to the 
main report. The papers describe detailed methods or procedures that are part of the 
framework. The criteria listed above have been followed as far as possible both in the 
main report and in the papers.  
The risk assessment procedure presented in the main report is developed in co-
operation with Norsk Hydro. The risk assessment procedure is now being implemented 
by Norsk Hydro. The plan is to conduct a series of courses to get user feed-back before 
the method is implemented as an internal procedure. Paper 2 is published in a journal. 
Paper 1 and Paper 3 are presented in conferences. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of a main report and enclosed papers. The main report provides a 
framework to the work presented in the thesis together with summary and discussion. 
The main report provides references to specific topics presented in the papers. The 
content of the main report are described in more detail below.  
Chapter 1 describes the background and motivation for the PhD project, along with 
the objectives and the limitations. The scientific approach adapted is discussed and the 
structure of the thesis is outlined. 
Chapter 2 describes the main characteristics of an offshore well. The chapter forms 
a basis for the discussions and evaluations later in the report. A base case well is 
described, as well as different well types and well operations. Finally, well integrity and 
the well shut-in function are discussed. 
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In Chapter 3 the boundary conditions for risk assessment of single wells are 
discussed. The boundary conditions are conditions or limitations determined by the 
higher levels in the offshore installation system hierarchy or by specific well integrity 
and well shut-in function requirements. With basis in the boundary conditions, suited 
types of risk analysis and risk measures are discussed. 
In chapter 3 it is identified that the IEC 61508/61511 standards require risk analysis 
to be performed to determine the required protection from safety functions, while a risk 
analysis normally not is required is Norway. In Paper 1 the difference between the two 
approaches is discussed in more detail. 
Chapter 4 describes well configuration and well component characteristics. The 
discussion includes functionality requirements, failure modes, failure causes, and 
reliability data. Different types of safety critical well barrier failures require different 
types of detection strategies and follow-up, and in Paper 3 strategies for revealing safety 
critical failures are discussed. Chapter 4 presents a failure classification scheme that is 
useful when performing quantitative reliability analysis. The basis for the classification 
scheme is described in Paper 5. 
Chapter 4 also presents barrier diagrams as a method to illustrate the possible leak 
paths between the reservoir and the environment. Barrier diagrams are useful for 
keeping an overview of the well barriers when analyzing various well barrier 
arrangements. Barrier diagram construction rules are described in Paper 4. 
In Chapter 5 the quantitative reliability analysis applied on well system level are 
discussed. On well system level the designers/user can primarily influence 1) the 
blowout and/or well release frequency and 2) the probability of failure on demand 
(PFD) for the well shut-in function. In chapter 5 the two reliability measures are 
presented, together with suitable analytic method. 
Paper 5 describes models to calculate the unavailability for different Surface 
Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve (SCSSV) configurations. In Paper 2 a common 
cause failure model is described. The models described in paper 2 and 5 are 
supplements to the methods described in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 describes a method for risk assessment of a single well. The method is to 
be applied in the operational phase when a failure of a well component has occurred.  
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Chapter 7 provides a brief evaluation of the research process, a discussion of the 
results of this thesis, and recommendations for further work.  
 
 
 2. Well system description 
To establish a basis for the discussions and evaluations later in the report this chapter 
describes the main characteristics of an offshore well A base case well is described, 
together with different well types and well operations. Finally, well integrity and the 
well shut-in function are discussed. 
2.1 Well system, well types and well operations 
A well consists of a x-mas tree, a wellhead, a well completion, and a casing program, 
where: 
• The well completion is the assembly of tubing hanger, downhole tubular, safety 
valve, production packer, and other equipment placed inside the production casing 
to enable safe and efficient surface access to a (pressurized) formation.  
• The x-mas tree is an assembly of valves, pressure gauges and chokes fitted to the 
wellhead to control the well flow. 
• The wellhead is the surface/seabed termination of a wellbore that incorporates 
facilities for installing casing hangers during the well construction phase and for 
hanging the production tubing and installing the x-mas tree. 
• The casing program encompasses all casing and liner strings, including hangers and 
cement, in a wellbore. 
 
The well as defined above is the system boundary in this report. An example well is 
included as a basis for discussion and exemplification later in the report. Figure 3 shows 
a sketch of the well, which is a typical surface oil production well. On a surface well the 
wellhead, the x-mas tree, and the production control system are positioned on the 
platform. On subsea wells these systems are located on the seabed and the reservoir 
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fluids are transported from the well through a flowline and a riser to the platform. On 
subsea wells there are two main x-mas tree types. Vertical subsea x-mas trees are in 
principle similar to the surface x-mas tree, while a horizontal x-mas tree is configured 
with the master valves and flow-control equipment on a horizontal axis (the PMV is 
located horizontally). 
The well completion gives access to the reservoir. The well completion part below 
the tubing hanger is commonly called the tubing. The tubing is an assembly of tubing 
joints and other completion components. The reservoir fluids (oil, gas and water) flow 
from the reservoir through the tubing to the x-mas tree and to surface. The components 
selected for any well completion should be compatible with the wellbore geometry, well 
pressure, reservoir fluids, etc.  
The casing program consists of different types of casing strings. The casing 
program has several functions. The production casing is set across or at the start of the 
reservoir and allows installation of the well completion. The intermediate casing string 
provides protection against caving of weak or abnormally pressured formations and 
enables the use of drilling fluids of different density necessary for the control of lower 
formations. The surface casing string provides structural strength so that the inner 
casing strings and the well completion can be installed. 
The space between the tubing and the production casing is called A-annulus in the 
report. The annuli outside the A-annulus are called B- and C-annulus, respectively.  
Several components with different functions are integrated into a well. Some 
commonly installed component types and associated functions are21: 
• Tubing hanger and tubing head. The tubing hanger is located in the tubing head. 
The tubing head provides a means of attaching the x-mas tree to the wellhead. Both 
components ensure that the tubing and annulus are hydraulically isolated. 
• Production packer. The production packer isolates the annulus and anchors the 
bottom of the production tubing string.  
• Seal assembly. The seal assembly is a component with seals that engages in a 
sealbore to isolate the production tubing conduit from the annulus. 
                                                 
21 See the Definitions chapter for detailed function description 
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• Surface controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV)22. The SCSSV is a downhole 
safety valve, which is operated from the surface through a control line. The valve is 
able to shut-in the well when demanded. The valve is fail-safe23, i.e., the valve 
closes with loss of hydraulic control pressure. Two basic types of SCSSV are 
common: wireline retrievable (WR), whereby the principal safety-valve components 
can be run and retrieved on wireline, and tubing retrievable (TR), in which the entire 
safety-valve assembly is installed with the tubing string. TR-SCSSV valves are most 
common in use. The WR-SCSSV are in some cases installed to replace a failed TR-
SCSSV. 
• Production master valve (PMV). The PMV is located on the x-mas tree and controls 
the flow from the wellbore. The PMV also has a safety function and is fail-safe 
close if control pressure is lost. On surface wells also a manual master valve is 
usually installed.  
• Production wing valve (PWV). The PWV is located on the side of the x-mas tree. 
The PWV is used to control and isolate production. In addition a service (kill) wing 
valve is available for treatment or well-control purposes. 
• Swab valve. The swab valve is located on the top of the x-mas tree and provides 
access to the wellbore if repair or inspection is required. 
                                                 
22 Other types of Downhole Safety Valves (DHSV) are available but the dominating type is 
SCSSV and only this type is included in the thesis. 
23 Fail safe - A design feature that ensures the system remains safe or, in the event of a failure, 
causes the system to revert to a state that will not cause a mishap (MIL-STD 882D). 
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Figure 3 Typical surface oil production well 
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2.1.1 Well types 
A well may be a production or an injection well. Production wells produce well fluids, 
while injection wells are used to inject gas or water to the reservoir to maintain reservoir 
pressure.  
 
Production wells 
A production well transports well fluids from the reservoir to the rest of the process 
facilities on the installation. In addition to oil, an oil well almost always produces some 
gas and frequently water. A gas well produces natural gas, and frequently some 
condensate (natural gas liquids such as propane and butane) and occasionally some 
water.  
In a naturally flowing production well the formation pressure is sufficient to 
produce oil at a commercial rate. In the North Sea most reservoirs are initially at 
pressures high enough to allow a well to flow naturally. After a period of time the 
pressure may decrease and it is required with artificial lift to continue production. 
Artificial lift means any system that adds energy to the fluid column in a wellbore with 
the objective to improve production from the well. Artificial-lift systems use a range of 
operating principles, such as rod pumping, gas lift, and electrical submersible pumps 
(Podio et al, 2001). Gas lift is the most common type of artificial lift in the North Sea. 
 
Injection wells 
In a gas injection well, separated gas from production wells or imported gas is injected 
into the upper gas section of the reservoir. The injected gas is used to maintain the 
pressure in the oil reservoir. In most cases, a field will incorporate a planned distribution 
of gas-injection wells to maintain reservoir pressure.  
Water injection wells are common offshore, where filtered and treated seawater or 
produced water is injected into a lower water bearing section of the reservoir. Water 
production can be significantly higher than oil production from a field. Consequently, 
treatment and disposal of produced water, especially in remote locations, have a 
significant impact on the feasibility of a project. 
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2.1.2 Well operations in the operational phase 
In the operational phase major maintenance or remedial treatments may be necessary. 
Eventually, the well will be terminated. Through-tubing workover is a common term for 
coiled tubing, snubbing or wireline operations conducted for treatment or service of the 
well. Wireline operations are most common. In this operation a piece of equipment is 
run inside the tubing string on a wireline either to make a replacement in the well, to 
install new equipment or to perform well surveys. Tubing access through vertical subsea 
trees and surface threes is achieved by simply opening the valves in the tree, while on 
horizontal subsea trees a set of plugs need to be retrieved to gain access to the well bore. 
Wireline operations are relatively routinely performed on platform wells, while a vessel 
or a rig must be contracted to do the same wireline operation on subsea wells. A 
through-tubing workover may avoid a full workover, which is more time and cost 
consuming. 
A full workover means that parts of or the complete tubing string is removed and 
replaced with a new. A full workover may be required due to necessary corrective 
maintenance24 or productivity problems. On surface wells and vertical subsea x-mas 
trees a failure of the tubing string will require pulling of the x-mas tree. On horizontal 
subsea x-mas trees the tubing string can be pulled without pulling the x-mas tree. 
Workovers on subsea wells are normally more time consuming than on platform wells 
because a workover rig must be contracted.  
To kill a well means to stop a well from flowing reservoir fluids. In the case of a 
producing well, a kill fluid with sufficient density to overcome production of formation 
fluid is pumped into the well.  
The well may be closed-in because of operational reasons. To close-in the well 
means to close one or several valves in the well.  
If the well is non-productive, the well will be abandoned. Before abandonment the 
well is plugged with cement plugs and recoverable equipment is removed. 
Workover operations are dynamic situations and are not covered directly in the 
report. Indirectly, such operations are included in the quantitative reliability analyses 
                                                 
24 Corrective maintenance - The maintenance carried out after a failure has occurred and 
intended to restore an item to a state in which it can perform its required function (BS 4778). 
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described later in the report because expected time to repair safety critical failures is 
included in the analysis. The risk of performing such operations are however not 
included. 
2.2 Well integrity 
NORSOK D-010 defines well integrity as “the application of technical, operational and 
organizational solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids”. The 
SINTEF offshore blowout database (SINTEF, 2005) defines a blowout as “an incident 
where formation fluid flows out of the well or between formation layers after all the 
predefined technical well barriers or the activation of the same have failed”. In addition 
to blowout the SINTEF offshore blowout database (SINTEF, 2005) has defined a 
second event called well release. A well release is a “an incident25 where oil or gas flow 
from the well from some point were flow was not intended and the flow was stopped by 
use of the barrier system that was available in the well at the time the incident started”. 
A typical well release will be a leak through a component in the x-mas tree and the 
SCSSV is activated. As seen, NORSOK D-010 defines well integrity as the solutions 
available to prevent a blowout (uncontrolled release). However, it is chosen to also 
include well releases in the thesis. Therefore the following well integrity definition is 
used: 
• The application of technical, operational and organizational solutions to reduce risk 
of blowout and well release. 
 
A well should be designed and operated to minimize the blowout and well release 
risk. Safety is defined by IEC 61508 as “freedom from unacceptable risk”. Safety 
related to well integrity may therefore be defined as “freedom of unacceptable blowout 
or well release risk”. 
A blowout or a well release may consist of salt water, oil, gas or a mixture of these. 
A blowout that flows into another formation and not to the surface is called an 
underground blowout. A blowout or well release may be caused by a well component 
                                                 
25 Incident - Any unplanned event resulting in, or having potential for, adverse consequences 
(ISO/TMB WG 1998). 
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failure or an external event directly affecting the well, both situations resulting in loss of 
control.  
2.2.1 Well integrity and well barriers 
The technical means of avoiding a blowout are well barriers. A well barrier is defined 
by NORSOK D-010 as “an envelope of one or several dependent barrier elements 
preventing fluids or gases from flowing unintentionally from the formation into another 
formation or to surface”. The same standard defines a well barrier element (WBE) as an 
“object that alone cannot prevent flow from one side to the other side of it self”. A well 
barrier can be viewed as a pressurized vessel (envelope) capable of containing the 
reservoir fluids. The two barrier principle is followed in Norway and in most oil 
producing countries. This principle means that there should be at least two well barriers 
in a well. A well can therefore be considered as a system of two or more pressurized 
vessels (envelopes) that prevent the fluid from entering the surroundings. Figure 4 
illustrates the well barrier system as pressure vessels. In Figure 4, the well tubulars and 
the x-mas tree body constitute the vessel walls while the SCSSV and x-mas tree valves 
are illustrated as the outlet valves from the vessel. The innermost vessel illustrates the 
well barrier closest to the reservoir while the outer vessels illustrate the consecutive well 
barriers.  
A well release will typically be an incident where the outer vessel leaks, and the 
inner well barrier stops the leak. In a blowout situation all the predefined technical well 
barriers or the activation of the same in one possible leak path have failed. 
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Figure 4 Illustration of well barriers to achieve well integrity 
 
2.2.2 Well integrity risk 
Blowouts (and well releases) can be catastrophic and lead to loss of life, material loss, 
and severe environmental impacts. Depending on installation type, location of wells, 
well type, etc., blowouts represent an important contribution to the total fatality risk in 
offshore oil and gas exploration activities. A measure for the fatality risk is the fatal 
accident rate (FAR), which is a frequency rate26 defined as the expected number of 
                                                 
26 Frequency rate - The number of occurrences of a given type of event expressed in relation to 
a base unit of measure (for example, accidents per 1 million miles traveled (Tarrants 1980) 
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fatalities per 108 hours of exposure. The FAR contribution from blowouts in all well 
phases is discussed in Holand (1997), where it is estimated that blowouts represent 
between 3.5% and 7.2 % of the total fatality risk in offshore oil and gas exploration 
activities in the US GoM outer continental shelf and the North Sea regions. 
 
Blowout and well release frequencies  
Blowout frequencies and failure causes are presented in Holand (1997). Holand (1997) 
include blowouts from the period 1 January 1980 until 1 January 1994 in US GoM outer 
continental shelf and the North Sea (Norwegian, UK waters). Holand (1997) is based on 
data from the SINTEF offshore blowout database, and this database is continuously 
updated (SINTEF, 2005). The database is available to the sponsors of the project. 
Two main potential blowout situations are reported in the operational phase: 
• Blowout during normal operation caused by well equipment failures. 
• Blowout caused by an external hazardous event. In such situations the external 
hazardous event damages the well components above the ground or on the seabed 
(wellheads and x-mas trees). 
 
Holand (1997) discusses 12 production blowouts, where six blowouts are caused by 
well equipment failures, and six blowouts are caused by external loads damaging well 
equipment with subsequent failure to close in the well, e.g., storm, earthquake, naval 
vessel collision, dropped objects, fire and explosion loads. All the production blowouts 
originate from platform completed wells. Holand (1997) did not distinguish between 
blowout and well release. This differentiation is now made in the SINTEF Offshore 
Blowout Database (SINTEF, 2005). It is reason to believe that many of the external load 
events now would have been classified as well releases.  
Further from Holand (1997), most of the production blowouts are caused by failure 
to take action after well equipment failures. Typically, production has continued with 
tubing or casing failure, or the SCSSV has been left in failed condition (or failed when 
activated).  
As input to risk analyses Holand (1997) recommends a well blowout frequency of 
5.0 10-5 blowouts per well year for wells in the operational phase (production and 
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injection wells). This blowout frequency is likely to be conservative due to outdated 
well design, operating practices, and the broad definition of blowout (include well 
releases). For example, modern SCSSVs are in general regarded to be far more reliable 
than SCSSVs used in the 80-ties and early 90-ties (Molnes and Strand, 1999).  
In Norway hydrocarbon leaks above 0.1 kg/s must be reported. According to PSA 
(2003) a total of 228 significant hydrocarbon leaks (i.e., leak rate above 0.1 kg/s) 
occurred from permanent and mobile installations on the NCS during the period 1996-
2002. None of the significant hydrocarbon leaks ignited. Valve faults and incorrect 
operational actions account for most of the leaks. No blowouts where reported in the 
same period. 
The blowout and well release frequencies presented above illustrate that the mean 
times between blowouts and major releases are long, and that the mean time between 
worst case consequences because of a major hydrocarbon release is even longer. 
Therefore, the risk (frequency and consequence) must be predicted. 
 
Blowout and well release consequences 
A well blowout or well release (or a hydrocarbon release in general) may have severe 
consequences for personnel and material assets caused by release of toxic substances 
(e.g., H2S), instability of platforms, or ignition resulting in fire and explosion loads.  
In the UK, the RIDDOR (Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous 
Occurrences Regulations) classification (HSE, 2002) is used to categorize the criticality 
of hydrocarbon leaks. The categorization is presented in Table 1. A blowout from a 
typical production well in the North Sea belongs to the RIDDOR “major releases” 
category.  
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Table 1 The RIDDOR classification of hydrocarbon releases (adapted from 
HSE, 2002) 
Category2 
Fluid1 Major Minor 
Gas and 2-
Phase 
EITHER 
Quantity released > 300 kg 
OR 
Mass release rate >1kg/s and duration 
>5 min 
EITHER 
Quantity released < 1 kg 
OR 
Mass release rate < 0.1 kg/s and 
duration < 2 min 
Liquids3 
EITHER 
Quantity released > 9000 kg 
OR 
Mass release rate >10kg/s and 
duration >15 min 
EITHER  
Quantity released < 60 kg 
OR 
Mass release rate <0.2 kg/s and 
duration < 5 min 
Remark / 
Scenario 
Gas: Capable of jet fire over 10 meters 
length (>1kg/s) capable of causing 
significant escalation after 5 minutes 
duration, or a flash fire/explosion on 
reaching LFL. Where 300 kg equates 
to approx. 3000 m3 explosive cloud at 
NTP, enough to fill an entire module or 
deck area, and to cause serious 
escalation if ignited. 
 
Liquids: This could result in a pool fire 
over 10 meters in diameter (>10kg/s) 
filling a module or cutting off a deck, 
hindering escape and affecting more 
than one person directly if lasting for 
over 15 minutes duration. 
Gas: This could result in a jet fire of 
less than 5 meters length (< 0.1 kg/s), 
which is unstable (< 2 min duration) 
and therefore unlikely to cause 
significant escalation, or a flash 
fire/explosion on reaching LFL. Where 
<1 kg equates to <10 m3 explosive 
cloud at NTP, probably insufficient to 
cause a significant hazard if ignited. 
 
Liquids: This could result in a pool fire 
smaller than 2 meters in diameter (< 
0.2 kg/s) unlikely to last long enough 
to hinder escape (< 5 min), but could 
cause serious injury to persons 
nearby 
1) For 2-phase Releases combinations of the gas and liquids scenarios described are 
possible, depending on the gas to oil ratio (GOR) involved. 
2) A third category called Significant is described as a scenario between major and minor 
3) Oil / Condensate / Non-process 
 
From the RIDDOR classification, it is seen that compared with gas a higher volume 
or leak rate of liquids is defined within each category. Empirically based ignition 
models (Cox, 1991) also indicate the ignition probability for a gas leak to be at least five 
times higher than for an oil leak. 
In Norway, a quantitative risk analysis (QRA) is used to quantify the installation 
risk. The QRA includes a range of hazardous event frequencies and models how safety 
functions contribute to reducing the consequences of the hazardous events. The results 
from the QRA are typically presented as estimated FAR values. The QRA is used as 
input to decisions concerning system layout, and type of safety functions to be 
implemented (placement of living quarter, dimensioning of structures, etc.). NORSOK 
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Z-013 describes requirements to the QRA performed on the NCS. The starting point for 
consequence calculations is a distribution of hole sizes. Based upon the pressure in the 
system, initial leak rates should be calculated and classified according to a leak rate 
distribution. In NORSOK Z-013 the following narrow leak rate categories are used (all 
values in kg/s): 0.1-0.5; 0.5-1; 1-2; 2-4; 4-8; 8-16; 16-32; 32-64: > 64. NORSOK Z-013 
use the leak rates as a starting point for modeling the consequences of a blowout. For a 
blowout event NORSOK Z-013 describes the following factors that should be taken into 
account in the consequence model: 
• Blowout location. 
• Flow rate as a function of time and bridging possibilities. 
• Medium (e.g., gas or oil). 
• Operation (e.g., drilling, completion, maintenance, production, injection). 
• Reservoir conditions (e.g., shallow gas). 
• Probability of ignition, time of ignition. 
• Probability of explosion, impact of explosion. 
• Effect of fire fighting system, heat load. 
• Wind conditions. 
• Escalation of accident. 
• Escape and evacuation. 
• Simultaneous operations (e.g., drilling, production). 
 
In contrast to the RIDDOR classification, NORSOK Z-013 does not describe 
typical consequences of ignited leaks. As seen, NORSOK Z-013 requires modeling of 
hydrocarbon leak consequences. A detailed description of fire and explosion models is 
given in, e.g., SINTEF/Scandpower (1992) and in Hekkelstrand and Skulstad (2004).  A 
blowout may also result in environmental damage, and in Norway the MIRA27 method 
(OLF, 2001) is a widely accepted method for environmental risk analysis. This method 
describes a quantitative approach to the assessment of environmental risk from offshore 
petroleum activities. The consequences of hydrocarbon releases are often difficult to 
                                                 
27 MIRA - Method for Environmental Risk Analysis (translated from Norwegian) 
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measure directly, and Lygner and Solli (2001) describe how risk indicators28 can be 
used to measure environmental risk. 
2.3 Well shut-in function 
PSA (2001b) state that “Facilities shall be equipped with necessary safety functions 
which at all times are able to: 
a. detect abnormal conditions, 
b. prevent abnormal conditions from developing into situations of hazard and accident,  
c. limit harm in the event of accidents.” 
 
In general, two main safety functions are required in a hazardous process. 
• Process control, which means to maintain equipment under control with minimum 
deviation29 from specifications (category a and b in PSA (2001b) requirements 
above). 
• Process safety, which mean to prevent and minimize damage upon loss of control 
(category c in PSA (2001b) requirements above).  
 
A general event sequence with process safety functions implemented to minimize 
damage upon loss of control is illustrated in Figure 5. The process safety functions are 
illustrated as barriers to mitigate the consequences of hazardous events. 
 
                                                 
28 Indicator - A measurable/operational variable that can be used to describe the condition of a 
broader phenomenon or aspect of reality (Øien 2001) 
29 Deviation - Departure from a norm (criterion) (Johnson 1980). 
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Figure 5 A general event sequence with process safety functions implemented 
to minimize damage upon loss of control 
 
The well shut-in function is a process safety function. The well shut-in function is 
required if a given hazardous event occurs elsewhere on the installation (e.g., fire on the 
installation or blowout from another well). The valves in the well must close and shut-in 
the well and thereby reduce the consequences of the hazardous event. For a standard 
production well, the well shut-in function consists of the following components (OLF, 
2004): 
• Emergency ShutDown (ESD) logic 
• Production wing valve (PWV) 
• Production master Valve (PMV) 
• Surface controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV) 
• Solenoid valves 
 
A typical configuration of the well shut-in function is illustrated in Figure 6. The 
well safety valves are fail-safe, i.e., they will close when hydraulic pressure is lost. In 
addition to automatic bleed down via the ESD logic, there may be additional means for 
removing the hydraulic power to the valves. Depending on the scenario that triggers the 
demand for shut-in, one of the three valves will be sufficient to isolate the well.  
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Figure 6 Well shut-in function for a typical surface production well 
 
Hazardous events may also affect the well directly. For surface wells the main 
source of external hazards will, e.g., be dropped objects on the platform with a potential 
for hitting and causing damage to the x-mas tree. Other events may be fire or explosion 
loads acting on the x-mas tree. For subsea wells the main source of external hazards will 
likely be dropped objects from vessels with a potential for hitting and causing damage 
to the subsea x-mas tree. In this case the well must close in on the SCSSV (placed 
below surface and assumed not affected by the external events). This well shut-in 
function is illustrated in Figure 7. For this function it is assumed that the control line is 
ruptured and that the SCSSV close due to loss of hydraulic pressure.  
According to the PSA (2003) statistics, more than half of the hydrocarbon leaks on 
the installations are discovered by automatic detection equipment, while personnel in 
the relevant area discover the remaining leaks. Information on how many of these 
events that required activation of the well shut-in function is not readily available in the 
PSA statistics. Some typical average demand rates are given in OLF (2004), where 3 
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isolations per well-year due to ESD segregation are assumed. However, the number of 
demands will vary depending on the type of installation. 
The two well shut-in functions described above are one of the most important safety 
functions on an installation. The potential volume released from a production well 
related to a major accident scenario is “infinite” and the ability to shut-in the well is 
therefore important to the overall installation risk. 
 
 
Figure 7 Well shut-in function given an event that result in x-mas tree failure 
(ESD logic not included, assume control line rupture) 
 
2.4 Main well risk factors 
Well integrity and well shut-in function risk factors are illustrated in Table 2. The risk 
factors are categorized in frequency and consequence factors.  
In the design phase the consequence factors are mainly controlled by decisions 
made on installation level or by reservoir properties (see discussion in section 1.4). The 
frequency factors, however, are strongly influenced by the decisions made on well 
system level in the design phase. 
In the operational phase a well component failure may result in changes in blowout 
and well release risk (well integrity). How to assess increased risk after a well 
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component failure is focused on in this thesis. The risk increase will be a combination of 
frequency and consequence factors. Figure 8 illustrate an example where a well 
component has failed (leak indicated in figure). The failure is located above the SCSSV. 
In this situation the well barrier system is degraded (frequency factor) and the well 
release risk has increased due to storage of hydrocarbons in the A-annulus. Both well 
shut-in functions is unaffected by the failure since the valves are functioning. However, 
the volume stored in the A-annuli will be released if the x-mas tree is damaged.  
 
Table 2 Main well blowout and well release risk factors in the well 
operational phase 
Frequency factors 
Well barrier system design  
Number of well barriers and WBEs in each leak path. 
Well barrier element (WBE) availability factors  
Functionality, reliability, detection of failures, repair of failures. 
External hazards 
Mudslide, fault slippage, extreme weather conditions, dropped/swinging objects 
(BOP, riser, container, pipe), collisions (icebergs, trawls, naval- and air traffic), fire or 
explosion loads and resulting fire/explosion resistance, operator/human errors. 
Consequence factors 
Installation type 
Platform/surface/subsea. 
Installation design /layout 
Protected subsea wellheads, templates, safety functions, placement of living quarter, 
evacuation routes 
Installation activity type and level 
Manned/unmanned. 
Well leakage fluid(s) 
Condensate/gas//oil/water/other. 
Well leakage characteristics 
Rate/quantity/duration. 
Well leakage exit point 
Casing/formation/wellhead/x-mas tree. 
External factors (not controlled by installation/well design)  
Weather conditions/location/nearby installations/external support 
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Figure 8 Well component failures influence on blowout and well release risk  
  

 3. Well risk assessment boundary conditions 
In this chapter the boundary conditions for risk assessment of single wells are 
discussed. The boundary conditions are conditions or limitations determined by specific 
well integrity and well shut-in function requirements. With basis in the boundary 
conditions, suited types of risk analysis and risk measures are discussed. 
3.1 Boundary conditions 
Well integrity and the well shut-in function are handled by different regulations, 
standards, guidelines, and recommended practices. The well integrity and well shut-in 
function boundary conditions from regulations and standards are discussed in sections 
3.2 and 3.3, respectively. In section 3.4 required risk analysis measures and risk 
assessment results based on the review of the requirements are summarized.  
3.2 Well integrity requirements 
This section gives a review of well system requirements in Norway and in the US GoM. 
In Norway PSA issues health, environment, and safety regulations. The basis for the 
regulations is functional requirements. It is left to the operator to find solutions 
(organizational and technical) that are in accordance with the regulations.  
The Framework regulation (PSA, 2001c) describes the overall framework and 
principles for the other regulations issued. In section 9, “Risk reduction principles” it is 
stated that “Harm or danger of harm to people, the environment or to financial assets 
shall be prevented or limited in accordance with the legislation relating to health, the 
environment and safety, including internal requirements and acceptance criteria. Over 
and above this level the risk shall be further reduced to the extent possible. Assessments 
on the basis of this provision shall be made in all phases of the petroleum activities.” 
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On well system level this means that blowout and well release risk should be minimized 
to the extent possible. The use of risk assessment is a means to achieve this objective.  
The Management regulations (PSA, 2001a) describe the operator management 
principles. In section 2 the principles for management of barriers is described, and it is 
stated that “It shall be known what barriers have been established and which function 
they are intended to fulfill, and what performance requirements have been defined in 
respect of the technical, operational or organizational elements which are necessary for 
the individual barrier to be effective.” Related to well system design this means that the 
well barriers shall be known, and it should be clearly defined what is required for the 
well barrier to be effective. 
Further in the Management regulations (PSA, 2001a), section 2, it is stated that “It 
shall be known which barriers are not functioning or have been impaired. The party 
responsible shall take necessary actions to correct or compensate for missing or 
impaired barriers.” Hence, it is left to the operator to take “necessary actions”. A 
possible approach to provide arguments for “necessary actions” is the use of risk 
assessment in the operational phase. 
In the US GoM the regulations are issued by the MMS. An overall safety 
requirement policy from MMS is found in the 30 CFR 250 on “Production Facilities”. 
The regulations are built up of “parts”, where each part addresses rather specific topics. 
Many of the same operating principles used in Norway are found in the MMS 
regulations. This relationship is natural because US oil and service companies 
dominated the industry, at least in the early years of the “oil age”.  
An important difference is that the use of rules (what to do) is dominating in the 
MMS regulations while a practice with use of risk analysis to demonstrate acceptable 
risk is accepted in Norway. This difference is exemplified by the handling of sustained 
casing pressure (SCP) in the MMS regulations. SCP often results from tubing leaks 
(leak in well barrier). A failure of, e.g., the production casing may then result in an 
underground blowout.  According to Bourgoyne et al (2000) the SCP requirements were 
consolidated in 1988 and included in 30 CFR 250.517. In 1991 MMS issued a letter that 
dictated changes in the SCP policy.  
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The requirements for continued operation with SCP were as follows: 
1. The SCP is less than 20% of the minimum internal yield pressure, AND 
2. The casing pressure bleeds to zero during the diagnostic tests. 
 
A “departure” (deviation from rule) is automatically granted to wells, which meet 
the criteria above. If not, a request for departure must be submitted to MMS. In the US, 
API RP 90 – Annular Casing Pressure Management for Offshore Wells is being 
developed to provide guidance on how to deal with SCP. The API standard is scheduled 
for completion in 2006 (no official version is available to the public). The standard will 
likely result in changes in the MMS regulations. An early draft included use of risk 
analysis to demonstrate acceptable risk. But the risk analysis approach seems to have 
been abandoned in later draft versions. 
As a conclusion, the regulations in Norway require that the operator develop 
internal procedures based on the principles in the regulations. The role of the authorities 
is to control that the operators follow their own procedures. The operator must 1) 
minimize the blowout risk by use of well barriers, 2) control the well barrier status when 
in operation, and 3) take necessary actions given unacceptable risk. Risk assessment in 
the design and the operational phase is accepted.  
Both the MMS and the PSA regulations frequently refer to international standards, 
like IEC, ISO and API standards. In Norway a range of NORSOK standards are 
developed and accepted by the PSA.  
The NORSOK standard D-010 defines the minimum functional and performance 
oriented requirements and guidelines for well design, planning and execution of safe 
well operations in Norway. NORSOK D-010 states that “Upon confirmation of loss of 
the defined well barrier, the production or injection shall be suspended and shall not re-
commence before the well barrier or an alternative well barrier is re-established”. 
However, in the next paragraph it is stated that “If for any reason the well is 
contemplated for continued operation, the following shall apply: 
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a. any well with a potential to flow to surface or seabed shall have two independent 
well barriers. If the well barrier status, availability or monitoring30 ability is 
altered, any continued use shall be supported by the subsequent points; 
b. a risk assessment shall be performed based on current reservoir/well condition and 
time factors in any continued use; 
c. any deterioration of the leak, or additional failure of a WBE, shall not significantly 
reduce the possibility of containing the hydrocarbon/pressure and normalising the 
well; 
d. a formal deviation process shall be implemented; 
e. any deviation from the original two defined well barriers shall be presented to the 
authorities for information and/or approval for further use.” 
In conclusion, the NORSOK D-010 standard opens for a risk-based approach to 
show that risk is within acceptable limits if deviations occur in the operational phase. 
The standard does not explicitly state that risk analysis have to be performed in the 
design phase. In practice quantitative risk analysis are often performed in the design 
phase to compare the blowout frequency of alternative well system alternatives. 
3.3 Well shut-in function requirements 
The PSA regulation requirements referred in section 3.2 also apply to process safety 
functions. In addition, in the guideline to section 7 in the Facilities regulations (PSA, 
2001b), it is stated that “… the IEC 61508 standard and OLF guideline No. 70 should 
be used where electrical, electronic and programmable electronic systems are used in 
constructing the functions.” So, IEC 61508/61511 and OLF (2004) are preferred for 
design and operation of safety functions implemented by a Safety Instrumented System 
(SIS).  
The IEC 61508/61511 requirements are given as a Safety Integrity Level (SIL). 
Safety Integrity is the “probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily performing 
the required safety functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period of 
time”. SIL is introduced for specifying the target level of safety integrity, and numerical 
                                                 
30 Monitoring - Activity, performed either to manually or automatically, intended to observe the 
state of an item (IEC 50(191). 
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target failure measures are linked to the safety integrity levels. Here, it is distinguished 
between two types of SIS, depending on if the system is “operated in low demand mode 
of operation” or “operating in high demand or continuous mode of operation”. The well 
shut-in function will be of the first category. For “low demand” functions safety 
integrity is given as “average probability of failure to perform its design function when 
demanded”. The defined SIL levels of the “low demand mode of operation” type 
systems are given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Safety integrity levels: target failure measures for a safety function, 
allocated to an SIS operating in low demand mode of operation (IEC 
61508) 
Safety integrity 
level 
Low demand mode of operation 
(Average probability of failure to perform its design function 
on demand) 
4 ≥ 10-5 to < 10-4 
3 ≥ 10-4 to < 10-3 
2 ≥ 10-3 to < 10-2 
1 ≥ 10-2 to < 10-1 
 
In contrast to the IEC 61508/61511 approach, where the SIL level is determined by 
the use of risk analysis, OLF (2004) does not require a risk analysis to be performed. 
OLF (2004) defines typical safety functions on an offshore installation and recommends 
a minimum SIL for each function. In Paper 1 the difference between the approaches in 
OLF (2004) and IEC 61508/61511 is discussed in more detail.  
Independent of approach chosen, both the OLF (2004) and IEC 61508/61511 result 
in a SIL requirement to the well shut-in function. In Norway, the well shut-in function is 
assigned a SIL 3 requirement, which means that the probability of failure on demand 
(PFD) should be 10-3 or lower (OLF, 2004). On well system level a risk analysis must 
be performed to demonstrate that this quantitative requirement can be achieved.  
IEC 61508/61511 describes a “safety life cycle” and describes requirements to the 
entire life of the safety function. This life cycle perspective also means that the PFD 
requirement must be followed up in the operational phase.  
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MMS requirements to safety-systems are found in 30 CFR 250. Identified parts 
related to safety functions are: 
• 250.801 Subsurface safety devices. 
• 250.802 Design, installation, and operation of surface production-safety systems. 
• 250.804 Production safety-system testing and records. 
 
In these parts it is often referred to API RP 14C for requirements to safety-systems. 
API RP 14C is widely accepted in the offshore industry, and the design principles in 
API RP 14C are established as “standard” safety function designs also in the UK and in 
Norway. So, even if the risk based approach in IEC 61508/615011 now is preferred both 
in the UK and in Norway the “tradition” from API RP 14C is still followed when 
designing the safety systems. The typical API 14C safety function designs are actually 
the basis for the minimum SIL requirements in OLF (2004).  
3.4 Well risk assessment requirements 
Based on the review in the previous sections in this chapter it can be concluded that risk 
assessment is accepted both in the design phase and in the operational phase. For the 
well shut-in function it is required to perform quantitative analysis to calculate the PFD 
and verify compliance with the SIL requirements. Related to the well integrity function 
no explicit blowout frequency requirements on single well level are identified. 
The well level risk assessment boundary conditions are summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4 shows that different risk measures are used for the well integrity and well shut-
in function. Also the risk assessment will have different objectives.  
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Table 4 Summary of well level risk assessment boundary conditions 
Risk objectives Well integrity Well Shut-in function 
Risk assessment 
objective in the design 
phase  
Risk assessment not explicitly required 
by regulations, but risk assessment 
frequently used to, e.g., evaluate 
alternative well designs. 
Verify that SIL requirement 
(e.g., SIL 3)  can be 
achieved (i.e., PFD < 10-3)  
Risk assessment 
objective in the 
operational phase 
It shall be known which barriers are not 
functioning or have been impaired.  
Two well barriers must be intact.  
Risk assessment must be performed 
before continued use if a well barrier 
have failed. 
Verify that SIL requirement 
is fulfilled. 
 

 4. Well barriers, well barrier elements, and barrier 
diagrams 
In this chapter well barriers and well barrier elements (WBE) are discussed. The 
discussion includes functionality requirements, failure modes, failure causes, and WBE 
reliability data. Barrier diagram is presented as a method to illustrate the possible leak 
paths between the reservoir and the environment. Barrier diagrams are useful when 
assessing well integrity for alternative well designs.  
4.1 Well barriers 
A well barrier system should prevent uncontrolled outflow from the borehole/well to the 
external environment (NORSOK D-010). The well barrier and WBE definitions in 
NORSOK D-010 are used in the thesis (see section 2.2.1, page 26). A well barrier is 
dependent on one or several WBEs to fulfill its function. A failure of one WBE results 
in a failure of the well barrier. A system that is functioning if and only if all of its 
components are functioning is called a series structure. The well barrier series structure 
is illustrated as a reliability block diagram (RBD) in Figure 9. A RBD is a success-
oriented network describing the function of the system. It shows the logical connections 
of (functioning) components needed to fulfill a specific system function. If we consider 
a well barrier we have connection between the end points a and b (the well barrier is 
functioning) if and only if we have connection through all the n blocks representing the 
WBEs (components), i.e., all WBEs are functioning. 
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Figure 9 Reliability block diagram of a well barrier  
 
4.1.1 Two well barriers principle 
According to NORSOK D-010 there must be “at least two well barriers available during 
all well activities and operations, including suspended or abandoned wells, where a 
pressure differential exists that may cause uncontrolled outflow from the borehole/well 
to the external environment.” This two barrier principle is established throughout the oil 
industry. The well barrier closest to the reservoir is often called the primary well barrier, 
while the secondary well barrier is the second object that prevents flow from the source. 
A system that is functioning if at least one of its components is functioning is called a 
parallel structure. Therefore, a system with a primary and secondary well barrier is a 
parallel structure (i.e., a redundant31 system). Redundancy is used to obtain high system 
availability. A system with a primary and secondary well barrier is illustrated in Figure 
10. The well barrier system is functioning if we have connection either through the 
secondary or the primary well barrier, or both. 
The principle of two independent barriers is also important from a robustness32 
point of view. For example, if the wellhead on a production well is severely damaged 
the only remaining well barrier against a severe blowout is the primary well barrier, 
namely the SCSSV and the tubing components below the SCSSV (see Figure 3, page 
22). 
                                                 
31 Redundancy - In an entity, the existence of more than one means of performing a required 
function (IEC 50(191)). 
32 Robustness – The ability to function under given accident conditions (PSA, 2002). 
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Figure 10 Reliability block diagram of primary and secondary well barrier 
 
4.1.2 Passive vs. active well barrier elements  
CCPS distinguishes between passive and active independent protection layers (IPL) 
(CCPS, 2001). A passive protection layer is a protection layer that is not required to 
take an action to achieve its function in reducing risk. An active protection layer is 
required to move from one state to another in response to a change in a measurable 
process property (e.g., temperature or pressure), or a signal from another source (such as 
a push-button or a switch). A well barrier can be viewed as a protection layer with the 
objective to prevent flow from the reservoir. A well barrier will however be a 
combination of passive and active protection layer “elements”. The protection layer 
categorization  in CCPS (2001) is used in this thesis to distinguish between passive and 
active WBEs. Typical passive WBEs are the production packer, the seal assemblies and 
the tubing string. Active WBEs are the PMV, the PWV, and the SCSSV. For these 
valves a signal has to be sent (input) to close the valve (change state). A combination of 
passive and active WBEs constitutes a well barrier and may be illustrated as the series 
structure in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11 Reliability block diagram of well barrier with one active WBE and 
“n” passive WBEs 
 
4.1.3 Well barrier system and interfaces 
The availability of a well barrier system (or any system) depends on its interfaces with 
the rest of the world. It is necessary to study how the interfaces influence the system. A 
clear understanding of system interfaces is essential both in the design phase and the 
operational phase. In the operational phase the interfaces may change, or a well barrier 
failure results in changes to the remaining well barrier system. In Rausand and Høyland 
(2004) a generic technical system and interfaces are illustrated as shown in Figure 12. 
This generic presentation is used to describe the well barrier system and interfaces. 
The elements illustrated in Figure 12 are discussed in detail in Rausand and 
Høyland (2004) and an extract is given here: 
1. System; the technological system that is subject to analysis (and design). The system 
usually comprises several functional blocks. 
2. System boundary; the system boundary defines elements that are considered part of 
the system and elements that are outside. 
3. Outputs; the outputs (wanted or unwanted) are the results of the required functions 
(like materials, information, etc.). 
4. Inputs; the inputs to the system (unwanted or wanted) are the materials and the 
energy the system is using to perform its required function. Unwanted input may be 
particles, scale build-up, excessive pressure, etc. 
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5. Boundary conditions; the operation of the system may be subject to many boundary 
conditions, like risk acceptance and environmental criteria set by authorities or by 
the company. 
6. Support; the system usually needs support functions, like cleaning, lubrication, 
maintenance and repair. 
7. External threats; the system may be exposed to a wide range of external threats. 
Some of these threats may have direct affect on the system, others threats may affect 
the system inputs. Examples of external threats are earthquake, falling loads, loss of 
energy supply, sabotage, impact from other systems. The distinction between 
unwanted inputs and external threats may not always be clear. However, the 
classification in itself is not important. What is important is that all inputs and 
threats are identified. 
 
 
Figure 12 Systems and interfaces (Rausand and Høyland, 2004) 
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As a supplement to the categorization above, PSA (2002) identifies three elements 
that describe the performance of safety barriers in general: 
1. Functionality/efficiency; the ability to function as specified in the design 
requirements. 
2. Reliability/availability; the ability to function on demand or continuously. 
3. Robustness; ability to function as specified under given accident conditions. 
 
With basis in the general system and interface model presented by Rausand and 
Høyland (2004) a well barrier system and its interfaces are illustrated in Figure 13. The 
figure is modified to include the PSA (2002) elements also. Robustness is included as 
the ability to function given external threats, while availability is illustrated as a RBD, 
and underlines the importance of the well barrier system to “function over time”. 
Functionality is seen as part of the design process where all interfaces are considered 
and are not included explicitly in the figure.  A list of generic well barrier requirements 
is given in NORSOK D-010. The requirements are grouped into the different system 
interface categories and included in Figure 13. 
A well barrier failure situation may result in a revision/re-assessment of the 
boundary conditions (acceptance criteria) and the interfaces. For example, a risk 
assessment after a WBE failure has occurred may conclude that production can continue 
given that pressure limits (input) and/or test frequency33 (support) are changed. 
 
                                                 
33 Test frequency - The number of tests of the same type per unit time interval; the inverse of the 
test interval (IEEE Std. 352). 
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Figure 13  Well barrier system and interfaces (NORSOK D-010 requirements 
included) 
 
Figure 13 illustrates how the identified interfaces may be used to categorize the 
generic well barrier requirements. Below the interface categories are used to group 
requirements to well barriers found in regulations and standards34: 
1) Wanted and unwanted input 
a) A well barrier should withstand the environment and maximum anticipated 
differential pressure it may be exposed to over time (NORSOK D-010). Changes 
in input during the well life must be frequently assessed (change in well fluid 
composition, excessive pressure, scale, particles in the flow, etc.). It is also 
                                                 
34 Text in italic are quotations from standards and regulations. Text not in italic are derived from 
standards and regulations. 
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important to consider unwanted input. For example, failure of the primary well 
barrier might result in high pressure on a secondary well barrier. 
2) Wanted and unwanted output 
a) The acceptable leak rate shall be zero, unless specified. In situations where the 
function of the well barrier is weakened, but are still acceptable should be 
defined (NORSOK D-010). A specific leak rate criterion35 for the SCSSV and 
the SCASSV36 (Surface controlled annular safety valve) is specified in 
NORSOK D-010, which originates from API RP 14B. API RP 14B defines an 
acceptable leak rate, which is 15 SCF/min (~0.42 SCM/min) for gas, and 
400cm3/min for liquids37. 
3) Boundary conditions 
a) Two well barriers shall be available during all well activities and operations 
(NORSOK D-010 and industry practice). In addition NORSOK D-010 states 
that “No single failure shall lead to uncontrolled outflow from the borehole/well 
to the external environment”. 
b) SCSSV and SCASSV valves should be placed minimum 50 m below seabed 
(NORSOK D-010). The setting depth requirement makes the SCSSV less 
vulnerable to external events. The setting depths of the SCSSV and the SCASSV 
are primarily dictated by the pressure and temperature conditions in the well. 
However, deep-set valves make the primary well barrier less vulnerable to 
tubing leaks (assuming that the failure rate38 increases with increasing length).  
4) External threats (robustness) 
a) The well barriers shall be designed, selected and/or constructed such that it can 
operate competently and withstand the environment for which it may be exposed 
to over time (NORSOK D-010). In addition to long term environmental 
exposure, robustness include the ability to function under all accident conditions, 
                                                 
35 Criterion - A norm, i.e., rule or test against which (the quality of) performance can be 
measured (Johnson 1980). 
36 SCASSV - Same functionality as SCSSV but installed in annulus between production string 
and production casing. The valve is normally installed in a packer (Schlumberger, 2005). 
37 Assuming a density of methane gas of 0.7 kg/m3, this gives a leak rate ~0.3 kg/min or 0.005 
kg/s. Assuming a density of oil of 840 kg/m3, this gives a leak rate ~0.34 kg/min or 0.006 kg/s 
38 Failure rate - The rate at which failures occur as a function of time. 
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and events like earthquake, fire, loss of energy supply, sabotage, falling loads, 
etc. should also be assessed.  
5) System (availability) 
a) The primary and secondary well barriers shall, to the extent possible, be 
independent of each other (NORSOK D-010). Independence makes the system 
more robust, and also increases the availability.  
b) A SIL requirement to the well shut-in function should be established. It should 
also be controlled that the well shut-in function is able to fulfill this requirement 
in the well life (see section 2.3, page 32). 
6) Support 
a) In the Facilities regulations (PSA, 2001b), section 47 it is stated that “Well 
barriers shall be designed so that their performance can be verified.” According 
to NORSOK D-010 “The physical location and the integrity status of the well 
barrier shall be known at all times”. Verification of the performance of well 
barriers may be based on functional testing and condition monitoring (e.g., 
monitoring of changes in pressure). More specific, NORSOK D-010 states the 
following requirements to well barriers: 
i) A well barrier shall be leak tested, function tested or verified by other 
methods (NORSOK D-010). NORSOK D-010 also requires that “The SCSSV, 
the production tree valves and the annulus valves shall be leak tested 
regularly”. Common practice on the NCS is to test valves every 6 months. 
ii) The pressure in all accessible annuli (A, B and/or C annuli) shall be 
monitored and maintained within minimum and maximum pressure range 
limits (NORSOK D-010).  
 
The requirements listed reflect the requirements in Norway. The list is not complete 
when looking at a specific well. However, the categorization above gives an overview 
of the most important requirements and how the requirements influence the system. The 
categorization may also be used to include additional requirements from other countries 
or from internal operator guidelines.  
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For a specific well situation the system and interfaces must be assessed before a 
well risk assessment is performed. 
4.2 Well barrier failures 
BS 4778 defines availability as “The ability of an item39 under combined aspects of its 
reliability40, maintainability41, and maintenance support to perform its required 
function42 at a stated instant of time or over a stated period of time.” Availability is a 
measure of the ability of a well barrier system to function over time. In this section well 
barrier failures and well barrier maintenance are discussed in more detail. 
Different types of well barrier failures are reviewed and fitted into a common 
terminology. The IEC 61508 terminology is used as a basis. In IEC 61508 safety critical 
failures are called dangerous failures, while non-safety critical failures are called safe 
failures. Only dangerous failures influence safety and are included in the discussion. 
Typical dangerous failures are failure to close the SCSSV, leak through production 
packer, etc. An example of a safe failure is a failure to open a SCSSV. This failure will 
not affect the ability to prevent a blowout or to shut-in the well when demanded. 
4.2.1 Failure definition 
A failure is usually described by a failure mode. IEC 50(191) defines a failure mode as 
one of the possible states of a faulty item, for a given required function. For example, 
one SCSSV function may be expressed as close SCSSV. A loss of this function may 
therefore be defined as the failure mode Failure to close SCSSV.  
According to IEC50(191) failure is the event when a required function is terminated 
(exceeding the acceptable limits), while fault is “the state of an item characterized by 
inability to perform a required function, excluding the inability during preventive 
                                                 
39 Item - Any part, component, device, subsystem, functional unit, equipment or system that can 
be individually considered (IEC 50(191)). 
40 Reliability - The ability of an item to perform a required function, under given environmental 
and operational conditions, and for a stated period of time (ISO 8402). 
41 Maintainability - The ability of an item, under stated conditions of use, to be retained in, or 
restored to, a state in which it can perform its required functions, when maintenance is 
performed under stated conditions and using prescribed procedures and resources (BS 4778). 
42 Required function - A function or combination of functions, of an entity, which is considered 
necessary to provide a given service (IEC 50 (191). 
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maintenance43 or other planned actions, or due to lack of external resources.” A fault is 
hence a state resulting from a failure. 
According to IEC 50(191) an error is a “discrepancy between a computed, observed 
or measures value or condition and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or 
condition.” An error is (yet) not a failure because it is within the acceptable limits of 
deviation from the desired performance (target value). The relationship between these 
terms is illustrated in Figure 14. 
A clear distinction between error and failure is important for the planning of 
corrective measures. For example, an error may call for increased monitoring, while a 
failure results in a corrective measure, e.g., a workover.  
Each WBE has different functions, and therefore different acceptable deviations (or 
performance criteria44). Examples of the relation between WBE functions, failure 
modes, and acceptable deviations are given in Table 5. The table illustrates that active 
WBEs change state and therefore the acceptable deviation for the state transition must 
be defined in addition to the acceptable deviation in the passive state (leak rate in closed 
position). 
For example, the target value for an SCSSV in closed position is no leak. However, 
a certain leak rate is accepted (API RP 14B), and this leak rate is the acceptable 
deviation from the target value. If the leak rate exceeds this limit, the valve is regarded 
to be in a fault (state). The standard was initiated after an incident where a jet fire took 
off on a x-mas tree. The incident was used to model jet fire heat exposure to 
neighboring x-mas trees. The maximum allowable leakage rate was then estimated from 
how much heat load the neighboring trees could carry. The acceptance criteria stated in 
the API RP 14B does not reflect that risk levels vary among installations and well types 
(e.g., platform vs. subsea wells, injectors vs. producers, etc.).  
                                                 
43 Preventive maintenance - The maintenance carried out at predetermined intervals or 
corresponding to prescribed criteria and intended to reduce the probability of failure or 
performance degradation of an item (BS 4778) 
44 Performance criteria - Operational standards for use in determining effectiveness or 
efficiency (Tarrants 1980) 
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The experience from reliability data collection work in the UK is that the leak rate 
criterion in API RP 14B is sometimes used as a leak rate criterion across other well 
barrier elements. 
 
 
Figure 14 Illustration of the difference between failure, fault and error 
(adapted from Rausand and Høyland, 2004) 
 
Table 5 WBE functions and corresponding failures 
WBE type Function Failure mode Acceptable deviation 
Passive Contain fluid, i.e. prevent  leak 
across WBE 
Leak across WBE Leak rate (kg/s) 
Close WBE Fail to close WBE Closure time (s)  Active 
Prevent leak (in closed 
position) 
WBE leak in closed 
position 
Leak rate (kg/s) 
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4.2.2 Well barrier element failure classification 
A failure may result from different failure causes45 (reasons why a component fails). A 
clear understanding of the failure cause is important to select countermeasures to avoid 
failures. 
 
Random hardware and systematic failures 
According to IEC 61508 a failure of a safety-related system can be classified as either a 
random hardware or a systematic failure. A random hardware failure is a “failure, 
occurring at a random time.” A systematic failure is a “failure related in a deterministic 
way to a certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a modification46 of the design 
or the manufacturing process, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant 
factors”. A systematic failure may be interpreted as a failure of the component to fulfill 
the intended function without any physical degradation. Systematic failures may be 
introduced in the entire life cycle of the component (design, operation, maintenance). In 
the thesis it is assumed that systematic failures remain undetected, and results in a 
“baseline” unavailability. This baseline unavailability is not quantified explicitly in the 
thesis. This approach is in line with IEC 61508, which states that random hardware 
failures should be quantified, while systematic failures should not.  
Random hardware failures occur because a physical property influences on the 
WBE function. Random hardware failures may result from various reasons. Typical 
reasons are physical loads (e.g., pressure, temperature), human errors (e.g., scratches 
during installation), and design factors (e.g., choice of materials). Random hardware 
failures may also occur as a result of stress failures, which are failures that lay outside 
the component design limit.  
 
Dependent failures 
So far single independent WBE failures have been discussed. Failures in a system may 
also be dependent and result in common cause failures (CCF) or cascading failures. A 
                                                 
45 Failure cause  - The circumstances during design, manufacture, or use which have led to a 
failure (IEC 50(191)). 
46 Modification - The combination of all technical and administrative actions intended to change 
an item (IEC 50(191)). 
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common cause event is, according to NUREG/CR-6268, a “dependent failure in which 
two or more component fault states exist simultaneously, or within a short time interval, 
and are a direct result of a shared cause”. NASA (2002) state that a common design or 
material deficiency, a common installation error, a common maintenance error, or a 
common harsh environment may cause common cause failures.  
According to Rausand and Høyland (2004) cascading failures are multiple failures 
initiated by the failure of one component in the system that result in a chain reaction or 
domino effect. Malfunction of a component may, for example, lead to a more hostile 
working environment for the other components through increased pressure, higher 
temperature, and so on. For a well barrier system, failure of one of the WBEs in the 
primary well barrier may result in failure of one of the WBEs in the secondary well 
barrier if, for example, the pressure contained by the primary well barrier is higher than 
the secondary well barrier design limit. 
The relationship between independent and dependent failures is illustrated in Figure 
15. The figure shows that the dependent failures may have a significant effect on the 
well barrier system.  
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Figure 15 Relationship between independent and dependent well barrier 
failures  
 
Detected and undetected failures 
Common to all types of WBEs is that they “shall be designed so that their performance 
can be verified (PSA, 2001b). IEC 61508 differs between detected and undetected 
failures. Detected failures are normally detected immediately without any specific 
testing, while undetected failures (also called hidden failures47) can only be revealed 
through functional testing. For active WBEs (SCSSV, PMV, and PWV) the dangerous 
hardware failures are undetected failures, while the safe failures are detected failures (a 
spurious closure of the SCSSV will be detected immediately). For active WBEs the 
                                                 
47 Hidden failure - A failure not evident to crew or operator during the performance of normal 
duties (MIL-STD-2173(AS)). 
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dangerous hardware failures may occur at any time in the interval between consecutive 
tests. The failure is, however, not manifested and discovered until a test is carried out or 
the valve is to be closed because of some operational reasons. Tests of active WBEs are 
carried out at regular intervals. The length of the test interval varies from installation to 
installation, but is usually one, three or six months. The test interval is partly decided by 
the authorities.  
For passive WBEs, the dangerous hardware failures may be detected by continuous 
monitoring (e.g., pressure and temperature) or by monitoring/readings at regular 
intervals.  
 
Restoration 
When a WBE failure is detected the critical time with respect to safety is the time from 
the failure is detected until the well is brought to a safe state. For some of the restoration 
time it is known that the failure is present but the state is still dangerous, while after 
some time the WBE is still not repaired but the well is brought to an equally safe or 
safer state than before the WBE failed. Hence, the dangerous repair time is usually 
much lower than the actual time used to restore the well barrier.  
If assuming that once the well is brought to a safe state, the remaining repair time is 
equally safe or safer than before the WBE failure was detected, this means that the 
critical time to include in the availability calculations is the time from a failure is 
detected until the well is brought to a safe state. The mean value of this time is called 
the Mean Dangerous Waiting Time (MDWT) in this thesis 
Well barriers can be repaired by various means and operations (see section 2.1.2, 
page 24). For a failed WBE the most common repair action is to perform a workover 
and replace the failed component. This type of repair is both costly and time consuming. 
Sometimes a through-tubing workover may be sufficient to restore the well barrier. If 
the failure is caused by, e.g., scale build-up it is often possible to inject fresh water, acid 
or chemicals or alternatively perform milling to clean the well. Wireline tools utilizing 
ultrasound are also available to remove scale. 
The MDWT may vary considerably depending on the type of well and installation. 
On surface wells repair of the x-mas three may be performed on the same shift. Repair 
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of a well completion on a surface well takes longer time but the well may be brought to 
a safe state by setting, e.g., a wireline plug. If a workover rig is installed on the 
installation, a surface well wireline operation may be performed within days. On subsea 
wells the repair involves contracting of a vessel. The repair of subsea wells will 
therefore take significantly longer time (from weeks to months). However, a subsea well 
may also be brought to a safe(r) state when a failure is detected. It may, e.g., be possible 
to close the well on the x-mas tree. Whether this state is safe or not depends on the 
distance to the neighboring platform, the additional valves available on the subsea 
template, etc. The risk of external damage of the x-mas tree must also be conidered. A 
compensating measure may be to reduce the vessel activity above the wellhead. 
 
Failure causes 
The classification into hardware and systematic failures, dependent and independent, 
and restoration types are used to discuss different hardware failure causes and failure 
mechanisms. The failure classification is discussed in more detail in Paper 5. The paper 
also describes a method that uses the failure classification to calculate the availability of 
SCSSVs. The following broad failure cause categories are suggested: 
• Hardware failures dependent on standby period. Moving parts relative to each other 
may reduce the effect of some failure mechanisms48, and therefore increased testing 
may improve the reliability of the component.  
• Hardware failures dependent on demands/tests. The effect of some failure 
mechanisms may be increased by testing (e.g., wear-out and hydrate formation). 
• Hardware failures independent of WBE operation. The failure mechanisms acting 
on the WBE are unaffected by the operation of the valve. 
• Stress failures (outside design limit) induced on the valve. Stress outside the design 
envelope of the valve result in an immediate failure (shock failure). 
 
                                                 
48 Failure mechanism - The physical, chemical or other process, which has led to a failure (IEC 
50(191)). 
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All four categories apply to active WBEs, while only stress and hardware failures 
independent of WBE operation applies to passive WBEs, which not is function tested at 
regular intervals (passive WBEs do not change state).  
Hardware failures that can be prevented by exercising the WBE are typically 
mechanisms influenced by loads like scale, debris, sand build up or sticking seals. 
Hardware failures dependent on testing or actual demands are typically wear out effects 
on the dynamic surfaces (e.g. because of “slamming” of the valve or friction between 
moving parts). Failure mechanisms not influenced by testing are ageing mechanisms 
(propagation of scratches, corrosion, etc). Stress failures typically occur because of a 
wireline operation where the wireline tool damages the WBE or a well pressure 
exceeding the WBE design limit. The total failure rate of a WBE will be a function of 
all these mechanisms. 
Figure 16 summarizes the discussion above and illustrates that different strategies 
must be used to address different types of failure causes. The figure also includes a 
division into systematic failures that occur in the design or operational phase. Even if 
systematic failures are not quantified they may be equally important, in particular for 
redundant systems. Hence, both hardware and systematic failures must be focused on 
when designing and operating the well.  
Within the industry the effect of testing is discussed. Some operators argue not to 
test the active WBEs (in particular the SCSSV). The argument is that testing has a wear 
out effect or may lead to hydrate formation during testing. However, the most operators 
have the opinion that the valve should be actuated in order for the valve to function 
appropriately and to reveal dangerous undetected failures. Even if the hardware failures 
for active WBEs may be dependent on the operation (length of test interval/number or 
tests) all dangerous hardware failures will be detected during test. Hence, the 
assumption that no testing will increase the overall availability requires a large 
proportion of the failures to be caused by the testing itself. For most active WBEs 
increased testing will result in increased availability. 
In relation to the suggested failure classification it is assumed that the hardware 
failures influenced by demands/tests or standby period and stress failures are more 
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prone to dependent failures than the hardware failures not influenced by the functional 
tests and demands, or stress outside the design envelope. 
The findings reported in Molnes and Strand (1999) underline the importance of 
controlling different types of failures. In this report a failure is categorized as an “item 
failure” when it has been confirmed that the cause of the failure lies within the item 
itself. If the failure is confirmed as being caused by another item, the failure is classified 
as “non-item failure.” For example, the observed TR-SCSSV49 distribution between 
“item failures” and “non-item failures” found in Molnes and Strand (1999) is 23% and 
47%, respectively (remaining failures categorized as “unknown”). This distribution 
shows that many failures are reported as failures not directly caused by the valve itself. 
Non-item failure causes are therefore important to consider when designing and 
operating a well. The data shows that hydrates, asphaltenes, erosion and scale in 
addition to through-tubing well operations are contributors to the non-item failures. 
Such non-item failures also contribute to dependent failures. 
In the design phase possible failure causes and loads that may lead to dependent or 
independent failures should be thoroughly assessed with the objective to: 
1. Reduce the overall number of hardware and systematic failures. 
2. Maximize the independence of the components to avoid dependent failures (CCF).  
3. Minimize the likelihood of cascading failures. 
 
The design phase should result in an understanding of the optimal design and 
operation of the well to avoid failures. In the design phase it is also important to study 
foreseen changes in well conditions in the entire well life cycle. Molnes and Strand 
(1999) describe the experience from Statoil’s Gullfaks field, and states; “This field is 
experiencing an increasing number of failures, primarily caused by scale build-up with 
frequent remedial action taken in terms of chemical (acid washing) and mechanical 
(brushing) scale removal.” 
In the operational phase, it should be controlled that the assumptions made in the 
design phase still are valid, that unforeseen failure causes do not occur, and that risk 
                                                 
49 TR-SCSSV - Tubing Retrievable Surface controlled subsurface safety valve 
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related to cascading failures is controlled (e.g., caused by changes in pressure regimes 
or degradation of components). 
 
 
Figure 16 Failure classification scheme 
 
Well Safety 
-67- 
4.3 Well barrier element reliability data 
Well component reliability data are used as input to the quantitative risk analysis 
performed on well system level. The importance of well component reliability data has 
been recognized in the oil industry. Extensive data collection projects are therefore 
established and have been running for many years.  
The well barrier system availability is a function of the configuration of the well 
barriers, and the reliability and restoration of the WBEs that constitute the well barriers. 
It is therefore necessary to use reliability data on WBE level as input to the reliability 
analyses.  
Input reliability data50 of high quality is essential to any reliability analysis. For 
example, Holand (1997) describes a case with two tension leg platforms (TLPs) in the 
Norwegian sector. The installations are in principle similar. Risk assessments were 
carried out for both installations to decide whether or not fire insulation of the risers was 
required to keep the risk within the acceptable levels. The objective in both analyses 
was to assess the blowout risk. Two different consultants performed the analyses. For 
one of the TLPs it was selected to include fire insulation and for the other not. The total 
investment cost was reduced with at least 120 million US dollars for the TLP without 
fire insulation (Molnes, 1995). This TLP was installed two years later than the first one. 
The availability of updated SCSSV reliability data was the main reason for arriving at 
the different conclusions, i.e., the updated reliability data showed that the SCSSV 
reliability had improved compared with previous experience. 
The basis for the discussion of input reliability data is illustrated in Figure 17. The 
figure illustrates the interfaces to be considered when establishing input reliability data 
for a specific well barrier system analysis. This section includes a discussion of generic 
failure rate estimates provided from publicly available databases or handbooks (i.e., 
support). Such reliability data must always be assessed related to the interfaces 
indicated in Figure 17 before use in specific application. The assessment should include 
aspects like well fluids, pressure limits, acceptable leak rates, common cause failures, 
and cascading failures (see section 4.2, page 56).  
                                                 
50 Reliability data - Reliability data is meant to include data for reliability, maintainability and 
maintenance supportability (NORSOK O-CR-001). 
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Figure 17 WBE failure data framework 
 
For well systems there are three main databases available: 
• The WellMaster (2006) project has run a more or less continuous data collection 
since the Bravo blowout on the Ekofisk field in the North Sea in 1977. The database 
is accessible only for the oil companies sponsoring the project, but some reports 
with aggregated data have been published. The most recent publicly available data 
are Molnes and Strand (1999). The database covers the well completion and the 
casing program.  
• The SubseaMaster (2006) project collects failure data on subsea production systems, 
including the subsea x-mas tree. The project was started in 1999. The database is 
accessible only for the oil companies sponsoring the project No publicly available 
data yet. 
• The OREDA (2002) project collects failure data on offshore subsea and topside 
equipment. The project is sponsored by several oil companies. Publicly available 
information is presented in the OREDA handbook (OREDA, 2002).  
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In addition to well system components, the well shut-in function consists of the 
process control system (control logic and solenoids), which actuate the safety valves in 
the well (see section 2.3, page 32). The following reliability data collection projects are 
identified that may contribute with input data: 
• Reliability Data for Control and Safety Systems (Albrechtsen and Hokstad, 2002). The 
report presents reliability data/for computer-based process safety systems (i.e, SIS). 
The report includes both random hardware and systematic failure data. The report is 
based on review of oil company data files, workshops with technical experts, and 
questionnaires.  
• OLF (2004). The guideline presents recommended reliability data for SIS on 
offshore installations. Values for well system components are also presented.  
 
The reliability data collection projects above present reliability data for random 
hardware as a failure rate, where the failure rate is presented as an average frequency of 
failure (i.e., the number of failures per unit of time). The data are assumed to represent 
independent random hardware failures. In addition, Albrechtsen and Hokstad (2002) and 
OLF (2004) present values for systematic failures, and for dependent failures (the 
common cause contribution). The dependent and systematic failures values are based on 
expert judgment and not on reported failures in databases. The difficulty with 
establishing dependent and systematic failure values are discussed in more detail in 
paper 3. 
Table 6 presents a comparison of components covered in the databases. The 
components are divided into input devices (senors, transmitters), control logic units and 
output devices/WBEs (valves and passive WBEs). As seen only WellMaster (2006) 
includes the well completion and casing program. 
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Table 6 Well integrity and well shut-in function components covered in 
different reliability databases 
Components Project and industry 
sector Input devices Control logic 
Units 
WBEs (Output 
devices) 
OREDA (2002) Fire/gas detectors, 
pressure senors 
Control logic units 
(subsea and 
topside) and pilot 
valves 
x-mas tree valves and 
passive x-mas tree 
components 
Reliability Data for 
Control and Safety 
Systems (Albrechtsen 
and Hokstad, 2002) 
and OLF (2004) 
Same as above Same as above PMV, and PWV and 
SCSSV 
WellMaster (2006) Downhole cauges 
(pressure and/or 
temperature) 
Not included Well completion 
components (including 
SCSSV and SCASSV 
and casing program 
SubseaMaster (2006)  Pressure and 
temperature 
sensors 
Subsea control 
logic 
x-mas tree valves and 
passive x-mas tree 
components 
 
Table 7 presents data for important WBEs in a well. The table includes the 
recommended reliability data in OLF (2004) and in Molnes and Strand (1999). The 
reliability data is only included for illustrative purposes and should not be regarded as 
recommended values. To perform a quantitative analysis a more detailed assessment of 
well component reliability data must be performed (see discussion in section 5.2, page 
77). Table 7 includes components from the reservoir through the tubing string and the x-
mas tree production bore. In blowout risk assessments the leak paths via the annuli must 
be included also (e.g., casing and annuli access valve failures).  
Functional tests of active WBEs reveal random hardware failures but will not 
differentiate between independent and common cause failures. Consequently, the 
reliability databases will not make this distinction. There are several methods available 
for modeling CCF failures. The most common in use is the β-factor method. The β-
factor is a measure of the fraction of common cause failures. For analysis purposes this 
fraction must be analyzed through use of, e.g., expert judgment. Many sources suggest 
ranges for the value of β. IEC 61508-6 describes a separate methodology to arrive at a 
specific β, where the β range from 1 to 10% for final elements (valves). Table 7 also 
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includes values for the common cause factor, β. The β−factor model is discussed in 
section 5.3. 
 
Table 7 Typical input data for WBE and well shut-in function components 
Components and dangerous 
hardware failure modes1 
Well safety 
function4 
Generic failure rate 
(failures per 106 hours) 
5 
Common 
cause, β6 
Topside PMV/PWV – FTC1 or 
LCP2 
WI/WS 0.8 2% 
Subsea PMV/PWV - FTC or LCP1 WI/WS 0.1 2% 
SCSSV – FTC or LCP WI/WS 2.5 (2.2 -2.5) - 
Production packer – LTA1 WI 0.2 - 
Seal Assembly (conventional) – 
LTA 
WI 0.5 - 
Tubing – LTA WI 0.4 (per km)3 - 
Programmable safety system/logic 
(ESD) – FTO1 
WS 1 1% 
Solenoid/pilot valve – FTO WS 0.9 2% - 10%2 
1)  FTC – Fail to close, LCP – Leakage in closed position, FTO- Fail to operate, LTA – 
Leak to annulus 
2)  10% for pilot valves on same valve. 2% otherwise 
3)  The failure rate must be multiplied with length of tubing 
4) WI – Well integrity, WS – well shut-in function 
5)  Numbers in italic from Molnes and Strand (1999). Numbers not in italic from OLF (2004) 
6)  β-factor model used to model common cause failures 
 
Table 7 illustrates that the difference between passive and active WBEs quite 
commonly is two to three orders of magnitude. This difference is natural because active 
WBEs involve many parts, where different failure mechanisms (erosion, chemical and 
temperature effects, etc.) act on each part.  
The failure rate may even for “simple” components be sensitive to the well 
conditions. Molnes and Strand (1999) report a failure rate ranging from 0.1 to 0.7 
failures per 106 hours per km for water injectors and gas/condensate tubing, 
respectively. 
There are several challenges and general concerns regarding reliability databases. 
Such limitations are thoroughly discussed by Rausand and Høyland (2004), by Cooke 
(1996), and by Cooke and Bedford(2002). A main concern is that to apply the data in 
the databases subjective judgments have to be made. In most cases acceptable 
limits/deviations (see section 4.2.1, page 56) are not defined and/or it is not possible to 
measure the degree of failure. Normally, the databases include reliability data from 
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different sources (operators and installations) and the criteria for failure reporting may 
vary significantly. This is a problem difficult to overcome since the databases covers 
equipment used in different applications (safety, control, auxiliary) or operators with 
different acceptable limits for the same application. Therefore, the databases should 
include a description of the boundary conditions and a definition of the acceptable limits 
to the greatest possible extent.  
The variation in acceptable limits may be less for some types of equipment. The 
acceptable leak rate for SCSSVs stated in API RP 14B is widely accepted as an 
acceptable limit in the industry, and this is also a benefit to the uniformity of the SCSSV 
reliability data found in the WellMaster database (WellMaster,2006).  
The reliability databases provide estimates of a failure rate51 or a mean time to 
failure (MTTF52) for specific component types. For analysis purposes it is assumed that 
the reliability data fit the exponential distribution53, i.e., a constant failure rate. 
However, it is possible to perform life data analysis to obtain information about the life 
distribution for a component. Life data analysis is, e.g., used to determine if a Weibull 
distribution fit to the failure data, i.e., an increasing failure rate with time. Life data 
testing is described in Rausand and Høyland (2004).  
For new components (or an existing component in a new application or 
environment), where the existing failure data are inadequate it is possible to perform life 
testing to determine the life distribution. Life testing is expensive and normally 
performed for products produced in large quantities, like consumer electronics. Life 
testing is therefore seldom performed on well equipment. Life testing is discussed in 
Rausand and Høyland (2004).  
In lack of reliability data or as a supplement it is also possible to perform expert 
judgment to arrive at a recommended failure rate. Expert judgment methods are 
presented in Øien (1998). 
                                                 
51 Failure rate - The rate at which failures occur as a function of time. 
52 MTTF - Let T denote the time to failure of an item. The mean time to failure is the mean 
(expected) value of T  
53 Consider a random variable X. the distribution function of X is  
)()( xXPxF rX ≤=  (Rausand and Høyland 2004) 
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4.4 Barrier diagrams 
Barrier diagrams are used in static barrier situations to illustrate well barrier systems. 
Barrier diagrams have been used in various forms for some 10-15 years to assist in well 
risk analysis.  
Barrier diagrams have been constructed in a variety of forms but no formal 
construction rules have been presented. Therefore, a method for constructing barrier 
diagrams is established. The method is described in Paper 4. The construction rules 
facilitate the possibility to make simple quantitative calculations directly from the 
barrier diagram. Alternatively, the barrier diagram construction rules assist in 
“automatic” transition to a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) structure.  
An example barrier diagram is shown in Figure 18. The basis for the barrier 
diagram is the well illustrated in Figure 3, on page 22. The construction of the barrier 
diagram and further transfer of the diagram into quantitative models or construction of 
fault trees are described in Paper 4, and only a brief description of the barrier diagram 
symbols are given here: 
• A rounded rectangle illustrates a cavity (or the reservoir) enveloped by well 
components. Top and bottom rounded rectangle illustrate the reservoir and 
surroundings, respectively. The lines between the cavities illustrate possible flow 
paths from one cavity to another. The arrows describe the flow direction. 
• In each line a rectangle is included. The rectangle includes the well component 
failures (components not qualified as a WBE may also be included) that can result in 
flow from one cavity to another. 
o The text part describes the well components failure modes. 
o The upper number describes the number of well components in each flow 
path. For example, the SCSSV, the seal assembly, the production packer, 
and the tubing string below the SCSSV are the well components closest to 
the reservoir (indicated with 1 in the rectangle). 
o The lower number describes the start and en point “cavity” if the well 
component (s) fails. 
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Benefits of the established barrier diagram construction rules are: 
• Possible flow paths from the reservoir to the surroundings are easily identified. 
• Number of well components in each flow path is easily identified. 
• The well barrier system is easily communicated to both well design and reliability 
personnel. 
• Easy to perform “what-if” analysis, e.g., what is the consequence if the tubing below 
the SCSSV fails. 
• The cavities can be used to identify the boundary conditions on both sides of the 
well components (pressure, fluids, temperature, etc.). 
• Simple quantitative reliability analysis may be performed directly from the barrier 
diagram. 
• Easy and consistent transfer of the barrier diagram to a FTA. Rules for transfer to 
FTA are presented in paper 4. 
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Figure 18 Example barrier diagram 

 5. Well system reliability analysis 
Earlier in the thesis it is concluded that the engineers on the well system level primarily 
can influence 1) the blowout and/or well release frequency and 2) the probability of 
failure on demand (PFD) for the well shut-in function. In this chapter the two reliability 
measures are presented in more detail, together with suitable analytic method. 
5.1 Reliability analysis and risk analysis 
A quantitative risk analysis is based on various models and risk input data. Both the 
models and the data may be incomplete. It is essential that the analysis reflects the real 
risk picture, and that it is possible to identify and rank major risk contributors.  
In chapter 2 it was concluded that in the design phase, the risk analyses on the well 
system level primarily are used to: 
1. Demonstrate that the blowout frequency from a specific well is acceptable. 
2. Verify through quantitative analysis that the required probability of failure on 
demand (PFD), stated through the SIL requirement, can be achieved for the well 
shut-in function. 
 
The analytical methods discussed in this chapter are methods used to provide 
quantitative measures for frequency or probability, and the common term used is 
reliability analysis.  
5.2 Basic component types used in reliability analysis 
As discussed in section 4.2.2, only dangerous hardware failures are included in the 
thesis. Four basic well component types are discussed: 
• Test interval components 
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• Repairable components 
• Non-repairable components 
• On demand components 
 
Test interval 
Test interval components are tested periodically with test interval τ. A failure may occur 
anywhere in the test interval. For such components dangerous hardware failures may be 
further split into (Hokstad and Corneliussen, 2003): 
• Dangerous Undetected (DU). Dangerous hardware failures not detected by 
automatic self-tests (i.e. revealed by a functional test or by demands). The reliability 
parameter is the dangerous undetected failure rate λDU (expected number of 
dangerous undetected hardware failures per hour). 
• Dangerous Detected (DD). Dangerous hardware failures detected by automatic self-
test. The reliability parameter used is the failure rate λDD (expected number of 
dangerous detected failures per hour). 
 
The dangerous hardware failure rate, λD (expected number of dangerous hardware 
failures per hour) will then be λD = λDU + λDD. This situation is typical for many types 
of detectors, process sensors, and safety valves. The active WBE’s (i.e., the SCSSV, the 
PMV and the PWV) in a well barrier system are such test interval components. The 
active WBEs do not have any automatic self-test functionality. Some sensors and the 
logic that actuate the valve have this functionality. Typically, it is assumed that the ESD 
logic self-test functionality will reveal more than 90% of the dangerous failures. The 
remaining 10% will be dangerous undetected failures. The ability to detect dangerous 
hardware failures is called diagnostic coverage.  
For active WBEs, a dangerous hardware failure will not be detected until a 
functional test is carried out or the component is needed. All dangerous hardware WBE 
failures are therefore undetected, and resulting in λD = λDU.  
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Following the PDS definition (Hokstad and Corneliussen, 2003), the safety 
unavailability measure for random hardware failures are PFD. The PFD measure is 
split in two parts: 
• PFDUK is the "unknown unavailability" and includes the unavailability due to 
dangerous undetected failures during the period when it is not known that the 
function is unavailable.  
• PFDK is the “known unavailability”. This includes the unavailability due to 
dangerous hardware failures during the period when it is known that the function is 
unavailable. 
 
Assuming an exponential failure distribution (i.e., constant failure rate), the 
reliability parameters entered are the failure rate λDU (expected number of dangerous 
undetected failures per hour), λD (expected number of dangerous hardware failures per 
hour), the test interval τ (in hours) and the mean dangerous waiting time MDWT (in 
hours). The (average) probability of a test interval component not functioning may then 
be calculated by54: 
MDWT
2
 PFDPFD PFD DDUKUK λτλ +≈+=  
 
Assuming no automatic self-test λD=λDU, the PFD is then calculated by: 
MDWT
2
  PFD DD λτλ +≈  
 
Repairable components 
Repairable components are repaired when a failure occurs. If the dangerous hardware 
failure rate is denoted λD and the mean time to repair MDWT, the probability of the 
component not functioning at time t, p(t), may be approximated by the formula: 
MTTF+MDWT
MDWT = p(t)   
                                                 
54 This is a simplified formula and main limitation is that the term λDU ⋅ τ should be small 
enough to allow exp(-λDU ⋅ τ)  ≈ 1 -λDU ⋅ τ.  
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where  
D
1 = MTTF λ  
 
Non-repairable 
Non-repairable component failures are not detected. If the dangerous hardware failure 
rate of the component is denoted by λD, then the probability that the component is not 
functioning at time t, p(t), may be calculated by (exponential distribution): 
e-1 = p(t) t- Dλ  
 
Note that non-repairable components cannot be defined as part of a well barrier, 
since the failure of the component cannot be detected. According to NORSOK D-010 
“A well barrier shall be leak tested, function tested or verified by other methods”. 
  
On demand 
On demand is used for components that have a certain probability to fail when they are 
required and are represented by:  
p = Constant, where the constant is a value between 0 and 1. 
 
Summary of basic component types and input parameters 
To summarize, the necessary input parameters for the basic component types included 
in quantitative reliability analyses are: 
• Failure rate (λ) presented as an average frequency of failure (i.e., number of failures 
per unit of time). In the thesis λ presents the dangerous random hardware failure 
rate.  
• Detection is the way the failure is detected (undetected (until test), detected, or not 
detected).  
• Repair time is the time used to restore/repair a failed component. The safety critical 
time is the time until the well is brought to a safe state. The term used in the thesis is 
the MDWT. 
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Table 8 shows a summary of the component types, the necessary input parameters 
and corresponding reliability measure used in quantitative reliability analyses. 
 
Table 8 Component types, necessary input parameters and reliability 
measures 
Input parameter Component types 
Dangerous 
hardware failure 
rate 
Detection 
time 
Repair time 
Reliability 
measure 
Test interval 
components 
λ τ/2 MDWT PFD 
Repairable 
components 
λ Immediate MDWT p(t) 
Non-repairable 
components 
λ Not 
detected 
- p(t) 
On demand 
components 
- - - p 
 
The repair time and detection (e.g., the test interval) are determined by the specific 
well subject to analysis. The generic failure rate may be extracted from failure 
databases. For a specific well, field a recommended failure rate must be determined by 
well specific conditions. The classification in section 4.2.2 is useful in this process. 
5.3 The β-factor model 
As discussed in section 4.2.2, the most commonly used model for common cause 
failures is the β-factor model. To illustrate the general model, consider a system with 
N=2 components with the same constant failure rate, see Figure 19. Letting λDU be the 
relevant failure rate for each component, we have 
 
λ1⋅2 = 2 ⋅ (1- β) ⋅ λDU = rate of single (independent) failures for duplex system 
λ2⋅2 = β ⋅ λDU = rate of double failures (CCFs) for duplex system 
 
β can therefore be given the following interpretation; given A has just failed, β is 
the conditional probability that B fails at the same time.  
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1- ββ1- β
 
Figure 19  Beta factor model for a duplicated system (N=2) 
 
The limitation of the β-factor is that the method does not distinguish between 
different parallel structures (see section 4.1.1, page 48), and the same result is obtained 
e.g. for a parallel structure with 2 and 3 components. So, e.g., the contribution to PFDUK 
from CCFs simply equals PFDUK  = β⋅λDU⋅τ /2 for parallel structures. The reason why it 
still can make sense to apply this model is that the reliability engineer can come around 
(or at least reduce) this problem by using different βs, e.g., with β=1% for a parallel 
structure with 3 components, and β=5% for a parallel structure with 2 components.  
IEC 61508-6 introduces an "application specific" β, which to some extent depends 
on the redundancy. However, the rate of system CCFs does only to a very slight degree 
depend on the system configuration. In Paper 2 a more general CCF model is suggested. 
The model is a simple, direct generalisation of the β-factor model that distinguishes 
between the performance of different parallel structures. 
5.4 Well integrity and well shut-in function reliability measures  
In this section well integrity and well shut-in function reliability measures are presented. 
 
Well integrity reliability measures 
The well integrity reliability analysis on well system focuses on the blowout frequency 
The reliability measure typically comprises the estimated average number of well 
blowouts per time unit (normal operation blowout frequency) and may be described as: 
 
Blowout frequency caused by inherent failure cause (per time unit) =FAll well 
barriers 
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Other useful reliability measures for blowout analysis are: 
• R(t)55 = P("Blowout will not occur in the time interval [0,t]"). R(t) is the survival 
function of the system with respect to the non-occurrence of blowout. 
• MTTF56 = mean time to first occurrence of blowout 
 
Well shut-in function reliability measure 
The required level of protection from the well shut-in function is given as a SIL 
requirement (see section 3.3, page 42), and an associated PFD requirement. The 
reliability measure for the well shut-in function is therefore: 
PFDWell shut-in = Average proportion of time the well is unable to shut-in  
 
If the hazardous event affects the integrity of the well itself, e.g., caused by fire in 
the wellhead area, the well must be shut-in by closing the SCSSV (the function is 
illustrated in Figure 7, on page 35). The reliability measure for this function is: 
 
Blowout frequency caused by external event(s) (per time unit) = Frequency of 
external event(s) damaging x-mas tree * Average proportion of time the SCSSV 
is unable to shut-in = FExternal event * PFDSCSSV 
 
For this well shut-in function, the personnel responsible for the wellhead area layout 
should focus on measures to avoid dropped objects and to protect the wellhead area 
against fire explosion loads. The personnel responsible for the well system should focus 
on selecting the best available SCSSV, where to place the SCSSV in the tubing string 
(e.g., to avoid scale), and recommend SCSSV operational procedures (testing, repair).  
                                                 
55 Survivor function - Let T denote the time to failure of an item. The survivor function R(t) of 
the item is 0)Pr()( ≥>= tfortTtR . R(t) is sometimes called the reliability function or the 
survival probability at time t of the item (Rausand and Høyland 2004). 
56 MTTF - Let T denote the time to failure of an item, with probability density f(t) and survivor 
function R(t). the mean time to failure is the mean (expected) value of T which is given by  
∫∫ ∞∞ =⋅= 00 )()( dttRdttftMTTF  (Rausand and Høyland 2004). 
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5.5 Reliability analysis procedure 
In this section a procedure for performing reliability analysis is presented.  The 
procedure is generic, but the reliability analysis techniques used are different. Therefore 
the procedure for well integrity is presented first, then specific well shut-in function 
conditions that differ from the well integrity procedure is presented in section 0.  
5.5.1 Well integrity reliability analysis 
The procedure includes the use of barrier diagrams and FTA. Barrier diagrams were 
presented in section 4.3. FTA is a well-known analysis technique and several software 
versions are available, like CARA Fault tree (2004). See, e.g., Rausand and Høyland 
(2004) for a more detailed description of FTA. The FTA technique is well suited for 
quantitative analysis and for assessing alternative well designs. The suggested 
procedure include the following activities: 
1. System understanding/design basis. To perform quantitative analysis recommended 
reliability data must be established for each of the WBE failure modes. For each 
component it should be identified if the component is of the test interval, repairable, 
non-repairable or on demand type (see section 5.2, page 77). The activity should 
also include an assessment of potential failure causes, the possibility of cascading 
failures, and common cause failures. Systematic failures should also be discussed. 
2. Barrier diagrams. The relationship between the well barriers is visualised in a 
barrier diagram. The barrier diagram for the example well (Figure 3, on page 22) 
was illustrated in Figure 18, on page 75.  The barrier diagram is used to discuss the 
well barrier system between well design and reliability personnel. 
3. Quantitative analysis. Based on the barrier diagram and input reliability data a fault 
tree can be constructed, and the blowout frequency calculations can be carried out. 
The first page of the fault tree for the example well is shown in Figure 20. The 
figure illustrates the leak paths from the reservoir via the tubing side to the 
surroundings. The leak paths from the reservoir via the annulus side are modelled in 
the same way.  
4. Present and evaluate results. Results from the analysis must be presented. The 
alternative reliability measures was presented in section 5.4. In addition, the effects 
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of various risk reduction measures and the sensitivity of various input data must be 
evaluated. Such an evaluation typically includes: 
a. Improved ability to detect dangerous WBE failures. E.g., through more 
frequent testing, condition monitoring, remotely operated vessel (ROV) 
surveys / other type inspections.  
b. Reduced WBE downtimes57, e.g., shorten repair times or time to kill the 
well. 
c. Sensitivity analysis by, e.g., altering input failure data for critical 
components and components with high uncertainty. 
5. Conclusions/present results. The analysis ends up with a conclusion, and typically 
includes recommended well design (e.g., casing program), and operation (e.g., 
monitoring, test interval, etc.). The conclusion should include the uncertainties in 
the calculations to allow for peer review. Recommendations for further work may be 
included. 
 
There should be a strategy for how to present the analysis results. Two possible 
presentation strategies are: 
• Present the blowout frequency as a relative difference between well alternatives, 
where one alternative may be a standard accepted solution. 
• Present the blowout frequency for one alternative and evaluate the result against a 
fixed frequency requirement, e.g. not more then 10-4 blowouts per well year 
 
The first option is the preferred because this allows for relative comparison between 
alternatives rather than a quantitative reliability result measured against an absolute 
requirement. Relative comparison between alternatives gives more robust results than 
giving “absolute” frequency numbers. 
As an illustrative example, it may, e.g., be an alternative to design the surface well 
presented in Figure 3, on page 22 either 1) as a well with the intermediate casing not 
qualified as a well barrier or 2) as a well with the intermediate casing qualified as a well 
                                                 
57 The period of time during which an item is not in a condition to perform its required function 
(BS 4778). 
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barrier. The results will show that the blowout frequency will be higher for the 
alternative with intermediate casing not qualified as a well barrier. The result can be 
further evaluated and include sensitivity analysis with respect to repair time, detection 
and altering of input failure data for safety critical components and components with 
high uncertainty.  
 
CARA Fault Tree version 4.1 (c) Sydvest Sotfware 1999
Licensee: ExproSoft AS, Norway
Supplied by Sydvest, Norway
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Figure 20 Example well - Fault tree layout  
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5.5.2 Well shut-in function reliability analysis 
As described in section 2.3, the well shut-in function is comprised of the SCSSV, the 
PMV, and the PWV. In addition the control system that actuates the valves must be 
included. This function only includes active WBEs, i.e., test interval components.  
Several reliability quantification methods are suited for modeling of active 
components. Rouvroye and Brombacher (1999) present a comparison of quantitative 
analysis techniques, and in Rouvroye and Bliek (2002) the discussion is further 
extended to a comparison of quantitative and qualitative safety analysis techniques. 
Both papers conclude that one of the methods best suited for the purpose is the PDS58-
method (Hokstad and Corneliussen, 2003). In this thesis the PDS-method is used as a 
basis. 
The procedure for quantification and evaluation of the well shut-in function follows 
the same steps as described for the well integrity function in the previous section. The 
main exception is that only active WBEs are included in the model, and that the PDS-
method is used to quantify the reliability. Hence, barrier diagrams and FTA are not 
used. Additional differences are: 
• In addition to active WBEs, the ESD logic and solenoid valves are included in the 
safety function.  
• The common cause contribution is an essential contributor to the ability to shut-in 
on demand. Common cause failures should therefore be paid particular attention.  
 
The PDS-method use reliability block diagrams (RBD) to illustrate the safety 
function (RBD was described in section 4.1, page 47). Figure 21 illustrates a typical 
well shut-in function, while the RBD for the function is shown in Figure 22. The 
function has a high degree of redundancy. However, if including common cause failures 
between the solenoid valves and the PMV and the PWV, the PFD contribution from the 
solenoids and the x-mas tree valves will be dominated by the common cause 
                                                 
58 PDS - Reliability of computer-based safety systems (Norwegian) 
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contribution, and the RBD will change into the RBD shown in Figure 23. The total PFD 
for the function then becomes: 
PFDTotal = PFDESDlogic + PFDβ Solenoid + PFDβPMV/PWV AND SCSSV 
 
With the same data as presented in Table 7, and a 6 months test interval for all 
components, the PFDTotal will be dominated by the ESD logic contribution and result in 
a total PFD = 4.4 * 10-3. Note that this result is above the SIL 3 requirement stated in 
OLF (2004), and OLF therefore recommend a redundant ESD logic to comply with the 
SIL 3 requirement. 
For a detailed description of the PDS-method and calculation formulas it is referred 
to Hokstad and Corneliussen (2003) and Paper 2. In addition, Paper 5 presents a model 
for SCSSV PFD calculations.  
 
 
Figure 21 Illustration of typical well shut-in function for a surface well 
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Figure 22 RBD for the example well shut-in function 
 
 
Figure 23 RBD including common cause failures for well shut-in function  
 
5.6 Reliability analysis discussion 
A model tries to represent the real world. However, any model has its limitations. This 
section discusses main limitations of the methods presented above. General to both the 
well shut-in function PFD calculations and the blowout frequency calculations are that:  
• Many systems are highly inter-linked, and a deviation at one of them may have a 
cause elsewhere. Many accidents have occurred because small local modifications 
had unforeseen knock-on effects elsewhere.  
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• The success of the analysis depends on the experience and interaction among team 
members. 
• The risk analysis only considers parts that appear on the design representation. 
5.6.1 WBE input parameters 
The reliability input data will highly influence the result. The uncertainty in failure rates 
is an important contributor to the results. However, relevant date may not always be 
available, e.g., because of new components, little operational experience or application 
of existing components in new well conditions. In this case sensitivity analysis is 
important.  
The awareness of different types of failure causes and mechanisms is important 
when establishing the field specific reliability data. Different failure causes require 
different strategies for detection and repair.  
Common cause failures may significantly reduce the reliability of a system, 
especially of systems with a high degree of redundancy.  
The models do not include cascading effects. It is assumed that the probability of 
such failures is negligible. However, such failures may have severe consequences. The 
likelihood of such failures must therefore be emphasized in the design process. The risk 
analysis should include a discussion of the likelihood of cascading failures. 
Most quantitative reliability methods only include random hardware failures. 
Actually IEC 61508 argues not to include systematic failures because it is not possible 
to collect data on systematic failures. However, the PDS-method (Hokstad and 
Corneliussen, 2003) does attempt to quantify systematic failures. The values for 
systematic failures in the PDS-method are based on, e.g., expert judgment. 
5.6.2 SIL budget 
The SIL requirements apply to entire safety functions, and the role of the reliability 
analysis is to validate that the SIL for the function can be achieved. Alternatively a “SIL 
budget” for the input, logic and output of the safety function may be established. For 
example, the PFD requirement to a SCSSV may be set to 5.5 10-3 (PFD = λDU*τ/2 = 2.5 
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10-6 failures/hours* 4380 hours/2 = 5.5 10-3)59. This result implies that the SCSSV 
should not fail more than once every 181 demands/tests. A similar approach may be 
used for the PMV and PWV. With the OLF assumptions, the PFD for a single 
PMV/PWV60 is 3.5 10-3, and this gives a “success criterion” of 285 demands/tests. This 
“SIL budget” approach is based on the historic occurrence of failures. Follow-up of 
such a “SIL budget” in the operational phase requires a large number of similar valves 
operated under comparable conditions. In the design of a new well this type of SIL 
budget may be used as a target value. The role of the engineers will then be to validate 
that the PFD for the valves can be fulfilled.  
5.6.3 Blowout versus leakage 
In the blowout frequency calculations it is assumed that all dangerous hardware failures 
may lead to a blowout. However, most WBE failure combinations may be controlled 
rather fast and will not be regarded a blowout. If, for instance, a leak to the annulus 
occurs and is followed by a leak in the flange of the annulus access valve, this will not 
be regarded a blowout as long as the annulus pressure can be bled down and the leak is 
stopped.  
For a leak to result in a blowout, a fairly rapid development of the failure has to 
occur, or the presence of a failure in the well barrier is undetected. A leak in a casing or 
tubing string caused by corrosion will likely develop more rapidly than a leak in a 
threaded connection. For a valve a fail to close failure is more serious than a failure 
where the valve leaks in closed position. 
In general, leaks to annulus below the SCSSV are important contributor to blowout 
risk because valves in the tubing cannot stop such leaks. If high pressure occurs in the 
annulus, a large leak may result if the casing or the formation behind the casing cannot 
withstand the pressure build up.  
Most leaks/blowouts will likely be leakages that can be controlled. This 
presupposes that when failures are detected proper steps need to be taken to bring the 
                                                 
59 Same assumptions as in OLF (2004) are used. The repair time is not included, 6 months test 
interval, and the SCSSV failure rate used in OLF (2004) 
60 OLF(2004) assumptions for PMV/PWV PFD calculations are λ=0.8*10-6 failures/hour and  
test interval = 12 months. 
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well to a safe state. However, for shorter periods (while preparing for an intervention) 
risk analyses often indicate that continued production can be accepted. This situation is 
further discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 6. Well risk assessment in the operational phase 
This chapter describes a method for risk assessment of a single well. The method is to 
be applied in the operational phase when a failure of a well component has occurred.  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes a method for risk assessment of wells in the operational phase. 
When a well is installed, the well risk is regarded to be acceptable. In the operational 
phase failures may occur, and these failures will usually result in an increased risk. The 
risk increase is influenced by which component has failed, the failure mode, and the 
extent of the failure (see the error versus failure discussion in section 4.2.1, page 56).  
The upstream industry tends to treat well integrity differently among countries, 
operators and even on fields/installations operated by the same company. This diversity 
in practice was, e.g., discussed at a SPE workshop held in Scheveningen, Netherlands in 
November 200561. To address this issue, Norsk Hydro wanted to develop a risk based 
procedure for handling of well leaks. The objective was to establish a uniform approach 
able to handle well annular leaks for different well types.  
The method described in this thesis is based on the procedure developed on behalf 
of Norsk Hydro. The primary user of the method is the operator. The method basis is the 
definition of a set of standard well types and possible well component failures for each 
well type. When a real failure occurs, Norsk Hydro operating personnel should then be 
able to perform an internal risk assessment. The benefit is that the defined failures for 
the standard well types are treated consistently and within a short time. After the risk 
assessment is performed, the operator may continue production given certain risk 
                                                 
61 No papers were released from the workshop 
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reducing measures that not involve repair of the failed well component, or decide to 
shut-in the well and perform more detailed risk assessment, or decide to shut-in and 
repair the well.  
The method described in this thesis covers the following well component failures: 
• Well component failures that influence the well shut-in function. In practice, this 
means that dangerous SCSSV and PMV hardware failures are included. Failures of 
x-mas tree components other than the PMV are not included. 
• Failure of passive well components in well completion and casing program. 
 
For other well component failures detailed and specific risk analyses must be 
performed. Also, the method only covers failures of one well barrier. Failure of more 
than one well barrier is an indication of a significant increase in risk, and should be 
treated accordingly.  
The Norsk Hydro procedure also includes guidelines for detection, diagnosis, and 
implementation of corrective measures. Only the risk assessment part is described in 
detail.  
6.2 Acceptance criteria 
Risk assessment is defined by IEC 60300-3-9 as an “Overall process of risk analysis and 
risk evaluation”, where NS 5814 defines risk evaluation as “A comparison of the results 
of a risk analysis with the acceptance criteria for risk and other decision criteria.”  NS 
5814 defines acceptance criteria as “Criteria based on regulations, standards, experience 
and/or theoretical knowledge used as a basis for decisions about acceptable risk. 
Acceptance criteria may be expressed verbally or numerically.” This definition of 
acceptance criteria is in line with The Royal Society (1992) that defines risk acceptance 
criteria as “A qualitative or quantitative statement of the acceptable standard of risk 
with which the assessed risk needs to be compared.” Hence, a risk assessment must 
include a risk analysis and acceptance criteria to compare the result from the risk 
analysis. A set of acceptance criteria must therefore be developed.  
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According to Hokstad et al (2003) the rationale behind the use of risk acceptance 
criteria could be: 
• To control the risk to a level that is accepted. 
• Improved efficiency of decision process. 
 
Further from Hokstad et al (2003), a successful implementation of such risk 
acceptance criteria requires that the criteria represent a direction for improvement and 
hence should be difficult to meet. However, setting ambitious risk acceptance criteria 
could also be difficult because this may substantially increase the ownership cost. The 
acceptance criteria must balance these considerations, and will be a trade-off between 
production and safety.  
 
Functional requirements versus rules 
Traditionally, well designs and well component failures have been treated by rules like 
the leak rate criterion for SCSSVs in API RP14B and the sustained casing pressure rule 
stated by the MMS (see section 3.2, page 39). The two barrier principle is also well 
established in the industry. Such rules are often based on sound engineering judgment, 
and should not be abandoned unless there is a documented reason for it. The use of rules 
can be a benefit, but the rules tend not to reflect variations in risk level and may 
therefore also limit the development.  
The method described in this chapter attempts to balance the rules established in the 
industry against a risk based approach for assessment of well component failures. A set 
of risk factors is identified, while it is left to the operator to define explicit acceptance 
criteria for each risk factor. 
6.3 Well risk factors 
In section 2.2, well integrity was defined as “The application of technical, operational 
and organizational solutions to reduce risk of blowout and well release”. A well 
component failure may increase both the blowout and well release risk. In the event of a 
dangerous SCSSV or PMV failure the reliability of the well shut-in function is also 
reduced. 
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A set of risk factors is identified that has a potential influence on well integrity risk 
and/or the reliability of the well shut-in function. It is assumed that the wells that 
experience a well component failure are designed, completed and operated according to 
an accepted risk level. Therefore, the method only threats risk factors that may change 
significantly after a well component failure has occurred. The risk factors are called 
well risk factors (WRF), where a WRF is defined as “an aspect of a well component 
failure that affects the well risk level during the operational phase”. It is assumed that by 
performing an assessment of each WRF separately all well risk aspects are covered, 
which may change significantly during the operational. The following WRFs are 
identified: 
1. Blowout consequence (acceptable deviation). The leak rate across a failed well 
component will influence the consequences of a blowout in the leak path(s) the 
failed component is part of.  
2. Well shut-in function and well integrity fault tolerance. The two barrier principle is a 
established rule in the industry and an alternative acceptance criterion resulting in a 
deviation from the two barrier principle is not considered realistic. This WRF assess 
if a well component failure result in failure to comply with the two barrier principle. 
The assessment includes both the well shut-in function and well integrity.   
3. Blowout frequency. The location of the leak/failure may influence the probability of 
a blowout because of reduced number of WBEs in the leak path(s) the failed 
component is part of. 
4. Well release consequences. A leak to annulus results in well fluids stored in the 
annuli. The increase in well fluids stored in the annuli will increase the potential 
consequences of a well release. The amount of fluid, fluid type, fluid toxicity, etc., 
influences the well release consequences. 
 
So far the influence on well integrity and the well shut-in function is treated. In 
addition, the following WRFs are identified to account for changes in the well design 
assumptions or well operation as a result of the well component failure: 
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5. Failure cause. This WRF examines if further development of the failure is likely or 
if other well components may be influenced by the same failure cause. If the 
situation is likely to escalate or if the failure cause is uncertain, the risk of continued 
operation may be unacceptable. 
6. Well barrier system and interfaces. The well barrier system and interfaces (see 
section 4.1.3, page 50) may be changed as a result of a well component failure. The 
well component failure may, e.g., result in increased risk of cascading failures 
unless the operation of the well is changed (e.g., by reducing injection pressure in a 
injection well). 
7. Operations in the well. A well component failure may result in increased risk when 
performing operations in the well (see section 2.1.2, page 24, for description of well 
operations). The well component failure may, e.g., result in reduced ability to kill 
the well in the event of an additional well component failure or in a blowout 
situation. 
The basis for the method is a comparison with a base case well without failure. The 
relative increase compared with the base case well is a measure for the increased risk. 
For each WRF separate acceptance criteria for the relative increase in risk should be 
defined. The acceptance criteria may be established separately and may be revised when 
experience is gained. The description in this thesis discusses the framework for the 
acceptance criteria for each WRF. The operator should establish explicit acceptance 
criteria. 
6.3.1 WRF 1 – Blowout consequence (acceptable deviation) 
Compared to a well without failures, failure of a well component may increase the 
consequences of a blowout. This WRF relates to the failure versus error discussion in 
section 4.2.1, and criteria for when a WBE is regarded to be in a failed state. The basis 
for the WRF is a scenario where a blowout is controlled by the well barrier the “failed” 
WBE is part of. Given this scenario, the following question(s) must be answered:  
1. What is the acceptable leak rate across the WBE?  
2. If the WBE is active, what is the acceptable closure time? 
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Specific acceptance criteria are not given here, but the SCSSV leak rate criterion in 
API RP 14B (see section 4.1.3, page 50) is far less than the leak rate included in the 
QRAs performed in Norway (see section 2.2.2, page 27). The SCSSV leak rate criterion 
is also below the hydrocarbon leak rates reported in the UK and Norwegian sectors (see 
section 2.2.2, page 27). The SCSSV leak rate criterion may therefore be relevant to use 
also for other well components. 
The API RP 14 B criterion does not distinguish between well types (as discussed in 
section 3.2). Different well types include different aspects of risk (human, 
environmental) and a differentiation in leak rate criterion should be possible for, e.g.: 
• Subsea vs. surface wells, since the consequences of a blowout will be different. 
• Non-natural flowing or non-hydrocarbon flowing wells vs. hydrocarbon flowing 
wells. Non-natural flowing wells will not be able to “produce” in the event of a 
blowout, while non-hydrocarbon wells will not have the same fire and explosion 
consequences as a hydrocarbon well. 
 
It should also be possible to establish different criteria for closure time of active 
WBEs. For example, to close in a subsea well will probably not be as time critical as for 
a surface well because of the distance from personnel.  
A well component that leaks externally or leaks to a volume not enveloped by a 
qualified well barrier will likely not be accepted independent of leak rate. This situation 
is comparable to a situation with an external leak from the process system on an 
offshore installation.. 
6.3.2 WRF 2 - Well shut-in function and well integrity fault tolerance 
IEC 61508, Part 4 defines fault tolerance as “Ability of a functional unit to continue to 
perform a required function in the presence of faults or errors”. The two barrier 
principle is a fault tolerance requirement. An alternative acceptance criterion resulting 
in a deviation from the two barrier principle is not considered realistic. It is therefore 
assumed that the acceptance criterion for the well shut-in function and the well barrier 
system will be that there should be at least two well barriers in all foreseen situations.  
For the well shut-in function, the PMV are regarded as the outlet from the 
secondary well barrier, while the SCSSV is the outlet from the primary barrier 
Well Safety 
-99- 
(production/injection well). If the failed WBE not is part of these two envelopes, the 
failure does not influence the ability to shut-in the well on demand, and the well shut-in 
function complies with the two barrier principle. 
The two barrier principle also applies to well integrity, i.e., there should be two well 
barriers to prevent a blowout in normal operation. Two or more WBEs should therefore 
be intact in all leak paths. 
In addition to the two well barrier requirements is it is assumed that the primary 
barrier always must be intact. This primary barrier must be intact to allow for isolation 
of the well in the event of an external event damaging the wellhead.  
6.3.3 WRF 3 - Blowout frequency 
If the two barrier principle is fulfilled, this WRF assess the relative increase in blowout 
frequency. The location of a well component failure may result in increased blowout 
frequency because of reduced number of WBEs to prevent a blowout, and a quantitative 
reliability analysis (FTA) is used to measure the relative increase in blowout frequency.  
The following reliability analyses (see section 5.5.1, page 84) are performed: 
1. Base case well blowout frequency. The base case well is a well with no failures 
operated according to normal industry (Norsk Hydro) practices. This well is 
considered to represent the “acceptable blowout frequency” level. 
2. Base case well with well component failure. This well is similar to the base case 
well but with the failed well component included in the model. 
3. Base case well with well component failure and with risk reduction measures. This 
well is similar to the failed well, but risk reducing measures not involving repair of 
the failed well component are included in the model. Examples of such measures are 
monitoring of outer annuli, increased test frequency, shorter well kill time, and 
shorter repair times (MDWT) for the remaining WBEs. 
 
In this situation acceptable risk (blowout frequency) is achieved if the quantitative 
reliability analysis (i.e., the FTA) can demonstrate that the “acceptable blowout 
frequency” represented by the base case well can be achieved for the well with the well 
component failure without repair of the failed well component, but with increased 
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testing, increased maintenance support (reduce repair time), and/or increased 
monitoring.  
For example, “Leak 2” in Figure 24 illustrates a situation with a leak in the tubing 
above the SCSSV. In this situation it will often be possible to include risk reducing 
measures that reduce the blowout frequency to the same level as the base case well (i.e., 
the “acceptable blowout frequency”). The reason why this can be achieved is that the 
primary well barrier and secondary well barrier are intact. In contrast, “Leak 1” in 
Figure 24 shows a situation where the primary well barrier has failed. In this situation 
the two well barrier principle will not be fulfilled, and at the same time it will be 
difficult or impossible to verify by use of FTA that the blowout frequency can be 
reduced to the base case frequency without repair of the failed component.  
In the Norsk Hydro project a “library” of standard well types was established. The 
library included a set of given “standard” Norsk Hydro wells. For each well FTA for the 
three base case well scenarios were performed for different leak locations (tubing leak 
above SCSSV, casing leaks, etc.). This library is used by Norsk Hydro to assist in the 
well risk assessment and recommend risk reducing measures. 
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Figure 24 Well component failures/leaks with different influence on the 
blowout frequency 
 
6.3.4 WRF 4 - Well release consequences 
A well component failure resulting in a leak to annulus results in well fluids stored in 
the annuli. The increase in well fluids will increase the potential consequences of a well 
release compared with a base case well without failure. For example, “Leak 2” in Figure 
24 may be acceptable from a blowout frequency perspective, but the increased volume 
stored in the A-annulus must also be assessed. 
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The extra volume of well fluids stored in the annuli represents an additional risk 
mainly related to increased well release consequences. The increase in well release 
consequences (hazardous fluids stored in well annuli) primarily depends on: 
• Release fluid type. 
• The amount of fluids stored. 
• Toxicity of fluids. 
 
The factors above are the immediate factors that influence the well release 
consequences. After a period of time the annuli will be drained, and the leak will be 
controlled by the leak rate. The leak rate risk (blowout consequences) was discussed in 
section 6.3.1 (WRF 1).  
A leak to annulus will cause gas to segregate and be “stored” below the tubing 
hanger, while the oil and water fractions stabilize lower in the well. This situation 
applies even for wells with liquid type reservoir fluids. Hence, there will always be an 
increased risk of a gas leak from the well. Gas is more volatile and has a higher ignition 
probability than oil (see section 2.2.2, page 27). 
The operator should establish explicit acceptance criteria related to allowable 
storage of well fluids. Possible “minimum storage criteria” may be a comparison 
between conventional wells and the typical volume of gas stored above a functioning 
SCASSV in a gas lift wells. In Norway, the SCASSV should be placed at least 50 m 
below mudline (minimum packer type SCASSV setting depth), and the typical gas lift 
injection pressure is 180 Bar pressure. 
In addition, the Guideline for protection of pressurized systems exposed to fire 
(Hekkelstrand, B. and P. Skulstad, 2002) may contribute with additional input. 
According to this guideline exceedance of either of the following criteria is considered 
to make a vessel rupture unacceptable: 
• Released quantity of hydrocarbons (the sum of gas and liquid) > 4 tons. 
• Released quantity of the sum of gas/initially flashed fraction of condensate/LPG > 1 
ton. 
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Other criteria that may be used are the sustained casing pressure criteria for 
departure in the US GoM (see section 3.2, page 39) or the RIDDOR classification given 
in Table 1, on page 36. 
For subsea wells the release quantity criterion may be linked to environmental 
consequences rather than personnel risk. 
For platform wells, factors such as toxicity (H2S in gas) may override fire/explosion 
criteria, and lead to a more stringent requirement related to the consequence of a well 
release.  
6.3.5 WRF 5 - Failure cause  
This WRF assess the failure cause (see section 4.2, page 56), and the likelihood that 
similar WBEs in the well will fail or the likelihood of further degradation of the WBE 
(if WBE not in fault state yet (see WRF 1)). The main criterion for this WRF is that 
further escalation, which cannot be controlled, should not be accepted. If the failure 
cause can be determined, and if further escalation/degradation of the well can be 
controlled, the risk can be accepted. 
6.3.6 WRF 6 - Well barrier system and interfaces 
The well barrier system and interfaces (see section 4.1.3, page 50) may change because 
of a well component failure. NORSOK D-010 states that if the well barrier status, 
availability or monitoring ability is altered, any continued use shall be supported by a 
risk assessment based on current reservoir/well condition and time factors. Hence, the 
change in boundary conditions for the remaining well barrier system must be assessed.  
For example, the well component failure may expose other well components to well 
conditions that result in new failures or escalation of failure mechanisms. The well 
componet failure may also result in increased risk of dependent failures. For example, 
the failure may result in changes in pressure regimes and thereby increase the risk of 
cascading failures.  
The main criterion for this WRF is that the well barrier boundary conditions must 
be within acceptable limits. For example, establishing new annulus pressure limits, 
decrease of injection pressure, etc., may reduce increased risk of cascading failures.  
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6.3.7 WRF 7 - Operations in the well 
During the operational phase, several types of (dynamic) operations are performed in 
the well (see section 2.1.2, page 24). A well component failure may result in increased 
risk when performing such operations. The risk associated with such dynamic 
operations should not be increased as a result of a well component failure.  
In addition the ability to perform operations to mitigate a blowout or well releases 
should not be reduced. In particular, the ability to kill the well is of vital importance if 
well control is lost. Also, the ability to kill the well if an additional WBE fails should be 
assessed before deciding to continue production without repair of the failed well 
component.  
6.4 Risk assessment framework 
The risk assessment is part of an overall framework for detection of abnormal well 
behavior, diagnosis, risk assessment and implementation of risk reducing measures. The 
framework is illustrated in Figure 25. After abnormal well behavior is detected, the 
framework includes three tasks, which are diagnosis, risk assessment, and 
implementation of risk reduction measures.  
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Figure 25 Risk assessment framework 
 
Boundary conditions for normal well operation 
A clear understanding and follow-up of the boundary conditions for normal well 
operation is a prerequisite for determining abnormal well behavior. The boundary 
conditions must be established early in the operational phase and continuously updated 
throughout the well lifetime. This work involves identification of general well data and 
well design limitations. In addition, allowable annulus pressure domains and allowable 
pressure alarm limits must be identified. The pressure alarm limits are used as criteria 
for normal well pressure behavior. Failure/leak symptoms can thus be identified by 
pressure readings outside these alarm limits. Similarly, the acceptable leak and closure 
times for the active WBEs must be determined (see Table 5, page 58). Key well data 
that should be available are: 
• Basic well data for leak detection and input to quantitative risk assessment (e.g., 
well fluids, pressure behavior). 
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• WBE design data, barrier diagrams, well schematics, etc. 
• Short-term/long-term allowable annuli pressures. 
• B-annulus well barrier design limitations. 
• Normal A-annulus pressure behavior and pressure alarm setting. 
 
Step 1; Diagnosis of well behavior outside boundary conditions 
This task includes three consecutive activities for diagnosis of abnormal annulus 
pressure behavior. Firstly, data collection for diagnosis must be initiated. Recommended 
maximum and minimum allowable annulus pressures must be identified to perform the 
diagnosis operation safely. Then the diagnosis work starts with an ‘external’ factors 
diagnosis with the objective to determine if the abnormal pressure reading is caused by 
factors other than a change in the downhole well components. If the external factor 
investigation is inconclusive, a well investigation must be performed to determine the 
‘internal’ factor that contributes to abnormal well behavior. The internal diagnosis work 
should establish the following properties of the downhole failure: 
• Location (depth) 
• Direction 
• Leak rate 
• Volume/mass influx to annulus 
• Probable cause 
 
It must be possible to verify the leak location and leak rate, either by testing or by 
direct measurement. The ability to identify the location and to monitor the leak rate(s) is 
of key importance in order to verify leaks against a predetermined acceptance criterion. 
Without knowing the leak rate or location the risk level cannot be adequately controlled. 
If the leak diagnosis activities fails to establish location and leak rate of a detected leak 
this will in itself call for an intervention to provide more information about the leak or 
to restore the well to a state that can be verified as acceptable.  
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Step 2 Well risk assessment 
With basis in the diagnosis results, the objective of this task is to evaluate the well state 
in respect of well risk. The assessment results in a risk status and required risk reducing 
measures. If risk is unacceptable, a workover must be performed. The method is 
described in section 6.5. 
 
Step 3 Implementation and follow-up 
After the risk assessment is performed, the required risk reducing measures must be 
implemented. The implementation is the responsibility of the operator and will vary 
depending on the overall risk management procedures of the company.  
6.5 Risk assessment method 
The risk assessment method is illustrated in Figure 26. Each WRF described in section 
6.3 is assessed separately. For each WRF the well is assigned a risk status code (RSC). 
The RSC indicates the risk level and the necessary extent of risk reduction measures. 
Most severe RSC deduced from each WRF assessment step determines the overall RSC 
for the well. 
 
 
Figure 26 Risk assessment method principle 
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The risk status code indicates the relative change in risk compared with the original 
well conditions (well with no failure). The definition of each RSC is given in Table 9. 
The RSC refers to whether the WRF is above or below the acceptance criteria 
determined for each WRF. The operator must establish explicit acceptance criteria. The 
required type of acceptance criteria was discussed in section 6.3. 
 
Table 9 RSC status code and influence on well risk and well functionality 
RSC Risk status Well Status 
0 Unchanged No change in well functionality. No downhole 
leak. 
I Acceptable 
• Small/marginal increase in risk.  
• Risk can be controlled by minor 
changes in operational practice 
Minor/marginal change in well functionality.  
• The well can be operated with minor 
operational changes 
II Tolerable 
• Acceptable only if risk factors 
can be controlled in remaining 
well life. 
• Risk reduction measures must 
be implemented 
Degraded well functionality. 
• Major change in operation of well 
• Workover not necessary. 
III Not acceptable  
• Two well barrier principle not 
fulfilled 
• Primary well barrier has failed 
• Risk reduction measures not 
sufficient OR one or more WRFs 
cannot be controlled in 
remaining well life. 
Well functionality not acceptable. 
• Increased blowout risk and/or ability to well 
shut-in. 
• Not possible to control risk without repair of 
failed component. 
• Workover must be performed. 
 
A summary of the WRFs, the required acceptance criteria categories/format, and 
RSCs is given in Table 10. The summary illustrates that the assessment of the separate 
WRFs generate a set of remedial actions/risk reducing measures to be implemented. If 
risk cannot be controlled by the measures, a workover must be performed. Note that the 
acceptable deviation for the well component failure mode (see section 4.2, page 56) 
defined in WRF 1 will influence the assessment performed for WRF 2 and WRF 3. 
Other WRFs are not affected by the acceptable deviation defined in WRF 1.  
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Table 10 WRF and RSC summary 
RSC WRF 
III – Not accepted II - Tolerable I – Accepted 
1 - Blowout 
consequence 
(acceptable 
deviation) 
Leak (any size) to a volume 
not enveloped by a qualified 
well barrier. 
Well component failure. 
May be acceptable 
(given WRF2 or WRF3).
Leak rate or closure 
time acceptable. Well 
component error NOT a 
well component failure. 
WRF 2 and 3 assessed if categorized as unacceptable deviation in WRF 1 
2 - Well shut-
in function 
and well 
integrity fault 
tolerance 
Two well barrier 
requirement not fulfilled. 
OR 
Failure of primary well 
barrier. 
 Two well barrier 
requirement fulfilled. 
AND 
Primary well barrier 
intact. 
3 - Blowout 
frequency 
Risk reduction measures 
cannot reduce relative 
(calculated) increase in 
blowout frequency to “base 
case frequency”. 
OR 
Risk reduction measures 
cannot be implemented due 
to operational reasons. 
Risk reduction 
measures can reduce 
relative (calculated) 
increase in blowout 
frequency to “base case 
frequency” and risk 
reduction measures can 
be implemented. 
 
WRD 4 to 7 assessed independent of assessment in WRF 1 
4 - Well 
release 
consequences 
Well fluids stored in well 
annuli > acceptance 
criterion  (due to fire or 
toxicity) AND volume cannot 
be controlled. 
Well fluids stored in well 
annuli > acceptance 
criterion  (fire or toxicity 
criterion) AND volume 
can be controlled (no or 
few bleed offs). 
Well fluids stored in well 
annuli < acceptance 
criterion. 
5 - Failure 
cause 
The failure cause cannot be 
controlled or not 
determined. 
Failure cause can be 
controlled by 
countermeasures. 
Otherwise (e.g., failure 
due to wireline 
operation). 
6 - Well 
barrier system 
and interfaces 
The well barrier system 
boundary conditions are 
changed and unacceptable 
(both wanted and unwanted 
input), AND measures 
cannot be implemented to 
reduce risk. 
The well barrier system 
boundary conditions 
changed. Risk reducing 
measures must and can 
be implemented. 
The well barrier system 
boundary conditions are 
not or marginally 
changed compared with 
original design 
assumptions. 
7 - Operations 
in the well 
Current well component 
failure OR an additional 
single component failure 
affect the ability to efficiently 
kill the well with mud. 
Corrective action cannot be 
implemented. 
Current well component 
failure OR an additional 
single well component 
failure affect the ability 
to efficiently kill the well 
with mud. Corrective 
action can be 
implemented to kill the 
well equally effective as 
for the base case well. 
Current well component 
failure OR an additional 
single well component 
failure do not affect the 
ability to efficiently kill 
the well with mud. 
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6.6 Risk assessment method benefits and limitations 
In this section main benefits and limitations of the proposed risk assessment method are 
discussed.  
The benefit of the proposed method is that it in a systematic order attempts to cover 
all well risk aspects of a well component failure. The method may also be used to 
establish specific acceptance criteria for different well types.  
The method facilitates the use of a “library” with blowout frequency analysis of 
standard well types (WRF 2). This makes the method effective and reduces downtime 
when a failure occurs. Otherwise, the well must be shut-in and an extensive risk 
assessment study must be performed. At the same time, care should be taken in a real 
situation, because the standard well in the “library” may not reflect the actual well 
conditions. The assumptions and prerequisites for the analysis must therefore be clear to 
all involved parties. Otherwise, the use of standard well blowout frequency analysis 
may be misleading. The method should not be used for well component failures that are 
not defined or for “non-standard” well types. WRF 5 and WRF 6 are included to ensure 
that the assumptions for the quantitative analysis are assessed. 
The risk assessment method depends on the ability to establish accurate diagnostic 
results. In particular leak rate estimation and location in the well are of critical 
importance. The ability to diagnose subsea wells in particular is limited. However, there 
are models/simulators available that may be utilized. In addition there are wireline tools 
available that are able to perform diagnostics of wells with a leak. 
 
 7. Summary and further work 
This chapter provides a brief evaluation of the research process, a discussion of the 
presented results, and recommendations for further work.  
7.1 Main contributions  
The overall objective of the PhD project was to develop a systematic approach for risk 
assessment of oil and gas wells in the operational phase. In this context a systematic 
approach means to describe procedures for risk assessment, with focus on quantitative 
analysis as a means to provide input to the assessment. The risk assessment is based on 
existing and new methods and knowledge gained during the PhD project. The risk 
assessment includes the development of a set of procedures and methods to be applied 
in the design and operational phase. To arrive at such procedures and methods, it was 
necessary to: 
1. Describe the state of the art related to analysis and control of the functions 
mentioned above. 
2. Describe regulations, standards, and industry practice, giving requirements to well 
safety in the operational phase. 
3. Identify commonly accepted analysis methods applied in risk assessment of wells, 
with focus on quantitative analysis techniques. 
4. Identify input reliability data available for quantitative well safety analyses and 
discuss the quality of the data. 
5. Assess the applicability of existing well safety analysis methods and, if necessary, 
suggest improvements. 
6. Suggest improvement in application of reliability input data. 
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7. Develop a systematic approach for risk assessment of oil and gas wells in the 
operational phase. In this context a systematic approach means to assess well risk 
when a well component failure occurs in the operational phase. The basis for the 
risk assessment is the quantitative analysis techniques identified.  
 
The use of risk analysis to assess well risk in the operational phase is not new. 
However, the risk assessment method for assessing well risk in the operational phase is 
new. More explicit the following contributions from the thesis are identified: 
• A systematic approach for well risk assessment in the operational phase. A set of 
WRFs are identified that influence the total well risk. The procedure is aimed at risk 
assessment in the operational phase after a well component failure has occurred.  
• A method for constructing barrier diagrams (paper 4). A barrier diagram is a 
structured way of describing a well as a barrier system. Barrier diagrams are used to 
1) calculate failure probability directly or 2) converted to quantitative reliability 
analysis techniques. 
• A framework for assessing well component failure causes, acceptable deviations in 
well component performance, and dependent failures.  
• A method for calculating the safety unavailability of safety functions (paper 2), and 
a method for calculating the safety unavailability for different configurations of 
surface controlled subsurface safety valves (paper 5). 
7.2 Evaluation of the research process 
The theme for the PhD work has been risk control in the operational phase since the 
start of the scholarship period, and has been driven by the desire to extend the 
applicability of risk analysis to the operational phase. Traditionally, risk control in the 
operational phase has been less focused on than the risk assessment performed in the 
design phase. It was early realized that risk analysis in the operational phase has been 
suffering from lack of methodology. In particular well integrity is handled in different 
ways throughout the industry. In the industry SIS is treated in a more uniform way 
independent of country and operator.  
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The application area of the PhD work has, however, shifted during the PhD work. 
Initially the focus was on SIS in general, while after some period the focus shifted to 
wells as the system boundary. Therefore, the development of adequate procedures and 
methods has been more complex than what might be immediately apparent in the final 
work presented in the thesis. At the same time the focus on SIS initially in the process 
has contributed to valuable knowledge about how risk is modeled within other system 
disciplines, and has also contributed to a broader perspective when establishing the well 
risk factors. 
To ensure the applicability of the procedures and methods, pragmatism has been 
important, but the procedures and methods presented are anchored in quantitative risk 
and reliability theory. To lend scientific credibility to the work, the criteria listed in 
section 1.5 have been followed as far as possible. Also the risk assessment method 
presented has been developed with strong involvement from the industry and colleagues 
mentioned in the preface. 
7.3 Discussion of results 
The petroleum activity gives extensive incomes to the operators and to the nations that 
possess the petroleum resources. At the same time the petroleum production may result 
in severe losses. It is therefore a pressure on the risk analysis to demonstrate acceptable 
risk. Freudenburg (2001) claims that there is a need to recognize that virtually all 
technological controversies inherently involves at least three sets of questions 
(Freudenburg, 2001): 
• How safe is it? This includes factual or technical questions. On such factual 
questions the views of technical experts tend to be far more persuasive than do the 
views of most of their fellow citizens (lay people). 
• Is that safe enough? This question involves not facts, but values – and when it 
comes to questions of values, another word for “scientist” is “voter”. For the value 
questions, in other words, ordinary citizens do indeed have just as much legitimacy 
as do scientist and engineers.  
• What have we overlooked? Risk decisions – and indeed, a growing number of the 
challenging decisions in the 21st century – inherently involve complex mix of facts, 
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values and blind spots. For this question both experts and the non-experts have a 
great deal to contribute.  
 
With these questions in mind the results are discussed.  
7.3.1 Pressure on safety margins 
Offshore systems in general have traditionally had an apparent degree of over 
dimensioning in the design. An example is the extensive use of redundancy in process 
control systems. The tradition has been to use a layer of protection philosophy to reduce 
the consequences of a hazardous event. Related to well systems there has also been a 
tradition for deterministic requirements stated in, e.g., API RP 14C and API RP 14B. 
However, there is trend towards functional requirements (what to achieve). Functional 
requirements give the engineers the possibility to develop a range of solutions to 
achieve the same function. It is the role of the engineers to decide if a solution achieves 
the required functional requirement and/or to compare alternative solutions. The risk 
assessment method proposed in the thesis is dominated by functional requirements. The 
exception is the two barrier requirement and the requirement that the primary well 
barrier should be intact (WRF 2 - Well shut-in function and well integrity fault 
tolerance). 
Functional requirements may result in a move towards changes in well-proven 
safety philosophies for offshore design and operations. Arguments for this development 
are provided in the introduction to the thesis (see chapter 1). The question in the 
operational phase then is whether risk in operation is acceptable or not? This question is 
especially important if changes in design and operation philosophy mainly are 
motivated by cost reduction. Rasmussen (1997) comments on this, when he points out 
that commercial success in a competitive market, will lead to an exploration of the 
advantages of operating at the boundary of accepted praxis. By exploring and moving 
closer to the limit, one also run the risk of crossing the boarder of what can be said to be 
safe operation. Rasmussen also argues that commercial pressure force managers and 
key-decision makers to focus on short-term gains rather than longer-term criteria 
concerning e.g. safety. In his terms “managers runs the risk rather than taking risk”. 
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The presented risk assessment method attempts to control the risk by focusing on 
WRFs assumed to cover all important risk aspects resulting from a well component 
failure. The method focuses on functions, and functional requirements are dominating. 
However, it is proposed to keep established principles like the two barrier principle. 
Despite the combination of both rules and function requirements there is always a risk 
that the proposed risk assessment procedure does not cover all significant risk aspects.  
The acceptance criteria applied will influence the well risk. The influence from 
different acceptance criteria is illustrated in Figure 27. In the figure it is assumed that 
the identified WRFs represent the total well risk. However, if the acceptance criteria are 
set to high, i.e., allow continued operation with to high risk, the operator will “run the 
risk”. On the other hand, too conservative acceptance criteria and risk reducing 
measures will result in “overprotective” operational philosophy. The reason for the 
elliptical form is that the deviation from the “optimal” philosophy is expected to be less 
for critical well component failures (e.g., failure of the primary well barrier) and for 
minor well component failures (minor leakage below leak rate criterion). For example, 
failure to close the SCSSV will in almost all cases result in a workover (or installation 
of a WR-SCSSV). The deviation from the “optimal” philosophy will be highest for well 
component failures where the influence on well risk are uncertain or may be reduced by 
different operational means, e.g., for leaks to the annulus above the SCSSV. By 
including several several WRFs in the risk assessment it is attempted to cover all risk 
aspects. There is therefore a risk of being overprotective. However, there is also a risk 
of running the risk if the acceptance criteria are set too high. 
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Figure 27 Risk assessment challenges 
 
By applying the method suggested in the thesis there is also a risk that the well 
system moves closer to the edge, meaning that in the event of some sort of well system 
failure, there is less of safety margin for recovery to take place. This is similar to 
Perrow’s (1984) notion of “tight coupling” between systems. By the application of a 
wide range of WRFs this tendency is attempted reduced to a minimum. In particular 
WRF 7 – Operations in the well attempts to cover the recovery risk. 
Another pitfall is the potential mismatch between the designer/method developer 
and user assumption. Designers are increasingly remote from the practitioner/operator 
of the system in many large-scale systems. A mismatch between designer and user 
expectations of how things should work may often occur. This mismatch may not be 
trivial, and sometimes may result in disaster (examples are given in Billings, 1996). 
Even if the procedure has been developed in close cooperation with the user (Norsk 
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Hydro), a mismatch between the method developers and the method users cannot be out 
ruled. A series of internal courses is planned in 2006 to reduce this risk. 
When moving from rules to functional requirements, one could (simplified) say that 
one has moved from a regime with little degree of uncertainty to a regime with 
quantitative analysis to show acceptable safety margins. Included in such calculations 
are assumptions, (generic) reliability data, models, etc., which in sum gives an increased 
degree of uncertainty (especially when introducing new technology). This uncertainty 
can in most cases not be measured. In the worst case there is a risk of reducing the 
safety margin even if the probabilistic calculations do not show this decrease.  
Because of this uncertainty a recommendation in NOU 2002:24 is to include some 
basic safety requirements with respect to barriers and redundancy from a precautionary 
principle. This strategy is also followed in the risk assessment method by including the 
two barrier principle and by recommending the leak rate criterion in API RP 14B. The 
recommended use of relative comparison with an accepted base case well also 
contributes to reducing the uncertainty. 
7.3.2 Documentation of risk assessment process 
There are problems related to verification of technology and assuring their safety. 
Kirwan (2001) highlights two main problems: 
1. Potential mismatch between the lifecycle of scientific investigation of new 
technology and the life cycle of the technological development itself. Technology 
development used to take place over longer timescales, but this is no longer always 
the case. Underpinning research, checking the integrity of the new technology and 
looking for unwanted by-products may, take too long. It may cause a fatal delay of 
the technology’s entry into the market. Given intense commercial pressure, a 
conflict of interest may then develop, with pressure to release the product into the 
market or industry. 
2. External regulations trying to control the fast developing products or systems. 
External regulations should be able to question the emergence of the new 
technologies and limit their implementation until satisfactory research and testing 
has been completed. But many new products will not fit into existing and mature 
technology categories. The regulatory framework is at best a slow and bureaucratic 
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system, and may not be able to catch up with the new technology until it is already 
released. 
 
Kirwan mainly focus on changes in technology, but the same points are relevant for 
changes in design and operating philosophy. Also, in the Norwegian oil sector there is 
increased focus on cost-effectiveness, resulting in introduction of new ways of both 
solving the technical issues and new ways of organizing the work. Kirwan (2001) gives 
an example from the introduction of new technology in aircraft cockpits. Experience has 
shown that there is a time lag between the introduction of new technology being 
implemented, and the occurrence and experience of system problems. Before these 
problems are known and the impact on the user of the system are realized, the design 
teams may be reduced and disbanded. This lag means that difficulties appear too late to 
be designed out, and therefore accidents may happen whereupon the industry is forced 
into costly refit. The same argument can be used for well systems, where new well 
designs constantly are being developed, and the life of existing wells is being extended. 
In this situation the risk assessment performed in the design phase and the changes in 
risk throughout the well life must be of high quality, have a broad scope and be well 
documented. In particular the “library” of standard well types may not capture all these 
aspects. The limitations in the analyses must therefore be known and criteria for when 
not to use the library should be clear. WRF 5 – Failure cause and WRF 6 – Well barrier 
system and interfaces are included to reduce this risk. 
7.3.3 Well risk versus installation risk 
Analysis and studies are performed on different system levels. Even if the proposed 
analyses and risk assessment method show that a given solution is acceptable on the 
well system level, the total risk on installation level is not modeled in this thesis. One 
problem is that a range of actors will be involved, and have different influence on the 
selected solution. As one of several possible approaches to this problem, Rasmussen 
(1997) recommends that the acceptable limits/level for safe operation of a system must 
be visible to the actors involved. The main challenge then becomes to identify the limits 
or barriers that actually exists in relation to different hazardous events and scenarios, 
and to make them known to the actors. In this perspective the methods and procedures 
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suggested in this thesis may contribute to a better understanding of well risk for actors 
not only involved with well risk. For example, the barrier diagram method may 
contribute to better visualization and communication between well design and well 
operation personnel. Similarly the safety unavailability calculations may contribute with 
useful input to the actors involved with SIS design. The division into WRFs may 
contribute to visualize different risk aspects to different actors. 
Often the methodology to show equality between technical solutions has a too 
narrow objective. This can also be claimed about analysis performed on well system 
level. The analysis might not be able to capture the spectrum of impacts a WBE failure 
has on safety. This argument can also be stated towards the risk analysis methods and 
risk assessment procedure described in this thesis. The thesis mainly covers technical 
aspects, and has in less degree assessed factors like operational complexity, more 
maintenance and the need for follow-up during operation. The influence from such 
factors must not be underestimated. 
The well operator is supposed to intervene if there are deviations that exceed 
acceptable limits or due to abnormal incidents. In this situation the operator should be 
aware of the reason for the established limits, and have knowledge about how to handle 
deviations. The proposed risk assessment method may, e.g., result in increased 
dependence on pressure monitoring and/or changes in allowable pressure limits. 
Changes in established procedures may, e.g., influence on the operators ability to act 
when deviations occur. Another factor is that human under stress have a tendency not to 
act rational, but perform reflexive actions based on previous experiences from similar 
events (Reason, 1990). The risk assessment method proposed in the thesis does not 
cover the possible extra burden on the well operators. The risk assessment may result in 
risk reducing measures that might weaken the ability of the human to intervene if 
something unexpected happens. This factor may sometimes be important.  
7.4 Further work 
Well integrity is of increasing concern, and the field has gained more emphasis just over 
the past years. This is partly because of the growing number of mature fields and the 
application of technology, e.g. subsea and unmanned platform developments. Also, the 
regulations and standards governing the management of well integrity in various parts 
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of the world are based on different approaches. In comparison the handling of SIS in 
high risk industries seems more uniform and has also been focused on over several 
years. A common best practice for well integrity is not established yet, and further work 
is necessary throughout the industry 
This thesis do not attempt to cover all aspects of what is necessary to manage well 
risk, but may have contributed to bring the industry a step forward. Below suggestions 
to further improvements and work based on the PhD work are suggested. 
 
Further testing of procedures and methods 
The risk assessment method should be tested before implementation in the entire 
organization. Within Norsk Hydro, s series of courses is planned. The objective is to 
receive feedback from operational personnel before the method is implemented fully. In 
parallel with the courses case studies are performed within Norsk Hydro. 
The methods applied in the risk analysis may also be further developed. For 
example the barrier diagram method may be further developed. In future, it should be 
possible to perform reliability analysis directly from the barrier diagram by, e.g., the 
development of a software tool. 
 
Acceptance criteria 
The acceptance criteria used by the operator are often generic and not flexible with 
respect to, e.g., well type. As an example today’s API RP 14B leak rate requirements do 
not reflect that risk levels vary between installations and well types (platform vs. subsea 
wells, injectors vs. producers, etc.). Many operators have chosen to go beyond the 
acceptance criteria, more based on a perception of risk and/or convenience rather than 
actual verification of the required acceptance criteria. More research can be made on 
this area, and the split into WRFs may contribute to more focus on specific and 
diversified acceptance criteria. 
 
Reliability data 
One of the objectives in the thesis was to suggest improvement in the application of 
reliability input data. This is partly done by suggesting improved failure classification of 
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WBE failures (paper 5) and by improved analysis techniques (paper 5 and paper 2). 
However, the ambition was to perform detailed analysis of component failures, and, 
e.g., establish recommended reliability data and investigate failure causes in more 
detail. Due to limited access to field data this was not possible. However, this work will 
be increasingly important due to the increased average well age in the industry. The 
failure classification suggested in paper 5 and in section 4.2 may be a starting point for 
further research. 
 
QRA and well risk assessment 
In the start of the thesis it was stated that the QRA included coarse hazardous event 
frequency estimates. In the future it should be focused on how to improve these 
estimates both in the design and operational phase. One possible solution is to use 
quantitative analysis on well level as a supplement to the generic frequencies used 
today. One possible strategy is to develop a set (library) of well categories where the 
estimated blowout and well release frequency is compared relative to each other. The 
relative difference in blowout and well release frequency may be used as a 
supplement/correction factor to the historic blowout frequencies. 
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 Definitions 
 
A-annulus A term used for the annulus between the production tubing and the 
production casing. 
Acceptance criteria Criteria based on regulations, standards, experience and/or theoretical 
knowledge used as a basis for decisions about acceptable risk. 
Acceptance criteria may be expressed verbally or numerically (NS 
5814) 
Accident An unintended event or sequence of events that causes death, injury, 
environmental or material damage (DEF-STD 00-56). 
Analysis An examination of a complex, its elements, and their relations; the use 
of methods and techniques of arranging facts to assist in deciding 
what additional facts are needed, establish consistency, validity and 
logic, establish necessary and sufficient events for causes, and guide 
and support inferences and judgments (Johnson 1980) 
Availability The ability of an item under combined aspects of its reliability, 
maintainability, and maintenance support) to perform its required 
function at a stated instant of time or over stated period of time (BS 
4778). 
B-annulus A term used for the annulus between the production casing and the 
intermediate casing (next outer casing string) 
Barriers The physical and procedural measures to direct energy in wanted 
channels and control unwanted release (Johnson 1980). 
Blowout A blowout is an incident where formation fluid flows out of the well 
or between formation layers after all the predefined technical well 
barriers or the activation of the same have failed (SINTEF, 2005) 
C-annulus A term used for the annulus between the intermediate casing and the 
surface casing (next outer casing string). 
Casing Large-diameter pipe cemented in place during the initial well 
construction process to stabilize the wellbore. The casing forms a 
major structural component of the wellbore and serves several 
important functions: preventing the formation wall from caving into 
the wellbore, isolating the different formations to prevent the flow or 
crossflow of formation fluids, and providing a means of maintaining 
control of formation fluids and pressure while the well is drilled. The 
casing string also provides a means of securing surface pressure 
control equipment and downhole production equipment, such as the 
drilling blowout preventer (BOP), x-mas tree or production packer. 
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Casing joint A length of steel pipe, generally around 40 ft [13 m] long with a 
threaded connection at each end. Casing joints are assembled to form 
a casing string of the correct length and specification for the wellbore 
in which it is installed (Schlumberger, 2005). 
Casing program A collective term that encompasses all casing and liner strings, 
including hangers and cement, located in a wellbore. 
Causal analysis A systematic procedure for describing and/or calculating the 
probability of causes for undesired events (NS 5814). 
Causal model Specification of the influence relations assumed to exist between a set 
of variables, often illustrated graphically using boxes and arrows 
(Hellevik 1999). 
Common cause 
failure 
Multiple component faults that occur at the same time or that occur in 
relatively small time window and that are due to a common cause 
(NASA 2002). 
Failure, which is the result of one or more events, causing 
coincident failures of two or more separate channels in a multiple 
channel system, leading to system failure (IEC 61508, Part 4). 
Failures of different items resulting from the same direct cause 
where these failures are not consequences of other failures (NORSOK 
O-CR-001). 
Note: Failures that are consequences of other failures are called 
cascading failures. 
Conductor  
(-casing/-pipe) 
The outermost casing string in a casing program set to support the 
surface formations. The conductor is typically a short string set soon 
after drilling has commenced since the unconsolidated shallow 
formations can quickly wash out or cave in. Where loose wellbore 
surface soil exists, the conductor pipe may be driven into place before 
the drilling commences. 
Consequence An outcome of an event (ISO/TMB WG 1998). 
A possible result of an undesired event. Consequences may be 
expressed verbally or numerically to define the extent of injury to 
humans, or environmental or material damage (NS 5814). 
Consequence 
analysis 
A systematic procedure to describe and/or calculate the possible 
extent of human injury, and environmental or material damage as a 
result of undesired events (NS 5814). 
Corrective 
maintenance 
The actions performed, as a result of failure, to restore an item to a 
specified condition (MIL-STD-2173 (AS)). 
The maintenance carried out after a failure has occurred and 
intended to restore an item to a state in which it can perform its 
required function (BS 4778). 
Criterion A norm, i.e., rule or test against which (the quality of) performance 
can be measured (Johnson 1980). 
Design life Planned usage time for the total system (NORSOK O-CR-001). 
Deviation Departure from a norm (criterion) (Johnson 1980). 
Distribution 
function 
Consider a random variable X. the distribution function of X is  
)()( xXPxF rX ≤=  (Rausand and Høyland 2004) 
Downtime The period of time during which an item is not in a condition to 
perform its required function (BS 4778). 
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Equipment under 
control (EUC) 
Equipment, machinery, apparatus, or plant used for manufacturing, 
process, transportation, medical, or other activities (IEC 61508, Part 
4). 
Error Any significant deviation from a previously established, required or 
expected standard of human performance that results in unwanted or 
undesired time delay, difficulty, problem, trouble, incident, 
malfunction or failure (Johnson 1980). 
Fail safe A design property of an item that prevents its failures being critical 
failures (BS 4778). 
A design feature that ensures the system remains safe or, in the 
event of a failure, causes the system to revert to a state that will not 
cause a mishap (MIL-STD 882D). 
Failure The termination of its ability to perform a required function (BS 
4778). 
An unacceptable deviation from the design tolerance or in the 
anticipated delivered service, an incorrect output, the incapacity to 
perform the desired function (NASA 2002). 
A cessation of proper function or performance; inability to meet a 
standard; non-performance of what is requested or expected (NASA 
2000) 
Failure cause The physical or chemical processes, design defects, quality defects, 
part misapplication, or other processes which are the basic reason for 
failure or which initiate the physical process by which deterioration 
proceeds to failure (MIL-STD-1629A). 
The circumstances during design, manufacture, or use which 
have led to a failure (IEC 50(191)) 
Failure effect The consequence(s) a failure mode has on the operation, function, or 
status of an item (MIL-STD 1629) 
Failure mechanism The physical, chemical or other process which has led to a failure 
(IEC 50(191)). 
Failure rate The rate of which failure occur as a function of time. If T denotes the 
time to failure of an item, the failure rate z(t) is defined as 
t
tTttTt
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t ∆
>∆+≤<= ∞→∆
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lim)(  
The failure rate is sometimes called “force of mortality (FOM)” 
(Rausand and Høyland, 2004). 
Fault A defect, imperfection, mistake, or flaw, of varying severity that 
occurs within some hardware or software component or system. 
“Fault” is a general term and can range from a minor defect to a 
failure (NASA 2002). 
Abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the 
capability of a functional unit to perform a required function (IEC 
61508, Part 4) 
Fault mode (failure 
mode) 
One of the possible states of a faulty item, for a given required 
function (IEC 50(191)). 
Fault tolerance Ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function 
in the presence of faults or errors (IEC 61508, Part 4) 
Frequency rate The number of occurrences of a given type of event expressed in 
relation to a base unit of measure (for example, accidents per 1 
million miles traveled (Tarrants 1980) 
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Full workover Preventive or corrective maintenance carried out on a well by pulling 
the X-mas tree and well completion string. 
Functional unit Entity of hardware or software, or both, capable of accomplishing a 
specified purpose (IEC 61508, Part 4) 
Hazard Source of potential harm or situation with a potential for harm (IEC 
60300-3-9) 
Hazard 
identification 
Process of recognizing that a hazard exists and defining its 
characteristics (IEC 60300-3-9). 
Hazardous event Event which can cause harm (IEC 60300-3-9). 
Hidden failure A failure not evident to crew or operator during the performance of 
normal duties (MIL-STD-2173(AS)). 
Hydraulic control 
line 
A small-diameter hydraulic line used to operate downhole completion 
equipment such as the surface controlled subsurface safety valve 
(SCSSV). Most systems operated by control line operate on a fail-safe 
basis. In this mode, the control line remains pressurized at all times. 
Any leak or failure results in loss of control line pressure, acting to 
close the safety valve and render the well safe (Schlumberger, 2005). 
Incident Any unplanned event resulting in, or having potential for, adverse 
consequences (ISO/TMB WG 1998). 
Indicator A measurable/operational variable that can be used to describe the 
condition of a broader phenomenon or aspect of reality (Øien 2001) 
Intermediate casing A casing string that is generally set in place after the surface casing 
and before the production casing. The intermediate casing string 
provides protection against caving of weak or abnormally pressured 
formations and enables the use of drilling fluids of different density 
necessary for the control of lower formations. 
Item Any part, component, device, subsystem, functional unit, equipment 
or system that can be individually considered (IEC 50(191)). 
Light intervention Preventive or corrective maintenance carried out on a well without 
pulling the X-mas tree or any part of the completion string. It also 
covers other interventions, e.g., wireline logging operations and 
production operations such as testing, stimulations, chemical injection 
and perforation. 
 
Note: Often also called a thru-tubing intervention 
Liner A casing string in which the top does not extend to the wellbore 
surface but instead is suspended from inside of the previous casing 
string. 
Maintainability The ability of an item, under stated conditions of use, to be retained 
in, or restored to, a state in which it can perform its required 
functions, when maintenance is performed under stated conditions 
and using prescribed procedures and resources (BS 4778). 
Maintenance The combinations of all technical and corresponding administrative 
actions, including supervision actions, intended to retain an entity in, 
or restore it to, a state in which it can perform its required function 
(IEC 50(191)). 
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Master valve A valve located on the x-mas tree that controls all flow from the 
wellbore. A correctly functioning master valve is important and most 
surface trees have two master valves fitted. The upper master valve is 
used on a routine basis, with the lower master valve providing backup 
or contingency function in the event that the normal service valve is 
leaking and needs replacement (Schlumberger, 2005). 
Mean time to failure 
(MTTF) 
Let T denote the time to failure of an item, with probability density 
f(t) and survivor function R(t). the mean time to failure is the mean 
(expected) value of T which is given by 
∫∫ ∞∞ =⋅= 00 )()( dttRdttftMTTF   
(Rausand and Høyland 2004). 
Model Simplified representation of a phenomenon or object where some 
aspects are highlighted whereas other are left out (e.g., causal models) 
(Hellevik 1999). 
Modification The combination of all technical and administrative actions intended 
to change an item (IEC 50(191)). 
Monitoring Activity performed either manually or automatically, intended to 
observe the state of an item (IEC 50(191). 
Partial workover Preventive or corrective maintenance carried out on a well by pulling 
the X-mas tree and/or a part of the well completion string. 
Performance criteria Operational standards for use in determining effectiveness or 
efficiency (Tarrants 1980) 
Preventive 
maintenance 
The maintenance carried out at predetermined intervals or 
corresponding to prescribed criteria and intended to reduce the 
probability of failure or performance degradation of an item (BS 
4778) 
Primary well barrier First object that prevents flow from a source (NORSOK D-010) 
Probability density Consider a random variable X. The probability density function fX(x) 
of X is 
x
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where FX(x) denotes the distribution function of X (Rausand and 
Høyland 2004). 
Production casing A casing string that is set across or at the start of the reservoir 
interval, and within which the main well completion components are 
installed. 
Production packer A well completion device used to isolate the annulus between the 
production tubing and the production casing (A-annulus), and to 
anchor or secure the bottom of the well completion string. 
Protected x-mas tree A x-mas tree with probability less than 1x10-4 per installation-year 
for critical barrier function impairment due to external hazardous 
loads (explosions, fires, dropped objects, trawls, iceberg/vessel 
collisions, etc.). This criterion is based on requirements to main safety 
functions stipulated in the PSA (2001b) “Facilities Regulations”. 
 
The opposite of a protected wellhead is called an ‘unprotected X-mas 
tree’ 
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Qualitative  The characteristic elements, attribute, kind, or degree of quality 
possessed by something. Refers to characteristics (physical or non-
physical, individual or typical) that constitutes the basic nature of 
something or is one of its distinguishing features (Tarrants 1980). 
Quantitative The property of anything that can be determined by measurement. 
The property of being measurable in dimensions, amounts, etc., or in 
extensions of these that can be expressed by numbers or symbols. A 
quantitative statement describes “how much”, while a qualitative 
statement answers the question, “what kind is it?” or “how good is 
it?” (Tarrants 1980). 
Redundancy In an entity, the existence of more than one means of performing a 
required function (IEC 50(191)). 
Existence of means, in addition to the means which would be 
sufficient for a functional unit to perform a required function or for 
data to represent information (IEC 61508, part 4). 
Reliability The ability of an item to perform a required function, under given 
environmental and operational conditions, and for a stated period of 
time (ISO 8402). 
Reliability data Reliability data is meant to include data for reliability, maintainability 
and maintenance supportability  
(NORSOK O-CR-001). 
Repair The part of corrective maintenance in which manual actions are 
performed on the entity (IEC 50(191)). 
Required function A function or combination of functions, of an entity, which is 
considered necessary to provide a given service (IEC 50 (191). 
Risk Combination of the frequency, or probability, of occurrence and the 
consequence of a specified hazardous event (IEC 60300-3-9). 
Risk designates the danger that undesired events represent for 
humans, the environment or material values. Risk is expressed in the 
probability and consequences of undesired events (NS 5814). 
Risk analysis Systematic use of available information to identify hazards and to 
estimate the risk to individual or populations, property or the 
environment (IEC 60300-3-9). 
Systematic use of available information to estimate the likelihood 
and consequences of risks and their components (ISO/TMB WG 
1998). 
A systematic approach for describing and/or calculating risk. 
Risk analysis involves the identification of undesired events, and the 
causes and consequences of these events (NS 5814). 
Risk assessment Overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation (IEC 60300-3-9). 
Risk control Process of decision-making for managing and/or reducing risk; its 
implementation, enforcement and re-evaluation from time to time, 
using results of risk assessment as one input (IEC 60300-3-9). 
Risk criteria A qualitative or quantitative statement of the acceptable standard of 
risk with which the assessed risk needs to be compared (The Royal 
Society 1992). 
Risk evaluation Process in which judgments are made on the tolerability of the risk on 
the basis of risk analysis and taking into account factors such as socio-
economic and environmental aspects (IEC 60300-3-9). 
A comparison of the results of a risk analysis with the acceptance 
criteria for risk and other decision criteria (NS 5814). 
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Risk management Systematic application of management policies, procedures, and 
practices to the tasks of analyzing, evaluating and controlling risk 
(IEC 60300-3-9). 
Safety Freedom from unacceptable risk (IEC 61508) 
Freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, 
occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or property 
(MIL-STD-882D). 
The expectation that a system does not, under defined conditions, 
lead to a state in which human life is endangered (DEF-STD 00-56) 
Safety function Function to be implemented by a SIS (Safety Instrumented System), 
other technological safety-related system or external risk reduction 
facilities which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the 
process in respect to a specific hazardous event (IEC 61511) 
Safety integrity Probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily performing the 
required safety functions under all the stated conditions within a 
specified period of time (IEC 61508, Part 4). 
Safety integrity 
level (SIL) 
Discrete level (one out of a possible four) for specifying the safety 
integrity requirement of a the safety functions to be allocated to the 
E/E/PE safety-related systems, where safety integrity level 4 has the 
highest level of safety integrity and safety integrity level has the 
lowest (IEC 61508, Part 4). 
Seal assembly A system of seals arranged on the component that engages in a 
sealbore to isolate the production-tubing conduit from the annulus. 
The seal assembly is typically longer than the sealbore to enable some 
movement of the components while maintaining an efficient seal 
(Schlumberger, 2005). 
Secondary well 
barrier 
Second object that prevents flow from a source  
Surface casing A casing string set inside the conductor in shallow but competent 
formations. The surface casing protects onshore fresh-water aquifers, 
and it provides minimal pressure integrity and thus enables a diverter 
or a blowout preventer (BOP) to be attached to the top of the surface 
casing string after it is successfully cemented in place. The surface 
casing provides structural strength so that the remaining casing strings 
may be suspended at the top and inside of the surface casing. 
Surface controlled 
annular safety valve 
(SCASSV) 
Same functionality as SCSSV but installed in annulus between 
production string and production casing. The valve is normally 
installed in a packer (Schlumberger, 2005). 
Surface controlled 
subsurface safety 
valve (SCSSV) 
A downhole safety valve that is operated from surface facilities 
through a control line strapped to the external surface of the 
production tubing. Two basic types of SCSSV are common: wireline 
retrievable, whereby the principal safety-valve components can be run 
and retrieved on slickline, and tubing retrievable, in which the entire 
safety-valve assembly is installed with the tubing string. The control 
system operates in a fail-safe mode, with hydraulic control pressure 
used to hold open a ball or flapper assembly that will close if the 
control pressure is lost (Schlumberger, 2005). 
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Survivor function Let T denote the time to failure of an item. The survivor function R(t) 
of the item is  
0)Pr()( ≥>= tfortTtR  
R(t) is sometimes called the reliability function or the survival 
probability at time t of the item (Rausand and Høyland 2004). 
System A bounded physical entity that achieves in its domain a defined 
objective through interaction of its parts (DEF-STD 00-56). 
Set of elements which interact according to a design, where an 
element of a system can be another system, called subsystem, which 
may be controlling system or a controlled system and may include 
hardware, software and human interaction (IEC 61508, Part 4). 
Systematic failure Failure related in a deterministic way to a cause, which can only be 
eliminated by a modification of the design or of the manufacturing 
process, operational procedures, documentation, or other factors (IEC 
61508, Part 4). 
Test frequency The number of tests of the same type per unit time interval; the 
inverse of the test interval (IEEE Std. 352). 
Test interval The elapsed time between the initiation of identical tests on the same 
senor, channel, etc. (IEEE Std. 352). 
Tubing hanger A device attached to the topmost tubing joint in the wellhead to 
support the tubing string. The tubing hanger typically is located in the 
tubing head, with both components incorporating a sealing system to 
ensure that the tubing conduit and annulus are hydraulically isolated. 
(Schlumberger, 2005). 
Tubing head A wellhead component that supports the tubing hanger and provides a 
means of attaching the x-mas tree to the wellhead (Schlumberger, 
2005). 
Tubing joint A single length of the pipe that is assembled to provide a conduit 
through which the oil or gas will be produced from a wellbore. 
Tubing joints are generally around 30 ft [9 m] long with a thread 
connection on each end (Schlumberger, 2005). 
Undesired event An event or conditions that can cause human injury or environmental 
or material damage (NS 5814). 
Wear-out failure A failure whose probability of occurrence increases with the passage 
of time, as a result of processes inherent in the entity (IEC 50(191)). 
Well A collective term that encompass the main entities used to enable a 
contained and controlled access to a (pressurized) formation. For 
example, in the operational phase, well will typically encompass the 
x-mas tree, wellhead, well completion and casing program. 
Well barrier A well barrier is an envelope of one or several dependent barrier 
elements, which are designed to prevent unintentional flow of 
formation fluids between formations or to the surroundings 
(NORSOK D-010). 
Well Barrier 
Element (WBE) 
An object that alone cannot prevent flow from one side to the other 
side of it self (NORSOK D-010). 
Well completion A collective term that encompass the assembly of tubing hanger, 
downhole tubular, safety valve, production packer and other 
equipment placed inside the production casing to enable safe and 
efficient surface access to a (pressurized) formation. 
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Well Integrity The application of technical, operational and organizational solutions 
to reduce risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids throughout 
the life cycle of the well (NORSOK D-010). 
Well release The reported incident is a well release if oil or gas flowed from the 
well from some point were flow was not intended and the flow was 
stopped by use of the barrier system that was available in the well at 
the time the incident started (SINTEF, 2005). 
Wellhead The surface/seabed termination of a wellbore that incorporates 
facilities for installing casing hangers during the well construction 
phase. The wellhead also incorporates a means of hanging the 
production tubing and installing the x-mas tree or other flow-control 
devices in preparation for the production of the well. 
Wing valve A valve located on the side of the x-mas tree. Two wing valves are 
generally fitted to the x-mas tree. A flowing wing valve is used to 
control and isolate production, and the service (kill) wing valve fitted 
on the opposite side of the Christmas tree is available for treatment or 
well-control purposes. The term wing valve typically is used when 
referring to the flowing wing (Schlumberger, 2005). 
x-mas tree  An assembly of valves, spools, pressure gauges and chokes fitted to 
the wellhead to control the well flow. 
 
Note: In the PSA regulations (2001b), Christmas trees also encompass 
wellheads, casing hangers and annular preventers. 
 
 

 Acronyms 
  
API American Petroleum Institute 
CCF Common cause failures 
DD Dangerous detected 
DHSV Downhole safety valve 
DU Dangerous undetected 
EIReDA European industry reliability data 
EN European Norm 
ESD Emergency shutdown 
EUC Equipment under control 
FAR Fatal accident rate 
FTA Fault tree analysis 
FTC  Fail to close 
FTO Fail to operate 
HIPPS High integrity pressure protection system 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IPL Independent protection layer 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
LCP Leakage in closed position 
LTA Leak to annulus 
MDWT Mean dangerous waiting time 
MIRA Method for environmental risk analysis (Norwegian) 
MMS Mineral Management Services 
MTTF Mean time to failure 
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NCS Norwegian continental shelf 
NORSOK The competitive standing of the Norwegian offshore sector (Norwegian) 
NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
OLF Norwegian Oil Industry Association (Norwegian) 
OREDA Offshore reliability data 
PDS Reliability of computer-based safety systems (Norwegian) 
PFD Probability of failure on demand 
PMV Production master valve 
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority 
PWV Production wing valve 
QRA Quantitative risk assessment 
RBD Reliability block diagram 
RIDDOR Reporting of injuries, diseases and dangerous occurrences regulations 
ROV Remotely operated vessel 
RSC Risk status code 
SCASSV Surface controlled annular safety valve 
SCP Sustained casing pressure 
SCSSV Surface controlled subsurface safety valve 
SIL Safety integrity level 
SINTEF Foundation of Science and Technology at the Norwegian Institute of 
Technology 
SIS Safety instrumented system 
TLP Tension leg platform 
TR-SCSSV Tubing retrievable surface controlled subsurface safety valve 
UK United Kingdom 
UKCS UK continental shelf 
US United States 
US GoM US Gulf of Mexico 
WBE Well barrier element 
WRF Well risk factor 
WR-SCSSV Wireline retrievable surface controlled subsurface safety valve 
 
 Papers 
 
 
 
Paper 1 Approaches to the determinations of safety integrity levels 
(SIL) for Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS); comparison 
and discussion 
 
Kjell Corneliussen, “The Third Edinburgh Conference on RISK: Analysis, Assessment 
and Management”, April 2002 
 
 
 
 
 1
Approaches to the determination of safety integrity 
levels (SIL) for Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS); 
comparison and discussion 
 
Kjell Corneliussen 
Department of Production and Quality Engineering 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) 
NO 7491 Trondheim, Norway  
E-mail: kjell.corneliussen@ipk.ntnu.no 
 
Abstract 
The generic standard IEC 61508 uses a risk-based approach to determine the safety integrity 
levels (SIL) for Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS). The same approach is used in the process industry 
specific standard IEC 61511. In Norway, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), refers to these 
standards in the new regulations. The application of IEC 61508/61511 is generally considered to be 
beneficial, but experience has revealed two main drawbacks; (1) extensive work is necessary to come 
up with the required SIL specification, and (2) the methodology does not necessarily preserve good 
working solutions. Therefore, a separate guideline for the application of IEC 61058/61511 has been 
developed by the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF). In particular the determination of SIL for 
the safety functions in offshore oil/gas production is treated. This paper examines the risk-based 
approaches for determination of SIL levels outlined in IEC 61508/61511 and compares them with the 
approach in the OLF guideline. 
 
1 Introduction 
A safety system is installed to mitigate the risk associated with the operation 
of a hazardous process. The role of the safety systems is twofold: (1) to prevent and 
detect deviations in critical process parameters, and (2) to control accident sequences. 
A safety instrumented system (SIS) is a safety system comprising electrical and/or 
electronic components. A SIS is composed of a logic solver and related field devices.  
The most important benefit of using a SIS is the increased flexibility to change 
the system and to introduce new functions. In some cases SIS may be the only 
alternative, e.g., for subsea HIPPS solutions [ 5]. SIS is a helpful commodity, but may 
also be a challenging consideration for the system developers and the regulatory 
authorities [ 6-7]. 
Requirements to such systems have traditionally been addressed through 
prescriptive requirements, for example, related to how a function shall be 
implemented. An example of a formulation may be: “all pressure vessels shall be 
protected against overpressure by installation of pressure safety valves (PSVs), and a 
protection system based on pressure transmitters and closure of inlet”. A typical 
example of such an approach from the Norwegian oil industry is ISO 10418 [ 8]. This 
type of standards offers little flexibility in realising safety functions. One of the 
arguments for developing risk-based standards is to meet the need for coping with 
rapidly developing technology and future developments. IEC 61508 [ 1] is an 
example of such a standard, and this standard is currently given the most attention 
within the SIS industry. This standard sets out a generic approach for all safety 
lifecycle activities for SIS. IEC 61508 is a generic standard common to several 
industries, and the process industry is currently developing their own sector specific 
standard for application of SIS, called the IEC 61511 [ 2]. The standards present a 
unified approach to achieve a rational and consistent technical policy for all SIS 
systems.  
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The application of IEC 61508/61511 is generally considered to be beneficial, 
but experience has clearly revealed two main drawbacks; (1) extensive work is 
necessary to come up with the requirements to the SIS for a specific application, and 
(2) the methodology does not necessarily preserve good working solutions [ 4]. The 
Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) has therefore developed a guideline to 
support the use of IEC 61508/61511 [ 4]. In the new regulations from the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) [ 3] specific references are given to the IEC standards 
and the guideline. 
The OLF guideline do not describe a fully risk based approach according to 
IEC 61508, and the objective of this paper is to describe the two approaches, to 
illustrate the differences and to discuss the challenges and pitfalls involved with both 
approaches.  
 
2 The IEC 61508 approach for determining SIL 
IEC 61508/61511 consider all relevant hardware and software safety lifecycle 
phases (for example, from initial concept, through design, implementation, operation 
and maintenance, to decommissioning). The standards describe an overall safety 
strategy were all the safety-related systems are taken into consideration in order to 
ensure that the risk is reduced to an acceptable level. The standards distinguish 
between three different types of safety-related systems: 
• SIS systems 
• Safety-related systems based on other technology 
• External risk reduction facilities, e.g., fire walls, physical distance/layout, 
manual intervention/procedures, etc.) 
 
IEC 61508/61511 requirements are only given for instrumented safety systems. The 
necessary risk reduction will, however, also require that safety functions depending 
on “other technology”/”external risk reduction” are capable of providing a given 
protection level. Figure 1 illustrates some typical safety systems for pressure 
protection of a separator. 
Separator
Control
valve
XV
XV
PSV
PT
SIS
Logic IO
 
Figure 1 Example of safety-related systems 
 
IEC 61508 focuses on safety functions, and the term “functional safety” is a 
characteristic of the safety-related system, whereas “safety” is a characteristic of the 
equipment that produces the risk. The focus on functional safety requires a 
 3
performance measure to be introduced. Thus, “safety integrity” and safety integrity 
levels ("SIL") is introduced. SIL is introduced for specifying the target level of safety 
integrity. There are three main types of requirements that have to be fulfilled in order 
to achieve a given SIL: 
• A quantitative requirement, expressed as a probability of failure on demand 
(PFD), or alternatively as the probability of a dangerous failure per hour. 
• A qualitative requirement, expressed as architectural constraints on the 
subsystems constituting the safety function. 
• Requirements concerning which techniques and measures should be used to 
avoid and control systematic faults. 
 
The general risk assessment procedure is illustrated in Figure 2. The relations 
to the risk reduction framework in IEC 61508/61511 are also illustrated. The first step 
is to define the Equipment under control (EUC). This is the equipment to be 
protected. Initially, it is assumed that no safety-related systems are installed. The next 
step is to perform a hazard and risk analysis to identify hazardous events [ 1]. The 
standards do not prescribe any particular method to be applied, and may range from 
simple screening analysis to Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)[ 9]. When, e.g., 
the HAZOP is completed, the initial risk (“EUC risk) [ 1] should be understood. A 
risk acceptance criterion must be defined in order to determine the required risk 
reduction (ref. Figure 2). Acceptable risk would normally be defined by the user, and 
is outside the scope of IEC 61508/61511. 
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Figure 2 Generalized method for determination of SIL for SIS 
 
If the risk is found unacceptable, safety-related systems must be introduced to 
reduce the risk. If it is identified that a SIS is required, the safety integrity level (SIL) 
should be assigned. In the informative annexes to IEC 61511-3 [ 2] a number of 
alternative methods are presented. The methods are:  
• The Semi-Quantitative Method is based on input from a hazard and risk 
analysis for identification of hazardous events, and different causes of these 
events. The resulting probability of an hazardous event is summarised in a 
fault tree, and the resulting consequences of the undesired event are 
summarised in an event tree. Safety-related systems are included in the event 
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tree to reduce the probability of the hazardous event to occur. The method is 
of particular value when the acceptable risk is specified numerically (for 
example that a hazardous event should not occur with a greater frequency than 
1 in 100 years). 
• The Safety Layer Matrix Method [ 10] is applied after “safety-related systems 
based on other technology” have been included, and the need for an additional 
SIS has been identified. The method uses a matrix with frequency, severity 
and number of other safety related systems. The categories are described in 
general terms and must be calibrated to get consistent results. 
• Calibrated Risk Graph is a semi-qualitative method that uses four parameters, 
which together describe the nature of the hazardous situation when safety 
instrumented systems fail, or are not available. The parameters are combined 
to decide the safety integrity level. The parameters are described in general 
terms and must be calibrated. As for the safety layer matrix, the need for SIS 
must be identified after other safety related systems have been included. 
• Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) [ 11] is based on the hazardous events 
identified in the Hazard and Operability analysis (HAZOP). The total risk 
reduction from all safety related systems are included in a standard tabular 
form. 
 
The approach above is iterative, and after the risk is found acceptable the 
required SIL is identified for the SIS. The next step is to establish the safety 
requirement specification for the SIS, and hand the specification over to the system 
developers for design. 
 
3 IEC 61508 challenges and pitfalls 
There is an obvious question how we, from a risk-based approach, can 
ascertain that SIS functions will perform satisfactorily, and whether the safety added 
by such systems is adequate and consistent. The process for SIL determination 
described above attempts to deal with the risk of each hazardous event and the 
capability of SIS and other safety-related systems to reduce the risk to an acceptable 
level. This process must be rational and consistent among risk analysis teams, 
development projects, companies, and industry sectors. It is important to have a clear 
understanding of (1) the risk assessment procedure (ref. Figure 2), (2) what is 
acceptable risk, and (3) how SIL determination should be performed. In order to 
achieve this, it is important to be aware of the challenges and pitfalls by using this 
approach. Some of the main challenges are: 
• Compared to a deterministic approach, using the SIL allocation methods in 
IEC 61508/61511, the methods will introduce considerable amounts of 
additional analysis work. There is a risk of companies not realising the 
consequence of implementing the IEC approach. Experience has shown that 
the IEC approach for many industries require extensive additional analyses, 
and the risk assessment process should be designed to prioritise events with 
high severity and high likelihood. There is also a possibility of selecting sub-
optimal safety integrity levels, when taking into consideration the numerous 
safety functions present, on e.g. an oil installation. 
• When moving from a deterministic approach, with SIS solutions based on 
experience, with a design practice that has resulted in a safety level considered 
adequate, there is a risk of moving to a design practice that is not “proven in 
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use”. The capability of each safety related system and the PFD estimate may 
be also be uncertain, and assumptions and uncertainties in the estimates must 
be documented. This uncertainty may also lead to a solution were the actual 
safety level is not acceptable. 
• It is important that the companies define acceptable risk. If not there is a risk 
of selecting sub-optimal safety integrity levels.  
• The risk assessment process is an iterative process that is performed until an 
acceptable risk level is reached, taking all risk reducing measures into 
consideration, and it is important that the results and assumptions are clearly 
documented. The risk assessment process should also facilitate for 
examination by other teams or later in the safety life cycle by people 
responsible for operation. In operation, it will be useful in order to handle 
safety functions that are taken out of service and also to verify that the initial 
risk assessment is in accordance with the operating conditions. Some of the 
methods for SIL determination do not deal with these factors explicitly. 
 
The challenges above indicate that the risk assessment process, including the 
SIL allocation process must consider the risk of the hazardous events event, measure 
it against tolerable risk, and allocate SIL levels in a consistent way. The uncertainty in 
estimates should be documented in a way such that other teams or operating personnel 
can verify the results. Each company must consider these criteria when they develop 
individual risk assessment procedures. All the SIL allocation methods in IEC 61511 
can be used in this process; the LOPA and the semi-quantitative method do, however, 
fit the criteria above more easily. The risk graph and the safety layer method require 
more calibration, and are applied only to decide the SIL for the SIS. These two 
methods are also not so explicit when considering acceptable risk, and the risk 
reduction from other safety-related systems. 
4 The method for determining the required safety integrity level in 
the Norwegian oil sector 
The offshore industry in Norway has been concerned with challenges 
discussed in the previous section, and the move from SIS solutions based on 
experience, with a design practice that has resulted in a safety level considered 
adequate, to a risk based approach adopted from IEC 61508/61511.  
These concerns resulted in a compromise between the IEC approach and the 
previous deterministic approach for protection of process equipment, based on API 
14C/ISO 10418 [ 8]. The approach is described in the OLF guideline [ 4], which 
describes an approach where minimum SIL requirements have been set to most 
common safety functions on an oil installation. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD) has recently issued new regulations [ 3], were it is referred to the OLF 
guideline and the IEC standards. The background for establishing minimum SIL 
requirements is that application of IEC 61508/61511, although beneficial, is 
experienced to have two main drawbacks: (1) extensive work is necessary to come up 
with necessary SIL specification, and (2) the methodology does not necessarily 
preserve good working solutions[ 4].  
Figure 3 illustrates the process for developing and allocating SIL 
requirements. This is not a fully risk based approach, and for most functions the OLF 
guideline gives minimum SIL requirements (i.e., fixed SILs are given independent of 
any risk analyses). These levels should be adhered to whenever possible and are based 
on, e.g.: 
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• Current practice,  
• Available generic reliability data,  
• What is technically possible with today's technology  
 
Needs for deviating from these requirements will, however, arise, e.g., due to 
technological advances as well as special conceptual or operational aspects. 
Whenever identified, these “deviations” need to be treated according to IEC 
61508/61511 methodology, i.e., the safety integrity level should be based upon a 
qualitative or quantitative risk based method.  
 
YesHave safety functions
for which SIL table is
not applicable been
identified?
EUC definition
Hazard and risk analysis
Definition of safety functions
Apply table with
recommended SIL
requirements
For each identified deviation:
Apply risk based methodology
for SIL determination
Perform SIL allocation
Develop safety functions
requirements specification
Provide input to SIS
design and engineering
No
 
Figure 3 Flowchart for SIL development and allocation (OLF, 2000) 
 
5 Challenges and pitfalls when using minimum SIL values 
The OLF approach saves time in the hazard and risk analysis process, reduces 
documentation in justifying the SIL choice, and ensures consistency across process 
units. The process for SIL determination for SIS is, however, not fully in line with the 
risk based approach in IEC 61508/61511. The main challenges associated with the 
OLF approach are: 
• For several safety functions it is difficult to establish generic definitions, due 
to process specific conditions, size of fire area, design and operational 
philosophies, etc., the number of final elements to be activated upon a 
specified cause will, for example, differ from case to case. There is therefore a 
risk of selecting a minimum SIL level that is not applicable for the actual 
application. The guideline have to some extent compensated for this by giving 
several of the requirements on a sub-function level rather than for an entire 
safety function. 
• It is not necessary to define initial risk or acceptable risk, and hence the 
minimum SIL values are not related to the frequency or acceptance criteria of 
the hazardous event. It is therefore not possible to measure SIL level against 
acceptable risk. It is however stated in the guideline, that the minimum SIL 
requirements should be used as input to QRA (quantitative risk analysis, on 
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platform level), which will then represent a verification of the stated 
requirements. If the QRA reveals that the overall risk level is too high, then 
this could trigger a stricter requirement to one or more of the safety functions. 
Other types of analyses performed in the design phase may also introduce 
more stringent requirements than specified in the minimum SIL table. 
• It is important to identify deviations from the assumptions the minimum SIL 
table is based on. The OLF guideline describes two types of deviations: (1) a 
functional deviations is a safety function not covered by the minimum SIL 
table, (2) an integrity deviation where an instrumented safety function as 
described in the minimum SIL table has been identified, but particular 
conditions imply a different integrity level requirement (e.g., related to the 
frequency of the associated hazard). To neglect such deviations, may result in 
applying the minimum SIL table based on wrong assumptions.  
• The minimum SIL table is based on generic data, and this could give 
unrealistic SIL values. It is important that the input data for the minimum SIL 
table are realistic both with respect to the failure rates being representative for 
new equipment as well as the test intervals. When using “conservative” failure 
rates and/or long test intervals for calculating the failure probability of a given 
function, the resulting PFD ≈ λ⋅ .τ / 2, becomes “high” [ 12]. Accordingly, a 
“low” SIL value will be claimed for the function, resulting in a “non-
conservative” requirement in the minimum SIL table. The applied failure rates 
are to a large degree based upon the PDS report “Reliability Data for Control 
and Safety Systems, 1998 Edition” [ 14] which is considered the most “up to 
date” database for the referred equipment. There are however “gaps” in the 
data, and there has been an increased the focus on collection of reliability data 
for SIS in the Norwegian sector, after the introduction of new NPD regulations 
and the OLF guideline.  
 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper the risk based approach outlined in IEC 61508/61511, and an 
alternative approach based on the Norwegian guideline for the application of the same 
standards, have been described. Both approaches must be rational and consistent 
among risk analysis teams, development projects, companies, and industry sectors, 
and important challenges in this respect have been discussed in the paper. A general 
conclusion is that the approaches must be thoroughly documented, so that the 
assumptions and uncertainties in the assessments are easily available for other parties. 
For future work it will be important to assess how the industry implements the 
approaches, both individually and also by comparing the approaches against each 
other. 
Acknowledgements to fellow colleagues at SINTEF, who was involved in the 
development of the OLF guideline, and to Marvin Rausand for asking the right 
questions. 
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Abstract
The standard IEC 61508 contains a lot of useful information and guidance for safety improvement regarding the use of safety systems.
However, some of the basic concepts and methods for loss of safety quantification are somewhat confusing. This paper discusses the failure
classification, the various contributions to the safety unavailability, and in particular the common cause failure (CCF) model presented in this
standard. Suggestions for clarifications and improvements are provided. In particular, a new CCF model is suggested, denoted the Multiple
Beta Factor model.
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1. Introduction
Today it seems evident that, at least in Europe, IEC
61508 [1] will become the central standard for specification,
design and operation of Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS).
Thus, the standard will have a major impact on the safety
work, e.g. within the process industry. Whereas IEC 61508
is a generic standard common to several industries, the
process industry is currently developing its own sector
specific standard for application of SIS, i.e. IEC 61511 [2].
One recent indication is that the Norwegian offshore
industry has now finalised guidelines for the use of the
standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, see Refs. [3,4], (and
will be revised in 2003). The Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate refers to this guideline in their new regulations
[5]. Overall, it is expected that these standards will
contribute to a more systematic safety work in the industry
and also to increased safety.
However, it has been realised that it may be difficult to
apply the standard in a practical and useful way. Also, there
seems to be a couple of ambiguities that impairs the
usefulness of the standards, and may contribute to some
confusion. These observations relate to the failure classifi-
cation and to the quantification of Probability of Failure on
Demand (PFD), which is the measure for loss of safety used
in the standard.
The objective of the present paper is to present
some suggestions for modification and clarification of
the approach suggested in IEC 61508. The advantage of
arriving at consensus on the main concepts and methods is
obvious. So we maintain the IEC notation, but extend the
notation by introducing some additional concepts not
defined in the standard.
The paper has a focus not only on the quantification of
loss of safety, but also considers related and more basic
questions concerning failure classification. In the standard,
there is an apparent inconsistency or at least ambiguity
regarding the definition and use of the terms random
hardware failures and systematic failures, and how these
relate to Common Cause Failures (CCFs). This classifi-
cation is discussed and some suggestions are given. Further,
we discuss the different contributions to loss of safety from
various failure categories, and suggest various measures for
loss of safety.
Our major objective regarding the IEC approach for
quantification of loss of safety relates to its suggestion to
apply the b-factor (i.e. beta factor) model for quantification
of CCFs. This b-factor method, as introduced in IEC 61508,
will not distinguish between the performance of various
voting logics like 1oo2 (1-out-of-2) and 2oo3. This is
usually not satisfactory for the safety engineer of today, and
an extended version of the b-factor model is presented,
denoted the multiple beta factor (MBF) model.
Several suggestions presented in the paper can be traced
back to the research project PDS (Reliability and avail-
ability of computerised safety systems) carried out for the
Norwegian offshore industry some 10–15 years ago, see
Refs. [6–9]. A forum succeeded the project, and this is
still active [10–13]. This forum has recently modified
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the approach for loss of safety quantification, e.g. by
adapting the notation to the IEC standard, and by
incorporating the MBF model, see Refs. [13,14].
It is the intention that the results of the present paper
will contribute to a better understanding of these
fundamental issues, and that a more mature way to
perform loss of safety quantifications will emerge. It is
our hope that the paper can contribute to further
discussions and eventually some consensus on the basic
approach for safety calculations.
2. Failure classification
First we look at the failure classification as it appears in
the standard [1] and then make some suggestions. Accord-
ing to the standard (see Note 4 in Section 3.6.6 of part 4),
failures of a safety-related system can be categorised either
as a random hardware failure or as a systematic failure.
However, in a few places of the standard also, the term
hardware failure is used (without attaching the term
‘random’), e.g. see Annex B of Part 6. This introduces
some inconsistency and makes the classification
somewhat confusing, but probably the term random
hardware failure is used synonymously with hardware
failure. Finally, the standard also treats software failures,
but we consider this as a subclass of the systematic failures,
e.g. see Note 3 on p16 of IEC 61508-4 (i.e. part 4 of IEC
61508).
A random hardware failure is according to IEC 61508-4
(Section 3.6.5) a “failure, occurring at a random time, which
results from one or more of the possible degradation
mechanisms in the hardware”. From this definition, we
could interpret the term random hardware failure as a
failure that occurs without the failed component being
exposed to any kind of ‘excessive’ stress, e.g. see the
beginning of Section D.2 of IEC 61508-6. In the literature,
this has also been referred to as ‘natural ageing’ failures.
However, the standard may actually intend to include all
hardware failures into this category.
IEC 61508-4 (Section 3.6.6) defines a systematic failure
as a “failure related in a deterministic way to a certain
cause, which can only be eliminated by a modification of
the design or the manufacturing process, operational
procedures, documentation or other relevant factors”. So it
includes all types of failures caused by design errors (e.g.
inability of smoke detector to distinguish between smoke
and steam, ‘erroneous’ location of gas detector and software
errors). Further, these failures may be caused by operational
errors (e.g. operator forgets to remove by-pass of the safety
system after an inspection). Thus, modification rather than
corrective maintenance of the hardware is required to
eliminate these failures.
Note that the standard makes a clear distinction between
these two failure categories, and it states that random
hardware failures should be quantified, but systematic
failures should not (IEC 61508-2).
The above classification and definitions should be
compared with the description of hardware-related CCFs
given in IEC 61508-6, Section D.2: “However, some
failures, i.e. common cause failures, which result from a
single cause, may affect more than one channel. These may
result from a systematic fault (for example, a design or
specification mistake) or an external stress leading to an
early random hardware failure”. As an example, the
standard refer to excessive temperature of a common
cooling fan, which accelerates the life of the component
or takes them outside their specified operating environment.
So, the CCFs may either result from a systematic fault or
it is a random hardware failure due to common excessive
stress on the components. Apparently, only those CCFs
arising from excessive stresses on the hardware are
quantified. However, it could be somewhat confusing that
these falls into the category ‘random hardware failures’. We
assume that several reliability engineers would delete the
word random here. However, we will use random hardware
failure to be in line with the standard. Below, we suggest a
notation that makes a distinction between those random
hardware failures that are caused by natural ageing and
those which are caused by excessive stresses (and therefore,
may lead to CCFs).
Nomenclature
CCF common cause failure
CSU critical safety unavailability
D dangerous failure (failure category in IEC
standard)
DD dangerous detected (failure category in IEC
standard)
DU dangerous undetected (failure category in IEC
standard)
E/E/PES electrical/electronic/programmable electronic
system
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
MBF multiple beta factor
MTTR mean time to restoration
NSU non-critical safety unavailability
PDS Norwegian acronym for ‘availability of com-
puterised safety systems’
PFD probability of failure on demand
PSF probability of systematic failure
SIS safety instrumented system
t Time elapsing between functional tests ( ¼ T1
in the IEC notation)
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To be specific, the following concepts and failure
categorisation are suggested, see Fig. 1:
1. Random hardware failures are physical failures, and are
split into
* Ageing failures, which are failures occurring under
conditions within the design envelope of the
component.
* Stress failures, which occur when excessive stresses
are placed on the component. The stresses may be
caused either by external/environmental causes or by
human errors during operation. An example is damage
to gas detectors due to inadequate protection during
sand blasting.
2. Systematic failures are non-physical failures, and are
split into
* Design failures, which are initiated during engineer-
ing and construction, and may be latent from the first
day of operation. Examples are software failures,
sensors that do not discriminate between true and false
demands, and erroneous location of fire/gas detectors.
* Interaction failures, which are initiated by human
errors during operation or maintenance/testing.
Examples are loops left in the override position after
completion of maintenance, and erroneous calibration
of sensors during testing. Another example is
scaffolding that cover up sensors.
When there is a random hardware failure, the delivered
service deviates from the specified service due to physical
degradation. All random hardware failures are quantified,
and a CCF model is introduced to account for the stress
failures.
When there is a systematic failure, the delivered service
deviates from the specified service, without a random
hardware failure being present (i.e. no physical degra-
dation). Then the failure can only be eliminated by
a modification of the design or the manufacturing process,
operating procedures, documentation or other relevant
factors. The standard suggests that the systematic failures
should not be quantified.
Note that random hardware failure could also be denoted
physical failure, and systematic failure could be referred to
as non-physical failure. Finally, the failures can be classified
into the two categories:
† Independent failures, including the single category aging
† Dependent failures (or CCFs) including the three
categories
* Stress
* Design
* Interaction
Following the standard, only the first category (stress)
should be quantified, whereas interaction and design are
systematic failures and thus are not quantified.
The above suggestion is a recent update (see Ref. [14]) of
the failure classification previously introduced in the PDS
project (see Refs. [6–10]), but now adapted to the IEC
61508 notation. We do not believe this categorisation to be
in conflict with that of IEC 61508.
When it comes to quantification of loss of safety, the
Standard introduces lDU; representing the rate of Dangerous
Undetected (DU)1 random hardware failures, i.e. including
both ageing failures and stress failures. Now using the b-
factor model, it follows that ð12 bÞlDU is the rate of
independent failures, i.e. ageing failures. Similarly, blDU is
the rate those CCFs that are quantified, i.e. the random
hardware failures due to excessive stress.
Fig. 1. Failure classification by cause of failure.
1 DU failures are Dangerous failures (i.e. preventing shutdown on
demand), which are Undetected by built in self-tests of the system. The DU
failures are also denoted ‘dormant’. Similarly, DD failures ¼ Dangerous
failures Detected by built in self-tests.
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3. Contributions to loss of safety quantification
Before starting to discuss the quantification of loss of
safety for a safety system, it is sensible to discuss the
contributions to loss of safety from the various failure
categories (causes) in Fig. 1. Actually it may be advan-
tageous to introduce various measures for loss of safety,
arising from the different contributions.
In addition to splitting the contributions according to
failure cause, we suggest splitting the loss of safety
contributions according to whether or not the unavailability
is ‘known’. The period of ‘unknown’ unavailability is here
given as the period elapsing from a DU failure occurs, until
it is detected by functional testing or possibly by a true
demand. The period of known unavailability is the time
elapsing from a dangerous (D) failure is detected, until it is
restored. The known unavailability may also include the
time needed to perform functional testing. During periods of
known unavailability, alternative safety precautions may
then be taken (e.g. shutting down), and hence is much less
critical than the periods of unknown unavailability.
Following this argument, we suggest to make explicit the
known and unknown contributions to loss of safety. This
split is, however, introduced for random hardware failures
only. For systematic failures, where there is no repair and no
functional testing, we will (for simplicity) assume all
unavailability to be unknown.
Thus, the total safety unavailability of a safety system is
split into the following contributions:
1. Unavailability due to random hardware failures, split into
(a) The unknown unavailability due to DU random
hardware failures (of rate lDU). The average period
of unavailability due to such a failure is t=2; where t
is the period of functional testing. In this period, the
failure has not been detected, and it is not known that
the component is unavailable
(b) The known unavailability due to dangerous (D)
random hardware failures. The average period of
unavailability due to these events is equal to the
mean restoration time, MTTR, i.e. time elapsing
from the failure is detected until the situation is
restored.
(c) The known (or ‘planned’) unavailability due to the
inhibition time during inspection/functional testing.
2. Unavailability due to systematic failures. Also this
unavailability is caused by ‘dormant’ (dangerous and
undetected) failures. Note that all the unavailability due to
systematic failures is considered to be unknown.
Observe that the contributions to loss of safety of
categories 1(b) and 1(c) will depend on the operating
philosophy, e.g. whether any action is taken when a failure
is detected. This provides a good reason to treat these
contributions separately and not together with contribution
1(a). Often both the contributions 1(b) and 1(c) are very
small compared to that of 1(a). That is, usually MTTR p t;
but this is not always the case; e.g. for subsea equipment in
offshore oil/gas production, the MTTR could be rather long.
Category 1(c) is the least critical, as this represents a truly
planned unavailability of the safety system.
Below, we first introduce the loss of safety measures for
random hardware failures, then for systematic failures, and
finally the overall measure is given.
In IEC 61508, the parameter PFD is used to quantify loss
of safety due to random hardware failures. According to the
formulas given for PFD, see IEC 61508-6, it is obvious that
this parameter includes the contribution from the categories
1(a) and 1(b). As explained above, we would like to separate
out the various contributions, and now introduce
† PFDUK is the unknown (UK) part of the safety
unavailability (i.e. category 1(a)). It quantifies the loss
of safety due to DU failures (with rate lDU), during the
period when it is not known that the function is
unavailable. The average duration of each unavailability
period is t=2; giving the contribution lDUt=2 (for a single
component without redundancy). PFDUK is the most
critical part of the PFD.
† PFDK is the known (K) part of the safety unavailability (i.e.
category 1(b)). It quantifies the loss of safety due to
dangerous failures (with rate lD ¼ lDU þ lDD), during the
period when it is known that the function is unavailable (i.e.
failure has been detected). The average duration of the
unavailability period is denoted MTTR, giving the contri-
bution lDMTTR to PFD for a single system.
Observe that PFD now is given as; also see Fig. 2:
PFD ¼ PFDUK þ PFDK
Next, systematic failures (category 2) is quantified by PSF,
the Probability that a Systematic Failure causes the safety
function to be unavailable.2
Fig. 2. Relations between loss of safety measures.
2 This has also been denoted the probability of a Test Independent Failure
(TIF), as it essentially is the probability that a component which has just
been functionally tested will fail on demand.
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Thus, the functional testing will not detect and prevent
such a failure to occur if there should be an actual demand.
As explained above, a design error or an interaction error
may cause the systematic failure. The probability, PSF may
be an important contributor to the overall safety unavail-
ability, and the effect of this term is further elaborated, e.g.
in Ref. [13,14].
As to the quantification of systematic failures, it is agreed
that this is difficult. However, it is often experienced that
systematic failures are a dominant contributor to the overall
safety unavailability. Thus, attempts should also be made to
quantify PSF and introduce safety unavailability measures
that are more complete than PFD. Thus, we introduce
CSU ¼ PFD þ PSF
where CSU, Critical Safety Unavailability is the probability
that the component/safety system (either due to a random
hardware failure or a systematic failure) will fail to
automatically carry out a successful safety action on the
occurrence of a hazardous/accidental event.
The last ‘building block’ for loss of safety quantification,
see Fig. 2 is denoted as NSU, Non-critical Safety
Unavailability which is the safety unavailability that occurs
when the system is functionally tested, and equals the
probability that it is known (actually planned) that the safety
system is unavailable due to functional testing. This
contribution to safety unavailability will depend on the
frequency and duration of functional tests.
Our conclusion is that quantification of PFD alone is not
sufficient for a proper evaluation of the loss of safety; rather
one should assess various elements of the safety unavail-
ability. The most critical part of PFD is PFDUK, and could
be stated separately. Further, one should attempt to perform
an assessment of PSF. Thus, also CSU is considered an
important measure for loss of safety, giving the total safety
unavailability, except for the truly planned one which is
denoted NSU.
4. The common cause failure modelling
In this section, we discuss the use of the b-factor model
and suggest an extension of this. We restrict the discussion
to the expression for PFDUK, which for a 1oo1 voting is
approximately equal to lDUt=2:
4.1. The curse of the b-factor model
Some years ago there was in the reliability community a
discussion regarding the ‘curse of the exponential distri-
bution’. Today we should perhaps look at the ‘curse of the
b-factor model’. The problem with the beta factor approach
is of course that for any M-out-of-N ðMooNÞ voting ðM ,
NÞ the rate of dependent failures (CCFs) is the same. If l is
the components failure rate, a system with MooN voting
ðM , NÞ has CCF rate equal to bl: So the approach does
not distinguish between different voting logics, and the
same result is obtained, e.g. for 1oo2, 1oo3 and 2oo3 voting.
So, e.g. the contribution to PFDUK from CCFs simply equals
PFDUKðMooNÞ ¼ blDUt=2 for any MooN voting ðM , NÞ:
The reason why it still can make sense to apply this model is
that the sensible reliability engineer can come around (or at
least reduce) this problem by using different b-s; e.g. using
b ¼ 1% for 1oo3, b ¼ 5% for 1oo2 and b ¼ 10% for 2oo3.
The approach suggested in the IEC standards the (IEC
61508-6 Annex D) introduces an ‘application specific’ b
which to some extent depends on the voting logic MooN
ðM , NÞ: However, the rate of system CCFs does only to a
very slight degree depend on the system configuration. For
instance, this approach does not distinguish at all between
voting logics like 1oo2 and 2oo3. In most cases, this is
hardly satisfactory.
Our goal is now to formulate a more general CCF model,
requiring that this model shall both
† be a simple, direct generalisation of the b-factor model.
† clearly distinguish between the performance of voting
logics like 1oo2, 1oo3 and 2oo3.
Of course there already exists a large number of
generalisations of the b-factor model, e.g. see various
references in Ref. [15]. In particular, the Multiple Greek
Letter model [16] has certain similarities with the model
suggested in the present paper. However, none of the previous
generalisations seem to have gained widespread use.
4.2. A generalisation of the b-factor model
The reason for the success of the b-factor model is of
course its extreme simplicity. So, it is very important that
the generalised model also is simple to use in practice. We
believe that this is best achieved by letting the CCF
contribution to PFDUK for a MooN voting be calculate as
PFDUKðMooNÞ ¼ bðMooNÞlDUt=2 ðM , NÞ
where bðMooNÞ is the beta factor for a MooN voting.
Further, this b-factor should be of the form
bðMooNÞ ¼ bCMooN ðM , NÞ
where b is the beta factor as obtained from the IEC approach
(see Appendix D of IEC 61508-6), and CMooN is a
modification factor taking into account the voting logic
(MooN) of the system. The important thing to observe here
is that the effect of the voting is singled out as a separate
factor, valid for any value of b: So, just one assessment is
carried out to assess the degree of dependence ðbÞ; to be
used for all configurations. The result is modified by a
separate factor CMooN ; independent of the chosen b: If now
an argument can be provided to support the choice of CMooN ;
a very simple and easy-to-use approach is provided.
Actually Refs. [3,4] present the above alternative
formula for PFDUK of a MooN voting, and suggest values
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for CMooN ðN ¼ 2; 3; 4Þ; see Table 1 below. Observe here
that C1oo2 ¼ 1: Thus, for the 1oo2 voting we use the
specified b-value without any modification. So the b
obtained from the IEC approach is the one that is ‘correct’
for a 1oo2 voting. Thus, b is maintained as an essential
parameter. However, its interpretation in the new model is
entirely related to a double set of components.
Below we formulate a model, which allows us to
motivate these values of CMooN ; and to derive CMooN values
for any N: This generalisation of the b-factor model is
denoted the MBF model.
Of course there are some arbitrariness in the CMooN values
presented in Table 1. However, the CMooN will be expressed
in terms of parameters with a clear interpretation, allowing
any user to calculate alternative values for CMooN : However,
the suggested values in Table 1 may be used as kind of
generic starting values, which undoubtedly is much better
than using CMooN ; 1; as suggested by the IEC standard.
Thus, it is our claim that this approach combines simplicity
with a reasonable degree of realism. We can now see no good
reason for using the b-factor model in the way suggested by
the standard. Only in cases where just a rough analysis is
required, without evaluation/comparison of various voting
logics, the more simplistic b-factor model should apply.
4.3. The b-factor model for duplicated system
In order to motivate the generalised model, we first
present well-known results for the b-factor model for N ¼ 2
channels (components), see Fig. 3. So there are two
components, A and B in parallel. Letting lDU be the relevant
failure rate for each component, we have
l1·2 ¼ 2ð12bÞlDU ¼ rate of single ðindependentÞ
failures for duplex system
l2·2 ¼ blDU ¼ rate of double failures ðCCFsÞ for duplex
system
So b can be given the following interpretation: Given A has
just failed, b is the probability that B fails at the same time.
We will relate this to the loss of safety probability, PFDUK
for duplicated systems. But for the present purpose, we
ignore second order terms like ðlDUtÞ2; and thus the
contribution to PFDUK from two independent failures, i.e.
ðlDUtÞ2=3; is not considered here. Further, PFDK is ignored,
(say we here assume MTTR ¼ 0).
Let A also represent the event that component A has
failed (at an arbitrary point of time), and let B be defined
similarly. Further, the probability Q ¼ PðAÞ ¼ PðBÞ;
where in our case Q ¼ PFDUKð1oo1Þ < lDUt=2; (as we
know this can be considered the average probability over
the interval ½0; t). Now by ignoring second order terms,
we get
Q1·2 ¼ Probability of duplex system having single failure
¼ 2ð12 bÞQ
Q2·2 ¼ Probability of duplex system having double failure
¼ bQ
It directly follows that PFDUK for the voting logics 1oo2
and 2oo2 equals, (still ignoring second order terms):
PFDUKð1oo2Þ ¼ Q2·2 ¼ bQ < blDUt=2
PFDUKð2oo2Þ ¼ Q1·2 þ Q2·2 ¼ ð22 bÞQ
< ð22 bÞlDUt=2 < 2lDUt=2
The last expression is easily generalised to
PFDUKðNooNÞ < NlDUt=2; N ¼ 1; 2; 3;…
Better approximations for NooN votings can obviously be
given, but this is not the topic here. Our main objective is
to generalise the approach to get simple expressions for
PFDUKðMooNÞ; when M , N:
4.4. The multiple beta factor model for N ¼ 3 channels
Now consider a triplicated system with three com-
ponents A; B and C: The situation is symmetric in these
three components, and the probability of these to be in the
failed state is denoted PðAÞ ¼ PðBÞ ¼ PðCÞ ¼ Q: The
parameter b has the same interpretation as given above
when we consider just two of the three events. Further
introduce b2 ¼ the probability that C fails, given that there
has just been a dependent failure (CCF) affecting both A
and B:
Then we have the following failure rates for the
triplicated system:
l1·3 ¼ 3ð12 ð22 b2ÞbÞlDU
¼ rate of single ðindependentÞ failures
l2·3 ¼ 3ð12 b2ÞblDU ¼ rate of double failures ðCCFsÞ
Table 1
1Modification factors, CMooN ; based on system voting logic
Voting 1oo2 1oo3 2oo3 1oo4 2oo4 3oo4
CMooN 1.0 0.3 2.4 0.15 0.8 4.0
Fig. 3. Beta factor model for a duplicated system ðN ¼ 2Þ:
P. Hokstad, K. Corneliussen / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 83 (2004) 111–120116
l3·3 ¼ b2blDU ¼ rate of triple failures ðCCFsÞ
Now b2 can take any value in the interval [0,1]. Illustrations
are given in Fig. 4 for the cases, b2 ¼ 0; 0.3 and 1.0,
respectively. Choosing the value b2 ¼ 1; we get the
ordinary beta factor model; then any failure affecting two
of the three components will also affect the third one. The
other extreme is b2 ¼ 0: We also think this model should
have a name and refer to it as the gamma factor (g-factor)
model. For this model all multiple failures are double ones,
and thus none are triple.
We take it for granted that these two extremes, b2 ¼ 0
and 1.0, usually give quite unrealistic models. However, the
knowledge about the ‘true’ b2 would in many cases be very
limited. So it would be useful to define some generic value
as a ‘Base Case’, applicable when little information is
available. We believe that this value usually is closer to 0
than 1, and rather arbitrarily choose the value b2 ¼ 0:3:
The general results for N ¼ 3 channels are easily
obtained for this parameterisation (ignoring second order
terms):
Q2·3 ¼ Probability of triplicated system having double failure
¼ 3ð12b2ÞbQ
Q3·3 ¼ Probability of triplicated system having triple failure
¼b2bQ
For a 1oo3 voting, a system failure occurs if all three
components fail, and thus PFDUKð1oo3Þ ¼ Q3·3 ¼ b2bQ;
which directly gives C1oo3 ¼ b2; (see definition of CMooN in
Section 4.2).
For a 2oo3 voting, there is a system failure if at least two
components fail, and thus PFDUKð2oo3Þ ¼ Q2·3 þ Q3·3 ¼
ð32 2b2ÞbQ; directly giving C2oo3 ¼ 32 2b2:
These results are now utilised to give the numerical
values for C1oo3 and C2oo3; see Table 2. It is seen that the
value of b2 has a very significant impact on the results; for
varying b2 actually C1oo3 [ ½0; 1 and C2oo3 [ ½1; 3:
However, except for the b-factor model ðb2 ¼ 1Þ;
the values of C1oo3 and C2oo3 are indeed different. Thus,
the b-factor model is very extreme by giving the same result
for the 1oo3 and 2oo3 votings. So even if the ‘Base Case’
ðb2 ¼ 0:3Þ is chosen rather arbitrarily, this should in most
cases give much more realistic results than the b-factor
model (and the g-factor model). Assuming that we most
often will have b2 ¼ 0:3 ^ 0:2; the values b2 ¼ 0:1 and 0.5
represent cases of sensitivity. These give values of
C2oo3=C1oo3 ranging from 4 to 28, while the Base Case
gives C2oo3=C1oo3 ¼ 8:
Observe that the results obtained for C1oo3 and C2oo3 for
b2 ¼ 0:3 are in agreement with the suggestions presented in
Table 1.
4.5. Summary of the MBF model
This approach for N ¼ 3 can obviously be extended to
cover any degree of redundancy ðNÞ: By increasing the
number of channels (redundant components) from N to N þ
1; we have to introduce each time a new parameter bN : In
order to cover N þ 1 ¼ 4; we need b3 ¼ probability of
component D failing, given that there has occurred a CCF
affecting both A; B and C: Proceeding as above, and
inserting b2 ¼ 0:3 (‘Base Case’) we get
C1oo4 ¼ 0:3b3
C2oo4 ¼ 0:3ð42 3b3Þ
C3oo4 ¼ 3:6 þ 0:9b3
Now a ‘typical’ value of b3 should be chosen. In our
judgement, it is natural to assume that the bN-s may increase
as N increases. Here we suggest the value b3 ¼ 0:5 as a
‘Base Case’. The range of ‘allowed’ values (corresponding
Fig. 4. Illustration of the multiple beta factor (MBF) model for a triplicated system ðN ¼ 3Þ: Three different choices of the parameter b2:
Table 2
Values of C1oo3 and C2oo3
b2 Description C1oo3 C2oo3
0.0 Gamma ðg-Þ factor 0.0 3.0
0.1 Lower sensitivity 0.1 2.8
0.3 Base Case 0.3 2.4
0.5 Upper sensitivity 0.5 2.0
1.0 Beta ðb-Þ factor 1.0 1.0
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to b3 ¼ 0 and 1, but b2 being fixed at 0.3) are given in
parenthesis:
C1oo4 ¼ 0:15 [ ½0; 0:3
C2oo4 ¼ 0:75 [ ½0:3; 1:2
C3oo4 ¼ 4:05 [ ½3:6; 4:5
The above ‘Base Case’ values are (essentially) in agreement
with the suggestions of Table 1, and are located in the
middle of the interval of allowed values (for b2 fixed at 0.3).
Observe that the above ranges are narrower than those for
CMoo3; see Table 1. When we step by step extend the model
to higher N; it is actually a general tendency of getting less
and less variation in the CMooN (when previous b-s have
been fixed).
To summarise, the CMooN values presented in Table 1 are
based on choosing b2 ¼ 0:3 and b3 ¼ 0:5. The basic assum-
ption for the parameterisation of the MBF model is as follows:
Suppose we choose k components (from a total of N . k
redundant ones). Given that a failure has occurred, and that
all k of these components are known to have failed, then bk
is the probability that also a specified one of the other N 2 k
components has failed at the same time. These probabilities
ðbkÞ are not affected by the total number of components ðNÞ:
In particular, consider the definition of b1: For a MooN
voting system, we may specify one component amongst the
total of N: If it is known that this one has failed, then b1 is
the probability that another specified component has also
failed simultaneously. Thus, b1 is identical to the parameter
b; as used in the MBF model above. Further, note that this
interpretation of b ¼ b1 in the MBF model is also valid for
the b of the ordinary beta factor model (e.g. see Fig. 4).
Now the MBF model has proved successful with respect
to satisfying the requirements stated at the beginning of
Section 4.2. The clue to this success is that the parameter-
isation of the MBF model gives a result where all
probabilities Qk·N ðk . 1Þ include the factor b; which can
then be separated out. Thus, it is our claim that this model
resolves the main objection against the standard b-factor
model adopted in IEC. It is the intention to later provide a
more comprehensive description of this model.
4.6. Extended PFD calculation formulas
The above formulas for PFDUK account for the
contribution of the CCFs only, and will for instance not
take into account the possibility that there are two
independent failures present simultaneously in a duplex
system. The more complete quantification formulas for PFD
become rather complex, in particular see formulas of
Appendix B of IEC 61508-6. Now actually all
such formulas are approximations, and below a couple
of simplified but rather more transparent expressions
for PFDUK are presented, see Table 3. If the full PFD ¼
PFDUK þ PFDK is required, the possible contribution from
PFDK could easily be obtained, given the operational
philosophy for the chosen action when it is known that some
(all) channels are unavailable (see Ref. [14]).
It is important to stress that the complete expression
for PFDUK requires assumptions regarding maintenance
strategy and operational philosophy. The suggested
formulas assume that a duplicated system is degraded
to a 1oo1 system when there is a known failure of one
channel. Similarly, a 2oo3 voting system is degraded to
1oo2 system when there is one known failure, and a
shut down is initiated with known failures of two or
more channels.
Note that ldet in the table is the total rate of detected
failures leading to degradation, i.e. both dangerous detected
(DD) and safe detected failures.3 MTTR is the duration of
the degradation. Further comments to the formulas:
† The second term of 1oo2 and 2oo3 corresponds to the
occurrence of two independent DU failures in the same
test interval.
† The last term of 1oo2, 2oo2 and 2oo3 corresponds to one
component having a detected single failure resulting in
degraded operation, and then the (degraded) system
getting a DU failure.
† The factor C2oo3 ¼ 2:4 is introduced for the CCF term
of 2oo3. Observe that for the ‘second order terms’ of
the 2oo3 voting we use the factor 12 1:7b to get the
rate of a single component failure, (cf. Fig. 4).
Any possible difference between b and bD
4 is ignored in
the formulas of Table 1. The effect of demands also serving
as functional tests is not incorporated in the formulas.
Similar formulas for other votings, including formulas for
PFDK, are suggested in Ref. [14].
4.7. Determination of application specific parameters
The IEC standard presents an approach to determine
‘application specific’ b; see tables in Appendix D of
Table 3
Suggested (approximate) formulas for PFDUK. Main terms in bold
Voting Formula for PFDUK
1oo1 lDUt=2
1oo2 blDUt=2 þ ½ð12 bÞlDUt2=3 þ 2ð12 bÞldetMTTRlDUðt=2Þ
2oo2 ð22 bÞlDUt=2 þ 2ð12 bÞldetMTTRlDUðt=2Þ
2oo3 2:4blDUt=2 þ ½ð12 1:7bÞlDUt2 þ 3ð12 1:7bÞ
£ldetMTTRblDUðt=2Þ
3 In the notation of IEC, we could say that ldet is the sum of Dangerous
Detected and Safe Detected, i.e. ldet ¼ lDD þ lSD; (provided we interpret
lSD to be the rate of ‘safe’ (trip) failures being detected and then causing
degradation). The report [14] is a little more specific with respect to the
concept of ‘safe’ failures.
4 In the IEC standard bD is the b-factor applicable for Detected failures
(but unfortunately this notation could be mixed up with b for Dangerous
failures).
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IEC 61508-6. This approach follows the work of
Humphrey [17], and is a sensible way of finding the
degree of dependence for random hardware failures in
a given application (the determination of the so-called
Z-value in Ref. [1] is, however, questioned, see Ref.
[13]).
Similarly, work should be initiated to give methods for
assessment of an ‘application specific’ b2; so that the values
of CMooN to some extent could be adapted to the actual
system and application. Of course several factors contribut-
ing to a small b ¼ b1; would also contribute to a small b2;
so that in a more sophisticated modelling, these parameters
are actually correlated.
Further, it is the recommendation of the present
authors that systematic failures should also be quantified
when the loss of safety is evaluated. It is believed that
the importance of systematic failures is increasing; at
least relatively speaking, as the reliability of hardware is
improving. Thus, it is a serious drawback, e.g. when the
SIL5 requirements of IEC 61508 regarding systematic
failures are rather vague. Requiring a qualitative
evaluation of systematic failures only, necessarily implies
that there will be less focus on these essential
contributions.
Some work has been initiated to assess these application
specific PSFs [11,12]. The first of these reports presents a
method to assess the loss of safety due to systematic failures
for gas detectors, and the second considers the PSF due to
software errors. However, much work remains to be done in
this area.
5. Conclusions and recommendations
The paper presents some recommendations regarding
loss of safety quantification and further standardisation in
safety/reliability modelling of safety systems:
1. A failure classification as given in Fig. 1 is suggested.
2. It is suggested that all the elements of the safety
unavailability should be calculated as part of an overall
evaluation of the safety system. Further, it is rec-
ommended to provide separate values for PFDUK,
PFDK and PSF. As a minimum, PFDUK should always
be quantified. However, the importance of systematic
failures is well documented, and also an assessment of
PSF should be provided.
3. The standard b-factor model, as suggested in IEC 61508,
will not allow a proper comparison of say the 1oo2, 1oo3
and 2oo3 voting logics. So this model should usually not
be applied, unless a very rough analysis is required, (or
the value of b is otherwise chosen to depend on the
voting). We suggest the use of the MBF model
introduced in Chapter 4. In this model, the b-factor of
the MooN system is of the form bMooN ¼ bCMooN : The b
could be determined as suggested in the Standard
(assuming a 1oo2 voting). For CMooN ; we suggest as a
start to use the generic values given in Table 1.
4. The IEC approach to find application specific b-factors
is a good principle. A similar approach should be
developed to assess other application specific par-
ameters, including the loss of safety of systematic
failures.
5. The formulas for quantification of PFD given in IEC
are rather complex, and it is suggested that these
formulas are not the most sensible approximations. The
formulas for PFDUK presented above (Table 1) are
considered simpler and more transparent, and these are
suggested as a basis for the quantification of PFDUK
(and other measures for loss of safety).
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1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the main principles for the safety work in 
high-risk industries such as the nuclear and process 
industry, is the principle of defence-in-depth or use 
of multiple layers of protection (IAEA 1999, Reason 
1997, CCPS 2001). 
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) 
emphasizes this principle in their new regulations 
concerning health, safety and environment in the 
Norwegian offshore industry (NPD, 2001a). An im-
portant issue in these new regulations is the focus on 
safety barriers, and in the first section of the man-
agement regulation, it is stated that “barriers shall be 
established which a) reduce the probability that any 
such failures and situations of hazard and accident 
will develop further, and b) limit possible harm and 
nuisance”.  
The IEC 61508 (IEC 1998) and IEC 61511 (IEC 
2002) standards have a major impact on the safety 
work within the process industry, and describe a 
risk-based approach to ensure that the total risk is 
reduced to an acceptable level. The main principle is 
to identify necessary safety functions and allocate 
these safety functions to different safety-related sys-
tems or external risk reduction facilities. In IEC 
61511 a safety function is defined as a “function to 
be implemented by a SIS (Safety Instrumented Sys-
tem), other technological safety-related system or 
external risk reduction facilities which is intended to 
achieve or maintain a safe state for the process in re-
spect to a specific hazardous event”. An important 
part of the standards is a risk-based approach for de-
termination of the safety integrity level requirements 
for the different safety functions. IEC 61508 is a ge-
neric standard common to several industries, while 
the process industry currently develops a sector spe-
cific standard for application of SIS, i.e., IEC 61511 
(IEC 2002). In Norway, the offshore industry has 
developed a guideline for the use of the standards 
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 (OLF 2001), and the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) refers to 
this guideline in their new regulations (NPD 2001a). 
Overall, it is expected that these standards will con-
tribute to a more systematic safety work and in-
creased safety in the industry. 
Further, the NPD in section 7 in the management 
regulation (NPD, 2001a) requires that “the party re-
sponsible shall establish monitoring parameters 
within his areas of activity in order to monitor mat-
ters of significance to health, environment and 
safety”, and that “the operator or the one responsible 
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corporates hardware, software and human/organizational factors, and all failure categories should be system-
atically analyzed to 1) monitor the actual performance of the safety functions and 2) systematically analyze 
the failure causes in order to improve the functionality, reliability and robustness of the safety functions.  
for the operation of a facility, shall establish indica-
tors to monitor changes and trends in major accident 
risk”. These requirements imply a need for surveil-
lance of safety functions during operation. In accor-
dance with these requirements, NORSOK (2001) 
suggests that “verification of that performance stan-
dards for safety and emergency preparedness sys-
tems are met in the operational phase may be 
achieved through monitoring trends for risk indica-
tors. […] Examples of such indicators may be avail-
ability of essential safety systems”. Also IEC re-
quires proof testing and inspection during operations 
and maintenance in order to ensure that the required 
functional safety of safety-related systems is ful-
filled (IEC 2002).  
In order to monitor the development in the risk 
level on national level, the NPD initiated a project 
called “Risk Level on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf”. The first phase of the project focused on col-
lection of information about defined situations of 
hazard and accident (DSHA), while the second 
phase also focus on collection of information about 
the performance of safety barriers (NPD/RNNS 
2002). According to this project, the performance of 
safety barriers has three main elements: 1) function-
ality/efficiency (the ability to function as specified 
in the design requirements), 2) reliability/availability 
(the ability to function on demand), and 3) robust-
ness (ability to function as specified under given ac-
cident conditions).  
The NPD uses the term safety barrier in their 
regulations. However, they have not defined the 
term, and in a letter to the oil companies as part of 
the project “Risk Level on the Norwegian Continen-
tal Shelf” (NPD/RNNS, 2002), they have referred to 
the definition proposed by ISO (2000): “Measure 
which reduces the probability of realizing a hazard’s 
potential for harm and which reduces its conse-
quence” with the note “barriers may be physical 
(materials, protective devices, shields, segregation, 
etc.) or non-physical (procedures, inspection, train-
ing, drills, etc.)”. Accordingly, the NPD uses the 
term barrier in an extended meaning and is therefore 
similar to other terms used in the literature, such as 
defence (Reason 1997), protection layer (CCPS 
2001), and safety function (as used by IEC). The 
term safety function is used in this paper.  
Surveillance of safety functions during operations 
in order to meet the requirements stated by the NPD 
(NPD 2001a) and IEC (IEC 1998 and IEC 2002) is 
not a straightforward task, but is a challenge for the 
oil companies. Therefore, several oil companies 
have initiated internal projects to fulfill the require-
ments (see e.g. Sørum & Thomassen 2002). This pa-
per focuses on the surveillance of safety functions 
during operations and maintenance. The paper pre-
sents main characteristics of safety functions, factors 
influencing the performance, a failure category clas-
sification scheme, and finally a discussion of chal-
lenges related to the surveillance of safety functions 
during operations and maintenance. The discussion 
is based on experiences from the Norwegian petro-
leum industry and results from a research project 
concerning the reliability and availability of com-
puterized safety systems. 
2 CHARACTERISTICS OF SAFETY 
FUNCTIONS 
Safety functions may be characterized in different 
ways, and some of the characteristics influence how 
the surveillance of the safety function is performed. 
The following characteristics are further discussed in 
this section: type of safety function, local vs. global 
safety functions and active vs passive systems. 
IEC 61511 (IEC 2002) defines a safety function 
as a “function to be implemented by a SIS, other 
technology safety-related system or external risk re-
duction facilities, which is intended to achieve or 
maintain a safe state for the process, in respect of a 
specific hazardous events”. By SIS IEC means an 
instrumented system used to implement one or more 
safety instrumented functions. A SIS is composed of 
any combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and fi-
nal element(s). Other technology safety-related sys-
tems are safety-related systems based on a technol-
ogy other than electrical/electronic/programmable 
electronic, for example a relief valve. External risk 
reduction facilities are measures to reduce or miti-
gate the risk that are separate and distinct from the 
SIS. Examples are drain systems, firewalls and 
bunds. 
A distinction between global and local safety 
functions is made by The Norwegian Oil Industry 
Association (OLF) (OLF, 2001). Global safety func-
tions, or fire and explosion hazard safety functions, 
are functions that typically provide protection for 
one or several fire cells. Examples are emergency 
shutdown, isolation of ignition sources and emer-
gency blowdown. Local safety functions, or process 
equipment safety functions, are functions confined 
to protection of a specific process equipment unit. A 
typical example is the protection against high level 
in a separator through the PSD (Process Shutdown) 
system. 
CCPS distinguishes between passive and active 
independent protection layers (IPL) (CCPS 2001). A 
passive IPL is not required to take an action in order  
to achieve its function in reducing risk. Active IPLs 
are required to move from one state to another in re-
sponse to a change in a measurable process property 
(e.g. temperature or pressure), or a signal from an-
other source (such as a push-button or a switch). An 
active IPL generally comprises a sensor of some 
type (detection) that gives signal to a decision-
making process that actuates an action (see Figure 
1). 
  
Figure 1. Basic elements of active protection layers (CCPS, 
2001)  
3 SAFETY FUNCTIONS FOR PROCESS 
ACCIDENTS 
The need for safety functions is dependent on spe-
cific hazardous events. Figure 2 gives a simplified 
illustration of the event sequence and necessary 
safety functions for “process accidents”. The event 
sequence begin with the initiating event “leakage of 
hydrocarbons (HC)”, and are followed by spreading 
of hydrocarbons, ignition, strong explosions or esca-
lation of fire, escape, evacuation, and finally rescue 
of people. The main safety functions in order to pre-
vent, control or mitigate the consequences of this 
accident are to prevent the hydrocarbon leakage, 
prevent spreading of hydrocarbons, prevent ignition, 
prevent strong explosion or escalation of fire, and to 
prevent fatalities. These safety functions may be re-
alized by different kinds of safety-related systems. 
In this paper, we focus on the safety function “pre-
vent spreading of hydrocarbons”.  
 
Figure 2. Event sequence for process accidents. 
 
In principle, the safety function “prevent spread-
ing of hydrocarbons” may be fulfilled in two differ-
ent approaches, 1) stop the supply of HC, and 2) re-
move HC. In this paper, we focus on the former 
approach in order to illustrate some of the challenges 
related to the surveillance of safety functions.  
The main elements of the active safety function 
“prevent spreading of hydrocarbons by stopping the 
supply” are shown in Figure 3. Firstly, the leakage 
of HC must be detected, either automatically by gas 
detectors, or manually by human operators in the 
area. Secondly, a decision must be taken, either by a 
logic solver or a human decision. The decision 
should be followed by an action, in this case, closure 
of an ESDV (Emergency Shutdown Valve). The ac-
tion may either be initiated automatically by the 
logic solver, or by a human operator pushing the 
ESD-button, or manually by a human operator clos-
ing the ESD-valve manually.  
There should be an integrated approach for sur-
veillance of safety functions that incorporates hard-
ware, software and human/organizational factors. 
 
 
Figure 3. Safety function – prevent spreading of hydrocarbons.  
 
4 FAILURE CLASSIFICATION 
For safety functions implemented through SIS tech-
nology (as in Figure 3), IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 
define four safety integrity levels (SIL). The SIL for 
each safety function is established through a risk-
based approach. To achieve a given SIL, there are 
three main types of requirements (OLF, 2001): 
− A quantitative requirement, expressed as a prob-
ability of failure on demand (PFD) or alterna-
tively as the probability of a dangerous failure per 
hour. This requirement relates to random hard-
ware failures. 
− A qualitative requirement, expressed in terms of 
architectural constraints on the subsystems con-
stituting the safety function. 
− Requirements concerning which techniques and 
measures should be used to avoid and control sys-
tematic faults. 
The requirements above influence the perform-
ance of the SIS, and in this section we present a fail-
ure classification scheme that can be used to distin-
guish between different types of failure causes 
(hardware and systematic failures). The scheme is a 
modification of the failure classification suggested 
in IEC 61508.  
The basis for the discussion can be traced back to 
the research project PDS (Reliability and availability 
for computerized safety systems) carried out for the 
Norwegian offshore industry (Bodsberg & Hokstad 
1995, Bodsberg & Hokstad 1996, Aarø et al 1989), 
and the still active PDS-forum that succeeded the 
project (Hansen & Aarø 1997, Hansen & Vatn 1998, 
Vatn 2000, Hokstad & Corneliussen 2000). The 
classification presented in this section is one of the 
results in the new edition of the PDS method (Hok-
stad & Corneliussen 2003).  
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According to IEC 61508 (Section 3.6.6 of part 4), 
failures of a safety-related system can be categorized 
either as random hardware failures or systematic 
failures. The standard also treats software failures, 
but we consider this as a subclass of the systematic 
failures (see Note 3 on p16 of IEC 61508-4). The 
standard makes a clear distinction between the two 
failure categories, and states that random hardware 
failures should be quantified, while systematic fail-
ures should not (IEC 61508-2, 7.4.2.2, note 1).  
In IEC 61508-4 (Section 3.6.5), a random hard-
ware failure is defined as a "failure, occurring at a 
random time, which results from one or more of the 
possible degradation mechanisms in the hardware". 
IEC 61508-4 (Section 3.6.6) defines a systematic 
failure as a "failure related in a deterministic way to 
a certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a 
modification of the design or the manufacturing 
process, operational procedures, documentation or 
other relevant factors".  
The standard defines "hardware-related Common 
Cause Failures (CCFs)” (IEC 61508-6, Section D.2): 
"However, some failures, i.e., common cause fail-
ures, which result from a single cause, may affect 
more than one channel. These may result from a sys-
tematic failure (for example, a design or specifica-
tion mistake) or an external stress leading to an early 
random hardware failure". As an example, the stan-
dard refers to excessive temperature of a common 
cooling fan, which accelerates the life of the compo-
nent or takes it outside it’s specified operating envi-
ronment.  
Hokstad & Corneliussen (2003) suggest a nota-
tion that makes a distinction between random hard-
ware failures caused by natural ageing and those 
caused by excessive stresses (and therefore may lead 
to CCFs). The classification also defines systematic 
failures in more detail. The suggestion is an update 
of the failure classification introduced in the PDS 
project, (Aarø et al 1989), but adapted to the IEC 
61508 notation, and hence should not be in conflict 
with that of IEC 61508. The concepts and failure 
categorization suggested by Hokstad and Cornelius-
sen (2003) is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Failure categorization (Hokstad & Corneliussen 
2003). 
 
Hokstad & Corneliussen (2003) define the failure 
categories as: 
− Random hardware failures are physical failures, 
where the delivered service deviates from the 
specified service due to physical degradation of 
the module. Random hardware failures are split 
into ageing failures and stress failures, where age-
ing failures occur under conditions within the de-
sign envelope of a module, while stress failures 
occur when excessive stresses are placed on the 
module. The excessive stresses may be caused ei-
ther by external causes or by human errors during 
operation.  
− Systematic failures are non-physical failures, 
where the delivered service deviates from the 
specified service without any physical degrada-
tion of the module. The failure can only be elimi-
nated by a modification either of the design or the 
manufacturing process, the operating procedures, 
the documentation or other relevant factors. Thus, 
modifications rather than repairs are required in 
order to remove these failures. The systematic 
failures are further split into interaction failures 
and design failures, were interaction failures are 
initiated by human errors during operation or test-
ing. Design failures are initiated during engineer-
ing and construction and may be latent from the 
first day of operation.  
As a general rule, stress, interaction and design 
failures are dependent failures (giving rise to com-
mon cause failures), while the ageing failures are 
denoted independent failures. 
To avoid a too complex classification, every fail-
ure may not fit perfectly into the above scheme. For 
instance, some interaction failures might be physical 
rather than non-physical. 
The PDS method focuses on the entire safety 
function (Hokstad & Corneliussen 2003), and in-
tends to account for all failures that could compro-
mise the function (i.e. result in "loss of function"). 
Some of these failures are related to the interface 
(e.g. "scaffolding cover up sensor"), rather than the 
safety function itself. However, it is part of the "PDS 
philosophy" to include such events. 
5 SURVEILLANCE OF SAFETY FUNCTIONS 
This section discusses the surveillance of safety 
functions during operation related to the failure clas-
sification in the previous section. 
The requirements for surveillance are related to 
the functional safety, and not only to the quantitative 
SIL requirements (see section 4). In IEC 61508-2, 
section 7.6.1 it is stated that one should “develop 
procedures to ensure that the required functional 
safety of the SIS is maintained during operation and 
maintenance”, and more explicitly stated in IEC 
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61511-1, section 16.2.5, “the discrepancies between 
expected behavior and actual behavior of the SIS 
shall be analyzed and where necessary, modification 
made such that the required safety is maintained”. In 
addition to the quantitative (PFD) requirement, sys-
tematic failures and changes in safety sys-
tem/functions should be considered. Also changes 
not explicitly related to the safety function may in-
fluence the safety level (number of demands, opera-
tion of the process, procedures, manning, etc.), how-
ever such conditions will not be treated in this paper. 
The discussion is limited to the boundary outlined in 
Figure 3. 
In operation or during maintenance the perform-
ance of the safety functions or part of the functions 
may typically be observed by means of a range of 
activities/observations, Table 1 illustrates the rela-
tion between the failure cause categories (as dis-
cussed in section 4) and the main types of activi-
ties/observations.  
 
Table 1.  Different types of surveillance of safety functions. 
Surveillance 
activity 
Random hardware 
failures 
Systematic failures 
 Ageing Stress Interaction Design 
Actual de-
mand 
x x x x 
Automatic 
self-test 
x x   
Functional 
test 
x x   
Inspection x x (x)  
Random de-
tection 
x x (x)  
 
Not every failure encountered during the different 
surveillance activities may fit perfectly into the 
scheme, but it illustrates which failure categories 
that typically can be identified by use of different 
surveillance activities.  
The actual demands of a function can potentially 
reveal both systematic and random hardware fail-
ures, provided that there is a systematic approach for 
registration of failures. The frequency of actual de-
mands is, however, in most cases low, and it is 
therefore important that the organization focuses on 
the actions taken after an actual demand. As an ex-
ample statistics from HSE (HSE 2002a) shows that 
gas detectors detected 59 % of 1150 gas leakages 
reported in the period 1-10-92 to 31-3-01, while the 
remaining releases were mainly detected by other 
means, i.e., equipment not designed for the purpose 
(visual means, by sound, by smell, etc.).  
In addition to the actual demands, the SIS func-
tions must be tested, and there are two types of test-
ing: 1) functional tests and 2) automatic self-tests. 
These tests are essentially designed to detect random 
hardware failures. However, no test is perfect due to 
different factors as the test do not reflect real operat-
ing conditions, the process variables cannot be 
safely or reasonably practicably be manipulated, or 
the tests do not address the necessary functional 
safety requirements (e.g. response time and internal 
valve leak) (HSE 2002b).  
Components often have built-in automatic self-
tests to detect random hardware failures. Further, 
upon discrepancy between redundant components in 
the safety system, the system may determine which 
of the modules have failed. This is considered part 
of the self-test. But it is never the case that all ran-
dom hardware failures are detected automatically 
(“Diagnostic Coverage”). The actual effect on sys-
tem performance from a failure that is detected by 
the automatic self-test may also depend on system 
configuration and operating philosophy. 
Functional testing is performed manually at de-
fined time intervals, typically 3, 6 or 12 months in-
tervals for component tests. The functional test may 
not be able to detect all functional failures. Accord-
ing to Hokstad & Corneliussen (2003) this is the 
case for: 
− Design errors (present from day 1 of operation), 
examples are: software errors, lack of discrimina-
tion (sensors), wrong location (of sensor), and 
other shortcomings in the functional testing (the 
test demand is not identical to a true demand and 
some part of the function is not tested).  
− Interaction errors that occur during functional 
testing, e.g., maintenance crew forgetting to test 
specific sensor, tests performed erroneously 
(wrong calibration or component is damaged), 
maintenance personnel forgetting to reset by-pass 
of component. 
Thus, most systematic failures are not detected 
even by functional testing. In almost all cases it is 
correct to say that functional testing will detect all 
random hardware failures but no systematic failures. 
The functional tests may be tests of:  
− The entire system/function typically performed 
when the process is down, e.g., due to revision 
stops. 
− Components or sub-functions. Component tests 
are normally performed when the process is in 
operation.  
Component tests are more frequent than the sys-
tem tests due to less consequences on production. 
Experience do, however, show that full tests (from 
input via logic to output device) “always” encounter 
failures not captured during component tests.  
In IEC 61511-1, inspection is described as “peri-
odical visual inspection”, and this restricts the in-
spections to an activity that reveals for example un-
authorized modifications and observable 
deteriorations of the components. An operator may 
also detect failures in between tests (Random detec-
tion). For instance the panel operator may detect a 
transmitter that is “stuck” or a sensor left in by-pass 
(systematic failure).  
6 DISCUSSION 
The data from the various activities described above 
should be systematically analyzed to 1) monitor the 
actual performance of the safety functions and 2) 
systematically analyze the failure causes in order to 
improve the performance of the function. The or-
ganization should handle findings from all above 
surveillance activities, and should focus on both 
random hardware and systematic failures. The fail-
ure classification in PDS may assist in this work. 
6.1 Performance of safety functions 
As stated above, the performance of safety func-
tions has three elements: 1) the functional-
ity/efficiency, 2) the reliability, and 3) the robust-
ness. The functionality is influenced by systematic 
failures. Since these failures seldom are revealed 
during testing, it is necessary to register systematic 
failures after actual demands or events that are ob-
served by the personnel (inhibition of alarms, scaf-
folding, etc.).  
Traditionally, the reliability is quantified as the 
probability of failure on demand (PFD) and is 
mainly influenced by the dangerous undetected ran-
dom hardware failure rate (λDU), the test interval (τ) 
and the fraction of common cause failures (β).  
The PDS-method (Hokstad & Corneliussen 
2003), however, accounts for major factors affecting 
reliability during system operation, such as common 
cause failures, automatic self-tests, functional (man-
ual) testing, systematic failures (not revealed by 
functional testing) and complete systems including 
redundancies and voting. The method gives an inte-
grated approach to hardware, software and hu-
man/organizational factors. Thus, the model ac-
counts for all failure causes as shown in Figure 4. 
The main benefit of the PDS taxonomy compared 
to other taxonomies is the direct relationship be-
tween failure causes and the means used to improve 
the performance of safety functions. 
The robustness of the function is defined in the 
design phase, and should be carefully considered 
when modifications on the process or the safety 
function are performed.  
6.2 Analysis of random hardware failures from 
functional tests 
Data from functional tests on offshore installations 
is summarized in a CMMS (computerized mainte-
nance management system). The level of detail in 
reporting may vary between oil companies and be-
tween installations operated by the same company. 
Typically, the data is presented as failure rates per 
component class/type independent of the different 
safety functions which the components are part of. 
This means that the data from component tests must 
be combined with the configuration of a given safety 
function in a reliability model (e.g. a reliability 
block diagram or PDS) to give meaning with respect 
to SIL for that safety function. Alternatively a “SIL 
budget” for detection (input), decision (logic) and 
action (output) might be developed. This can be ad-
vantageous since tests of the components are more 
frequent, and data from tests can be used to follow 
up component performance independent of safety 
functions.  
It is important to have a historical overview of the 
number of failures and the total number of tests for 
all the functional tests in order to adjust the test in-
terval, but it is equally important to analyze the fail-
ure causes to prevent future failures. This is particu-
larly the case for dependent failures (i.e. stress 
failures). An example is sensors placed in an envi-
ronment that results in movements and temperature 
conditions that further may lead to stress failures on 
several sensors. The functional tests will reveal ran-
dom hardware failures but will not differentiate be-
tween independent (ageing) and dependent failures, 
and the fraction between independent and dependent 
failures must be analyzed.  
Common cause failures may greatly reduce the 
reliability of a system, especially of systems with a 
high degree of redundancy. A significant research 
activity has therefore been devoted to this problem, 
and Høyland and Rausand (1994) describe various 
aspects of dependent failures.  
For the β-factor model we need an estimate of the 
total failure rate λ, or the independent failure rate 
(λI), and an estimate of β. Failure rates may be 
found in a variety of data sources. Some of the data 
sources present the total failure rata, while other pre-
sent the independent failure rate. However, field 
data collected from maintenance files normally do 
not distinguish between independent failures and 
common cause failures, and hence presents the total 
failure rate. In this case, the β, and λI will normally 
be based on sound engineering judgment. An ap-
proach is outlined in IEC 61508 for determining the 
plant specific β(s). 
The maintenance system (procedures and files) 
should be designed for assisting in such assessments, 
and it is especially important to focus on the failure 
causes discussed in this paper 
The tests and calculated PFD numbers may be 
used as arguments for reducing the test interval or 
more critical, to increase the test interval. Such deci-
sions should not be based on pure statistical evi-
dence, but should involve an assessment of all as-
sumptions the original SIL requirement was based 
on. OLF suggests an approach for assessment of the 
failure rate (OLF, 2001), but the oil companies have 
not implemented this approach fully yet. 
6.3 Analysis of systematic failures 
As described earlier, the systematic failures are al-
most never detected in the tests or by inspection, but 
it is important to analyze the systematic failures that 
occur in detail and have a system to control system-
atic failures.  
Systematic failures are usually logged in other 
systems than the CMMS, but the information is 
normally not analyzed in the same detail as the data 
from functional tests. In particular, it is important to 
investigate the actions taken by the safety functions 
when an actual demand occurs. Systematic analysis 
of gas leaks is important for gas detection systems. 
Such analyses may indicate if the sensors have 
wrong location and do not detect gas leakages. In 
addition, other systems like incidents investigation, 
systems or procedures for inhibition of alarms, scaf-
folding work, and reset of sensors must be in place 
and investigated periodically. Another possibility 
that could be utilized more in the future, is to build 
in more detailed logging features in the SIS logic, to 
present the signal path when actual demands occur. 
This type of logging might give details about failed 
components and information about how the leak was 
detected. 
6.4 Procedure/system for collection of failure data 
Experiences from the failure cause analysis should 
be used to improve the procedures and systems for 
collection and analysis of failure data. A structured 
analysis of failures and events may reveal a potential 
for improvements in the actual maintenance or test 
procedures, or need for modifications of the safety-
related systems to improve the functionality.  
An important aspect regarding collection of fail-
ure data is the definitions of safety-critical failures. 
Ambiguous definitions of safety-critical failures may 
lead to incorrect registration of critical failures (e.g. 
failures that are repaired/rectified “on the spot” are 
not logged) or registration of non-critical failures as 
critical ones. The oil companies in Norway have ini-
tiated a joint project with the objective to establish 
common definitions of critical failures of safety 
functions. 
6.5 SIS vs. other types of safety functions 
Our case, “prevent spreading of HC by stopping the 
supply” is an active safety function, and we have not 
discussed challenges related to surveillance of pas-
sive safety functions. However, the functionality of 
passive safety functions is integrated in the design 
phase of the installation, and in practice, passive 
safety functions will be tested only during real acci-
dents. Surveillance of passive safety functions may 
be carried out by continuous condition monitoring or 
periodic inspection.  
The focus of this paper has been surveillance of 
SIS. However, surveillance of other safety functions 
as other technology safety-related systems and ex-
ternal risk reduction facilities is important to control 
the risk during operation. The failure classification 
and the surveillance activities presented above may 
also be used for other active, safety-related systems. 
Surveillance of some kinds of external risk reduction 
facilities in the form of operational risk reducing 
measures as operational procedures may require use 
of other kinds of surveillance activities.  
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Recent standards and regulations focus on the entire 
life cycle of safety functions, and in this paper we 
have focused on the surveillance of safety functions 
during operations and maintenance.  
The main message is that there should be an inte-
grated approach for surveillance of safety functions 
that incorporates hardware, software and hu-
man/organizational factors, and all failure categories 
should be systematically analyzed to 1) monitor the 
actual performance of the safety functions and 2) 
systematically analyze the failure causes in order to 
improve the functionality, reliability and robustness 
of safety functions.  
Not all surveillance activities reveal all kind of 
failures, and a comprehensive set of activities should 
be used. Failures of safety functions should be regis-
tered during actual demands (e.g. gas leaks), testing 
(functional tests and self-tests), and inspection. The 
presented failure classification scheme can contrib-
ute to an understanding of which surveillance activi-
ties that reveal different types of failures. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The essential function of an oil and gas producing 
well is to transport hydrocarbons from the reservoir 
to the processing equipment in a cost effective and 
safe manner.  
Safety is defined by IEC 61508 as “freedom from 
unacceptable risk”, while IEC 60300-3-9 defines 
risk as a “combination of the frequency, or probabil-
ity, of occurrence and the consequence of a specified 
hazardous event.”  
The importance of well safety has been recog-
nized and accepted for a long time, and significant 
improvements concerning both design and operating 
procedures have been made. In spite of these im-
provements, failures still occur and will probably 
continue to occur in the future. Also the industrial 
and technological development, the extended life-
time of wells and, recent regulations and standards 
with focus on functional requirements imply that 
there is a need for a systematic approach towards 
well safety during the entire life cycle of a well. 
For a well the main risk contributor is blowout. 
The acceptable mean time between blowouts is very 
long compared to the lifetime of a well. In such 
situations Rasmussen (1994) states that the risk in-
volved in operation has to be predicted analytically 
from the first beginning and the proper defenses de-
signed from this prediction. Use of predictive meth-
ods in the well risk assessment is not new. However, 
descriptions and guidelines on how to apply the 
analysis techniques in the well lifecycle are frag-
mented.  
The standard NORSOK D-010 – Well integrity in 
drilling and well operations, defines the minimum 
functional and performance oriented requirements 
and guidelines for well design, planning, and execu-
tion of safe well operations in Norway. The focus of 
the standard is well integrity, where well integrity is 
defined as application of technical, operational, and 
organizational solutions to reduce risk of uncon-
trolled release of formation fluids throughout the 
lifecycle of a well.  
In NORSOK D-010 a well barrier is defined as an 
envelope of one or several dependent barrier ele-
ments preventing fluids or gases from flowing unin-
tentionally from the formation, into another forma-
tion or to surface, while a well barrier element is 
defined as an object that alone can not prevent flow 
from one side to the other side of it self. Hence, a 
well barrier element will typically be of a physical 
nature (safety valves, tubing, seals, packers, etc.), 
while operational and organizational measures are 
used to ensure the integrity of the physical compo-
nents. The terms well barrier and well barrier ele-
ment (WBE) are used in this paper. 
In the Norwegian oil industry a two barrier prin-
ciple is followed. In NORSOK D-010 it is stated that 
there shall be two well barriers available during all 
well activities and operations, including suspended 
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or abandoned wells, where a pressure differential ex-
ists that may cause uncontrolled outflow from the 
borehole/well to the external environment. In 
NORSOK D-010 the primary well barrier is defined 
as the first object that prevents flow from a source, 
while the secondary well barrier is the second object 
that prevents flow from the source. 
Quantitative reliability analyses are often per-
formed to assess alternative well designs. Quantita-
tive analyses are performed to: 
− Compare different well completion alternatives 
with respect to leak probabilities 
− Identify potential barrier problems in specific 
well completions 
− Assess the effect of various risk reduction meas-
ures 
− Assess the effect of failed barrier elements with 
respect to leak probabilities and recommend risk 
reducing measures. 
− Identify potential barrier problems during well in-
terventions 
 
To assist in this process a barrier diagram may be 
used to illustrate the structural relationship between 
well barrier elements. The major uses of barrier dia-
grams are: 
− Prioritize the contributors leading to the blowout 
− Contribute in communication between reliability 
and well design/operation personnel 
− Assist in design of the well 
− Easier to model the well with well-known and 
commercially available quantitative analysis 
techniques, e.g. FTA 
 
Barrier diagrams have been used for some 20-25 
years to assist in well risk analysis. However, the 
diagrams are constructed in a variety of forms and 
no formal construction rules have been presented. 
The main objective of this article is to present a bar-
rier diagram method description. The article also de-
scribes how to transfer the barrier diagrams directly 
to a fault tree or to perform reliability calculations 
directly from the barrier diagram. 
Holand (1997) describes two main types of bar-
rier situations. That is static and dynamic barrier 
situations. A static barrier situation is a situation 
where the same well barrier will be available over a 
“long” period of time. Examples of static barrier 
situations are the production/injection phase or when 
the well is temporarily closed. In a dynamic situa-
tion the well barrier varies over time. This situation 
is typical for well drilling, well workover, and well 
completion operations. Barrier diagrams are best 
suited for static barrier situations.  
The discussion is based on experiences from the 
Norwegian petroleum industry and results from sev-
eral projects concerning blowout risk from well 
completions. 
A typical oil production well is shown in Figure 
1-1 as a basis for further discussion and exemplifica-
tion. The well is a typical oil producing well with 
the x-mas tree located on the surface. 
 
Figure 1-1 Example well 
 
A well barrier can be regarded as a pressurized 
vessel (envelope) capable of containing the reservoir 
fluids. The two-barrier principle implies that it must 
be at least two well barriers in a well. A well can 
therefore be considered as several pressurized ves-
sels (envelopes) that prevent the fluid from entering 
the surroundings, as illustrated in Figure 1-2. The 
well tubulars and the x-mas tree body constitute the 
vessel walls while the SCSSV and x-mas tree valves 
illustrate the outlet valves. The innermost vessel 
with the SCSSV illustrated as the outlet valve illus-
trates the primary well barrier closest to the reservoir 
while the outer vessels illustrate the consecutive 
well barriers.  
A well release will typically be an incident where 
the outer vessel leaks, and the inner well barrier 
stops the leak. 
The principle of viewing the well as several pres-
surized vessels is used when constructing a well bar-
rier diagram. 
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Figure 1-2 Well illustrated as several vessels 
CCPS distinguishes between passive and active 
independent protection layers (IPL) (CCPS, 2001). 
A passive protection layer is a protection layer not 
required to take an action to achieve its function in 
reducing risk. An active protection layer is required 
to move from one state to another in response to a 
change in a measurable process property (e.g. tem-
perature or pressure), or a signal from another 
source (such as a push-button or a switch). This 
categorization is used in this article to distinguish 
between passive and active WBEs. Typical passive 
WBEs are the production packer, the seal assemblies 
and the tubing string. Active WBEs are the hydrau-
lic master valve (HMV), the wing valve (WV) and 
the surface controlled subsurface safety valve 
(SCSSV). For these valves a signal has to be sent 
(input) in order to close the valve (change state). A 
combination of passive and active WBEs constitutes 
a well barrier. 
2 BARRIER DIAGRAM CONSTRUCTION 
RULES 
This section describes the barrier diagram construc-
tion rules. The well in Figure 1-1is used as example. 
Main construction steps are: 
1 Define the hazardous event 
2 Define cavities where the pressure can be trapped 
between the reservoir and the surroundings 
3 Identify the WBE failure modes and correspond-
ing leak paths 
4 Identify the fault tolerance of the well system 
5 Identify barrier vectors 
6 Identify minimal cut sets 
7 Calculate leak probabilities 
 
Each step is described in the following subsec-
tions. Step 2 and step 3 will be an iterative process. 
The steps are described separately to describe the 
construction principle. 
2.1 Step 1 - Define the hazardous event 
Before the diagram is constructed it is important to 
clearly define the hazardous event and the WBEs 
that is available to prevent the hazardous event.  
The SINTEF blowout database (SINTEF, 2005) 
defines a blowout as “an incident where formation 
fluid flows out of the well or between formation lay-
ers after all the predefined technical well barriers or 
the activation of the same have failed”. In addition 
to blowout SINTEF (2005) has defined a second 
event called well release. A well release is defined 
as a “an incident where oil or gas flow from the well 
from some point were flow was not intended and the 
flow was stopped by use of the barrier system that 
was available in the well at the time the incident 
started”. A blowout will therefore be an uncontrolled 
flow from the reservoir. A well release may be a 
leak of gas lift gas that stops after the gas lift gas has 
escaped. The barrier diagram will not be the same 
for these two events.  
Guidelines for defining the hazardous event are: 
1. Define the criteria for the occurrence of the 
event by first defining the system success crite-
ria. 
2. Assure that the event is consistent with the prob-
lem to be solved and the objective of the analysis 
to be performed. 
3. If unsure of the accidental event, provide alterna-
tive definitions that cover the event and assess 
the applicability of each one. 
 
The hazardous event defined for the example well 
is: 
− Formation fluid flows out of the well or between 
formation layers after all the predefined technical 
well barriers or the activation of the same have 
failed.  
 
Together with the defined hazardous event a set 
of assumptions must be made, for example: 
− Leaks from the reservoir via the wing valve into 
the flowline is regarded a hazardous event 
− Leaks from the reservoir via the production cas-
ing is regarded a hazardous event 
− Uncontrolled flow out of the well is defined as 
flow to the surroundings 
2.2 Step 2 – Define cavities where the pressure can 
be trapped between the reservoir and the 
surroundings  
As discussed a well barrier can be viewed as a pres-
surized vessel (envelope) capable of containing the 
reservoir fluids. In this step all “pressurized vessels” 
surrounded by WBEs able to contain the reservoir 
fluids are identified. The pressurized vessels are 
called cavities in this article. The cavities are placed 
between the reservoir and the surroundings. The 
cavities are enclosed by active WBEs in the final 
state (i.e., in closed position) in combination with 
passive WBEs, or cavities enclosed by passive 
WBEs only. The final stage of step 2 is illustrated in 
Figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1 Cavities preventing reservoir fluid from 
reaching surroundings 
2.3 Step 3 – Identify WBE failure modes and 
corresponding leak paths 
In this step all WBE failure modes and correspond-
ing leak path are identified. 
A failure is usually described by a failure mode 
and IEC 50(191) defines a failure mode as one of the 
possible states of a faulty item, for a given required 
function. As an example, one SCSSV function may 
be expressed as close SCSSV. A loss of this function 
may therefore be defined as the failure mode “Fail-
ure to close SCSSV”.  
A failure of a WBE may result in a leak path from 
one cavity to another or from one cavity to the sur-
roundings.  
All relevant failure modes and the corresponding 
leak paths should be entered into the barrier dia-
gram. The result is illustrated in Figure 2-2. The leak 
paths are illustrated with lines with arrows. The ar-
rows illustrate the leak direction. All leak paths in-
clude rectangles, where the WBEs and the related 
failure mode(s) that will result in the specific leak 
path are described. 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Leak paths and WBE failure modes 
2.4 Step 4 – Identify the fault tolerance of the well 
system  
The number of WBEs failures that must occur before 
there is an uncontrolled leak from the reservoir to 
the surroundings indicates the fault tolerance of the 
well, where fault tolerance is defined by IEC 61508, 
Part 4 as “the ability of a functional unit to continue 
to perform a required function in the presence of 
faults or errors.” The leak path with the fewest WBE 
failures has the lowest fault tolerance.  
The number of WBE failures in each leak path is 
found by starting from the reservoir and by follow-
ing the leak paths through the cavities to the sur-
roundings. The primary WBE will be the WBE pre-
venting leak from the reservoir to the first cavity 
after the reservoir. The secondary WBE will the 
WBE preventing flow from the first cavity after the 
reservoir, etc. Primary WBEs are marked with 1 in 
the upper part of the WBE failure mode rectangle, 
the secondary WBE is marked with 2, etc. The final 
stage of step 4 is illustrated in Figure 2-3. As an ex-
ample, it is seen from Figure 2-3 that a leak to the 
surroundings will occur if the SCSSV fails to close 
(FTC) or leaks in closed position (LCP) and if the 
manual master valve (MMV) leaks externally 
(EXL). The primary WBE failure will be that the 
SCSSV -FTC or LCP and is indicated with 1 in the 
diagram. The MMV-EXL failure is indicated with 2 
in the barrier diagram. 
From Figure 2-3 it is seen that the well have one 
leak path where only two WBEs must fail before a 
leak to surroundings occur, while for one leak path 
five WBEs must fail before a leak to surroundings 
occurs. 
There may be several leak paths to one cavity. 
The WBE failure mode from the cavity may be part 
of a leak path with different fault tolerance. In the 
failure mode rectangle, all leak paths should be en-
tered. The leak path with the highest fault tolerance 
should be entered in parenthesis. From Figure 2-3 it 
is seen that the X-mas tree connector seal will be 
part of a leak path with fault tolerance three if one of 
the WBEs between the reservoir and the A-annulus 
fails. If the leak path is from the reservoir via the 
SCSSV and the tubing above the SCSSV, the x-mas 
tree connector seal will be part of a leak path with 
fault tolerance four. 
It is also seen from Figure 2-3 that the WBEs that 
form the primary well barrier are the SCSSV, the 
polished bore receptacle (PBR), the production 
packer and the tubing below the SCSSV. 
 
Figure 2-3 Well system fault tolerance 
2.5 Step 5 – Identify barrier vectors  
This step is an intermediate step that includes identi-
fication of barrier vectors. A barrier vector uniquely 
describes the start and end point (cavity) for each 
each leak path. The barrier vectors are used for 
quantitative and qualitative analysis in later stages.  
The final stage of this step is illustrated in Figure 
2-4. The step starts with labeling each cavity with a 
number, and by labeling the reservoir and surround-
ings with the letters R and S, respectively.  
For each leak path, the barrier vector is entered in 
the lower part of the failure mode rectangle. The 
barrier vector identifier starts with the upstream cav-
ity label and ends with the downstream cavity label. 
As an example, barrier vector for the leak path be-
tween the reservoir and the tubing below SCSSV 
cavity is identified as R-1.  
 
 
Figure 2-4 Barrier vectors 
2.6 Step 6 – Identify minimal cut sets  
In this step the barrier vectors are used to identify 
the minimal cut sets of the well system. A minimal 
cut set fails if and only if all the basic events in the 
set fail at the same time (Rausand and Høyland, 
2001). Minimal cut sets are used as a basis for quan-
titative reliability analysis. 
From the example, it is seen that the minimal cut 
set with the lowest fault tolerance is the leak from 
the reservoir to the surroundings via cavity number 
1. The minimal cut sets will be 1) the SCSSV- FTC 
and MMV-EXL and 2) the SCSSV-LCP and MMV-
EXL. These two minimal cut sets may be combined 
to a minimal cut set including the barrier vectors R-1 
and 1-S.  
The remaining minimal cut sets of barrier vectors 
are easily identified from the barrier diagram by fol-
lowing the different leak paths. The cut sets for the 
example well are given in Table 2-1. As seen, the 
minimal cut sets should always start with the letter 
S, be linked together with the same number and end 
with the letter R. 
Table 2-1  Cut sets of barrier vectors 
K1   = {R-1, 1-S} 
K2   = {R-1, 1-2, 2-S} 
K3   = {R-1, 1-5, 5-S} 
K4   = {R-8, 8-5, 5-S} 
K5   = {R-8, 8-6, 6-S} 
K6   = {R-8, 8-7, 7-S} 
K7   = {R-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-S} 
K8   = {R-1, 1-8, 8-5, 5-S} 
K9   = {R-1, 1-8, 8-6, 6-S} 
K10 = {R-1, 1-8, 8-7, 7-S} 
 K11 = {R-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 4-S} 
 
It is possible to perform qualitative reliability 
analysis directly from minimal cut sets. However, 
barrier diagrams are frequently transformed to a 
fault tree for further qualitative analysis. The identi-
fied minimal cut sets make this transfer easy. An il-
lustrative example of a fault tree is presented in 
Figure 2-5. Fault trees are constructed by definining 
a top event (TOP). In this article the top event will 
be the hazardous event defined in step 1. And-gates 
(K1, K2, KK) and or-gates (CI, C2, Cn) present the 
structural relationship of the system, while basic 
events (B1, B2, Bm) are the failure modes of the 
system. Fault tree construction rules are presented in 
many standards and books and will not be described 
further (see, e.g., Rausand and Høyland, 2001). The 
transition from barrier diagrams to fault trees is fo-
cused in this article. 
Each minimal cut set identified from the barrier 
diagram can be represented as and-gates (K1, K2, 
etc) in the fault tree, while each barrier vector (cut) 
in the minimal cut set represents an or-gate (C1, C2, 
etc). The corresponding basic events (B1, B2, etc.) 
are the WBE failure modes in each barrier vector 
(cut). The transfer from minimal cut sets to a fault 
tree is illustrated in Figure 2-5. 
It is also possible to calculate the leakage prob-
ability directly from the minimal cut sets. How to do 
this is described in the next step. 
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K1 KKK2
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B1 B2 Bm
 
Figure 2-5 Fault tree constructed with the use of 
minimal cut sets 
2.7 Step 7 - Calculate leak probabilities  
From the cut sets, approximate formulas can be used 
to calculate the leak probability. A system that is 
functioning if and only if all of its components are 
functioning is called a series structure. Each barrier 
vector (cut) will be a series. A system that is func-
tioning if at least one of its components is function-
ing is called a parallel structure, and a cut set will 
represent a parallel structure. 
Rausand and Høyland (2001) describe how to 
calculate probability of failure (Q) based on minimal 
cut sets, and an extract is given here. Consider a sys-
tem with k minimal cut sets K1, K2, …Kk. Let )(tQj
(
 
denote the probability that minimal cut j fails at time 
t. If the basic events are assumed to be independent, 
then 
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The CARA fault tree software tool (CARA 
FaultTree) uses four basic event types (assume ex-
ponential distribution, i.e., constant failure rate): 
− Test interval 
− Repairable 
− Non-repairable 
− On demand 
 
Test interval is used to describe components that 
are tested periodically with test interval t*. A failure 
may occur anywhere in the test interval. The failure 
will, however, not be detected until the test is carried 
out or the component is needed. This is a typical 
situation for many types of detectors, process sen-
sors, and safety valves. The probability qi (t) is in 
this situation often referred to as the probability of 
failure on demand (PFD) or unavailability. The reli-
ability parameters entered are the failure rate λ (ex-
pected number of failures per hour), the test interval 
t* (in hours) and the repair time τ (in hours). An ap-
proximate formula for the MFDT is: 
λτλ +≈
2
t  (t)q
*
i  
Note that this formula is only valid if we have in-
dependent testing of each component. If components 
are tested simultaneously, or if we have staggered 
testing, this formula will not be exactly correct, and 
the results will be too optimistic. 
Repairable is used for components that are re-
paired when a failure occurs. If the failure rate is de-
noted λ, and the mean time to repair (MTTR) is de-
noted τ, qi(t) may be approximated by the formula: 
λτ
λτ
+=≈ 1MTTF+MTTR
MTTR (t)qi   
where 
λ
1 = MTTF   
 
The required reliability parameters are the failure 
rate λ (expected number of failures per hour) and the 
mean time to repair, MTTR (in hours). 
Non-repairable is used to describe components 
where failures of single components will not be de-
tected unless there is a leak to the surroundings. In 
this period the components may be considered as so-
called non-repairable components. If the failure rate 
of the component is denoted by λ, then: 
e-1 = (t)q t-i
λ  
Where qi (t) denotes the probability that item no. i 
is not functioning at time t. The required reliability 
parameter is the failure rate λ (expected number of 
failures per hour). The time is represented by t. 
On demand is used for components that have a 
certain probability to fail when they are required. In 
this study it has only been used in association with 
sensitivity analyses. 
The four basic event types may be used to calcu-
late the probability Q for each minimal cut set. 
Minimal cut set K1 is used to illustrate the principle. 
The SCSSV is a test interval component, which is 
tested every 4380 hours (6 months). The repair time 
is assumed to be 360 hours (15 days). The total fail-
ure rate for LCP and FTC failures is assessed to be 
2.5 failures per 106 hours. The corresponding PFD 
(qSCSSV) is then 4,92*10-6. An external leak from the 
MMV is assumed to be detected immediately, and 
repaired within 72 hours (3 days). The failure rate is 
assessed to be 0.02 failures per 106 hours. The corre-
sponding qMMV-EXL is 7,19*10-6. When using these 
assumptions the leak probability, Q1, to the sur-
roundings via minimal cut set K1 is equal to qSCSSV 
* qMMV-EXL = 5,65*10-6.  
The remaining minimal cut sets may be calcu-
lated in the same way. The total probability will be 
the sum of all the cut sets. 
3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this article a method to construct barrier diagrams 
is described. The barrier diagram is used to illustrate 
the structural relationships between well barriers. 
Barrier diagram construction rules are presented to-
gether with a description of how to transfer the bar-
rier diagrams directly to a fault tree or alternatively 
how to calculate leak probabilities directly from the 
barrier diagram. 
The barrier diagram is a simplified representation 
of the real world. It is therefore important to validate 
the barrier diagram. This may not be an easy task 
and depends, e.g., on the experience of the personnel 
involved in the work, the input data used (if quanti-
tative analysis is performed), etc. Some guidelines 
for validation are: 
1. Obtain the minimal cut sets, and check if barrier 
vectors (cuts) are valid leak paths from the res-
ervoir to the surroundings. 
2. Identify WBE failure modes that have occurred 
from, e.g., failure databases. Check if the failure 
modes are included in the barrier diagram. 
3. Check the ability of each WBE to function under 
given well conditions. This can, e.g., be per-
formed by introducing failures downstream the 
cavity and by verifying that the WBE upstream 
the cavity can withstand the load. 
4. Check the probabilities of the cut sets and their 
relative contributions to determine if the results 
are sensible. 
5. Also, check the overall leak probability to see if 
it is realistic. 
 
The method description in this article has only 
included single independent WBE failures. Failures 
in a system may also be dependent and result in 
common cause failures (CCF). The inclusion of 
common cause failures may be included in the fu-
ture. 
It should also be possible to develop a software 
tool to perform quantitative analysis directly from 
the barrier diagram. Such a program may ease the 
communication between the reliability engineer and 
the well design/operation personnel. 
The author would like to thank Professor Marvin 
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Abstract
The surface controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV) is one of the
most important barriers against blowouts on offshore oil and gas installa-
tions. This article suggests an SCSSV failure classification in line with the
IEC 611508 terminology, discusses the various contributions to the safety un-
availability, and describes a method for calculating the safety unavailability
of different SCSSV configurations. The paper is based on data and experi-
ence from the WellMasterTM project.
1 Introduction
The subsurface controlled safety valve (SCSSV) is one of the most important barri-
ers against blowouts on offshore oil and gas installations. In spite of improvements,
SCSSV failures still occur, and will most likely continue to occur. New and com-
plex well completion designs and more hostile reservoir conditions raise further
challenges to the reliability of the SCSSV.
New regulations and standards have increased the focus on the reliability of
barriers and safety functions. The IEC 61508 [5] and IEC 61511 [6] standards de-
scribe a risk-based approach to ensure that the total risk is reduced to an acceptable
level. These standards require that a safety integrity level (SIL) is established for
safety functions. The SIL requirements are partly quantitative and the standards
1
focus on application of reliability data and modeling of common cause failures.
The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) has developed a guideline [10] for
using IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, and the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority
refers to this guideline in their Management Regulations [11]. The OLF guideline
sets minimum SIL requirements to safety functions where the SCSSV is part of the
function. Requirements to the SCSSV are also given in the NORSOK D-010 stan-
dard [9], which covers all aspects of well integrity, i.e., technical, operational, and
organizational means to reduce the risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids
throughout the life cycle of a well. The standard does not state any quantitative
reliability requirements concerning the SCSSV, but gives physical requirements,
e.g., related to acceptable leak rates.
It is expected that the new standards will contribute to more systematic work
on safety and thereby increased safety in the industry. The requirements also imply
that there is a need for continued focus on the SCSSV as a barrier element.
The objective in this paper is to discuss potential SCSSV failures and failure
causes and to present a new model for SCSSV safety unavailability that is in com-
pliance with the IEC approach. To be realistic, the model has to be based on a clear
understanding of all potential failure modes and failure causes of the SCSSV. This
is important both for the reliability modeling and also in the well design process.
The reliability of the SCSSV as a safety barrier is often measured by the avail-
ability of the valve, i.e., the probability that the SCSSV is able to function as re-
quired when if a demand occurs. The unavailability of the SCSSV is the probability
that the SCSSV is unable to function upon a demand. The unavailability is often
denoted probability of failure on demand (PFD).
The paper is based on data and experience from the WellMasterTM project and
several other projects concerning blowout risk. The WellMaster project has run
a more or less continuous data collection since the Bravo blowout on the Ekofisk
field in the North Sea in 1977. The database is accessible only for the oil companies
sponsoring the project, but some reports with aggregated data have been published.
The data presented in the current paper is from one of these reports [8]. In this
paper the data is used only to illustrate analytical problems, and the results should
not be considered as representing the current status of SCSSV reliability.
2
2 SCSSV characteristics
This section describes the most important characteristics of the SCSSV.
2.1 SCSSV types and configurations
The SCSSV is located in the production tubing, 100 meters or more below the
seabed. There are two main types of SCSSVs: wireline retrievable (WR) valves
and tubing retrievable (TR) valves. The WR-valve is installed and retrieved by
a wireline operation through the tubing and is locked to a landing nipple inside
the tubing. The WR-valve reduces the tubing diameter and has to be pulled prior
to wireline operations in the well. A TR-valve is an integral part of the tubing
string and is installed together with the tubing. To replace a TR-valve, the tubing
has to be pulled. The TR-valve does not reduce the tubing diameter, and wireline
operations can therefore be carried out through the valve. The TR-valves have be-
come increasingly popular in the last decades, and the rest of the paper is therefore
restricted to TR-valves.
The SCSSV has a failsafe-close design, and is opened and held open by hy-
draulic pressure through a control line from the platform (or from the seabed con-
trol system for subsea wells). When the hydraulic pressure is bled off, the valve is
designed to close by the force of an integrated spring. Two different closing prin-
ciples are used: ball and flapper. Of these, the flapper valves are most common.
The SCSSV system may be configured in different ways. In Norway, the most
common SCSSV configurations are:
• A single TR-valve with a single control line. When a TR-valve malfunction
is detected, the crew will attempt to operate the valve by pressure manipula-
tion or wireline operation to brush/clean the valve. If such manipulations are
not successful, two options may be available. Either to install a WR-valve
inside the failed TR-valve, or to pull the tubing and replace the TR-valve.
• Two TR-valves in series, making it a redundant system. When a failure of
one valve is detected, this valve is locked open and the well is protected by
the remaining valve. The tubing is pulled only when both valves have failed.
3
2.2 SCSSV safety functions
The main focus of IEC 61508 [5] and IEC 61511 [6] is on so-called safety instru-
mented systems (SIS). A SIS consists of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final ele-
ment(s). In this context the SCSSV is a final element that has to react on some
specified hazardous events. The main functions of the SCSSV are:
1. To prevent well fluids to be released to the environment if there is a leakage
on the downstream side of the SCSSV.
2. To shut-in the production from the well if there is an emergency on the in-
stallation, e.g., if a fire occurs on the installation.
In the first case the SCSSV is a barrier elements that has been installed to ensure
well integrity. It is necessary to close the SCSSV when components on the down-
stream side of the SCSSV are leaking and when the X-mas tree or the wellhead
area is damaged (e.g., because of a dropped object). In the second case the pro-
duction has to be shut in because an emergency shutdown (ESD) action has been
initiated on the installation. In this case the SCSSV together with the X-mas tree
should stop the production in order not to escalate the critical situation.
A ‘dual barrier philosophy’ with the requirements of having two independent,
testable well barriers in a well is laid down in §76 of the PSA Activities Regula-
tions [12]. This is further elaborated in NORSOK D-010 [9] where it is explicitly
stated that there should be two independent and tested barriers available. This
means that the SCSSV will be a primary barrier while the X-mas tree valves will
be a secondary barrier in order to shut-in the well. This is a deterministic require-
ment and hence deviates from the main principle of the PSA regulations where it
is stated that ‘the operator shall stipulate the strategies and principles on which the
design, use, and maintenance of barriers shall be based’ ([11], §2).
The SCSSV is a very important shut-in barrier in a platform well in case of fire
in the wellhead area (ref. the Piper Alpha accident). The situation is different for
a subsea well since there are several barriers in the production flow before hydro-
carbons enter the riser termination area on the platform. However, the SCSSV in
a subsea well is an important barrier against leakages to the environment, and will
be the only barrier if the X-mas tree should fail. If the subsea well is located close
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to the installation, the loss of the secondary barrier (X-mas tree) may also result in
severe personnel risk due to leakage below or close to the installation. Therefore,
the SCSSV has an important role both for topside and subsea wells. However, the
risk of fire or explosion will be lower for subsea wells than for platform wells.
Stringent requirements to prevent production leaks and blowouts lead to a
rather high intervention frequency and correspondingly, a rather high intervention
risk. Even if the dual barrier requirement is considered to be a minimum require-
ment, it may, in particular for subsea wells with low fire and explosion risk, be
justifiable to assess the possibility of implementing risk reducing measures with-
out shut-in of production until a workover can be performed. The risk reducing
measures should then not be permanent and a time schedule for workover should
be established. Some operators discuss whether or not it is necessary to install an
SCSSV at all for some subsea wells [3]. This depends on a number of factors, like
field layout, reservoir fluid, etc.
The reliability of the SCSSV system will depend on the configuration of the
system. However, the reliability of the SCSSV as a final element will be indepen-
dent of the safety function the SCSSV is part of. The SCSSV as a single barrier
element is focused in the rest of the paper.
3 Failure classification
In this section the SCSSV failure modes are reviewed and fitted into the terminol-
ogy of IEC 61508 [5]. The failure classification is also extended to reflect specific
SCSSV characteristics and well conditions.
In IEC 61508 [5] safety critical failures are referred to as dangerous failures,
while non-safety critical failures are referred to as safe failures. The standard also
differs between detected and undetected failures. Detected failures are normally
detected immediately without any specific testing, while undetected failures can
only be revealed through functional testing.
For an SCSSV the dangerous failures are undetected failures, while the safe
failures are detected failures. This means that dangerous failures may occur at
any time in the interval between consecutive tests. The failure is, however, not
manifested and discovered until a test is carried out or the valve is to be closed
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because of some operational reasons.
Tests of SCSSVs are usually carried out at regular intervals. The length of the
test interval varies from installation to installation, but is usually either one, three
or six months. The test interval is partly decided by the authorities.
The dangerous failure modes of the SCSSV are:1
1. Fail to close on command (FTC) is the most serious failure of an SCSSV.
FTC failures are mainly caused by damage to certain steel parts of the valve,
such as pistons, flapper hinge and pin or seat. The failure may also be caused
by scale or hydrates preventing movement of the flapper. FTC failures may
also be caused by a plugged control line.
2. Leakage in closed position (LCP) occurs when there is a leakage across the
valve that is greater than a threshold value defined in API RP 14B [1]. LCP
failures are detected during regular tests or by an unacceptable tubing pres-
sure above the SCSSV for a well being shut in. LCP failures are normally
caused by a damaged flapper, or scratches in the seat sealing area. Such dam-
ages may be caused by wireline or coiled tubing work through the valve.
Contaminants in the tubing may also result in a leak above the threshold
value (e.g., scale, hydrates).
A clear understanding of the failure cause is important to select countermeasures
to avoid failures, and to understand how different failure causes influence on the
reliability of the SCSSV as a safety barrier.
Failures of safety-related systems can, according to IEC 61508 [5], be classi-
fied as either random hardware or systematic failures. A random hardware failure
is defined as a ‘failure, occurring at a random time.’ A systematic failure is defined
as a ‘failure related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, which can only be
eliminated by a modification of the design or the manufacturing process, opera-
tional procedures, documentation or other relevant factors.’ A systematic failure
may therefore be seen as a failure of the component to fulfill the intended function
without any physical degradation, and such failure may be introduced in the en-
tire life cycle of the component (design, operation, maintenance). In this paper we
1The same failure modes are also used in WellMaster and in ISO 14224 [7]
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assume that systematic failures will remain undetected until a real demand for the
valve occurs, and will hence result in a ‘baseline’ unavailability.
Random hardware failures occur as a result of physical mechanisms influenc-
ing the valve function. Important mechanisms are physical loads (e.g., erosion due
to sand particles in the fluid, corrosion due to high H2S content, pressure, tem-
perature), human errors (e.g., scratches during installation), design factors (e.g.,
choice of materials). A detailed FMECA should be performed to identify the fail-
ure causes and understand the failure mechanisms (e.g., see [13]).
The effect of testing is fiercely discussed within the industry. Some operators
claim that the valve should not be tested since testing will cause wear-out of the
valve, or may lead to hydrate formation during testing. Most operators, however,
agree that the valve should be actuated to reveal dangerous undetected failures.
Some operators also claim that the availability of the valve will be improved by the
testing, since the testing can prevent sticking seals, etc. To elucidate this discussion
we suggest to divide random hardware failures into the following broad failure
categories:
• Hardware failures related to a long standby period. The effect of some failure
mechanisms may be reduced by moving parts relative to each other, and the
testing may therefore improve the reliability of the component.
• Hardware failures related to demands/tests. The effect of some failure mech-
anisms may be increased by testing (e.g., wear-out and hydrate formation).
• Hardware failures that are independent of valve operation. The failure mech-
anisms acting on the valve are unaffected by the operation of the valve.
• Stress failures (outside design limit) induced on the valve. Stress outside the
design envelope of the valve that results in an immediate valve failure (shock
failure).
Stress failures will typically be due to (i) a wireline operation where the wire-
line tool damages the valve, or due to (ii) a well pressure exceeding the design
limit. Hardware failures that can be prevented by exercising the valve are typically
caused by scale, debris or sand build-up. Hardware failures caused by degrada-
tion due to testing (or real demands) are typically wear-out effects on the dynamic
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surfaces (e.g., due to ‘slamming’ of the valve or friction between moving parts).
Failure mechanisms not influenced by testing are ageing mechanisms (propagation
of cracks, corrosion, etc). The total failure rate of a valve will be a function of all
these mechanisms (e.g., see [2]).
So far, we have discussed the SCSSV as a single element where SCSSV failures
occur independent of each other. The SCSSV is also part of a system, and failures
in the system may be dependent, and result in common cause failures (CCF). Fig. 2
illustrates some typical dependencies between components where the SCSSV is
part of the safety function. IEC 61508 [5] requires that CCF failures are modeled
by a β-factor model, where the parameter β denotes the fraction of common cause
failures among all failures. The parameter β is also the conditional probability
that a component failure is a common cause failure (e.g., see [13]). In relation to
the failure classification above it is assumed that the hardware failures influenced
by demands/tests or standby period and also stress failures are more prone to de-
pendent failures than the hardware failures not influenced by the operation of the
valve.
Fig. 1 summarizes the discussion above and also illustrates that different strate-
gies should be used in order to address the various failure causes. Even if system-
atic failures are not quantified, they may be equally important, in particular for
redundant systems. Hence, both hardware and systematic failures should be fo-
cused when planning the well. The different types of hardware failures should also
be considered. Even if the hardware failures may be dependent on the operation
of the valve (length of test interval or number or tests) all dangerous failures will
be detected during testing. Hence, the assumption that no testing will increase the
overall availability requires that a large proportion of the failures are caused by
the testing itself. If the failures occur due to long standby times (no movement
of the valve) or are independent of the test philosophy, no testing will result in an
increased average unavailability.
4 Strategies for avoiding failures
To understand the factors that influence the likelihood of failures is important both
during design and for reliability modeling purposes. The following approach is
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Failure cause Dependent/independent Detection Restoration
Random
hardware
failures
Hardware failure independent 
of valve operation
Hardware failure dependent 
on demands/tests
Hardware failure dependent 
on standby period
Stress failure 
- outside design envelope
Design failure - latent from 
first day of operation
Operational failure
- erroneous procedures or
failures introduced during
testing/maintenance
Systematic
failures
Independent
- random failure
Dependent
- operation or stress
outside design
envelope will 
possibly affect more 
than one valve 
(component)
Dependent
- failure cause
will possibly affect
more than one item
Hidden/undetected
until test
- assume no diagnostic
on valves. 
All dangerous failures
remain undetected until
test. Safe failures
assumed to be
detected immediately
Not detected
- only detected by
real demands or from 
revision of procedures, 
reviews, etc
Repair
- well brought to safe
state and repair
performed
Modification of
component required
Modification of
work process
required
Figure 1: Failure classification
suggested:
1. Perform a detailed FMECA to identify and understand failure mechanisms
and failure causes and loads that may lead to dangerous failures. The FMECA
should cover all parts of the safety function the SCSSV is part of. Generic
failure rate estimates based on field experience may be used (e.g., from [8]).
2. Use the information from step 1 to prevent random hardware and systematic
failures by focusing on the random hardware failure classifiaction discussed
in section 3. Evaluate the generic failure rate with the actual valve and well
conditions in order to reduce (or increase) the failure rate for a single com-
ponent.
3. Maximize the independence of the components to prevent common cause
failures. Establish β-factors for relevant dependent components.
This iterative process will improve the understanding of failure causes, and
create a better basis for design of the valve, well operation procedures, and also to
provide specific reliability data as input to unavailability calculations (as required
in IEC 61508 [5]).
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HPU
ESD
βSCSSV/x-mas tree
βSCSSV
βpilot-v and cl
Figure 2: Examples of dependent failures in a well
There are several methods available for modeling common cause failures [13].
The most widely used model is the β-factor model. Many sources suggest ranges
within which the value of β is likely to occur. The OLF guideline [10] has a data
dossier where β is set to 2% for X-mas tree valves. Part 6 of IEC 61508 [5] suggests
an approach to estimate a specific β (see also [15]). The approach will give β-values
from 1 to 10% for final elements. Independent of which method that is used for
arriving at β, the approach above should give a good basis for determining the
β-factors.
The experience from WellMaster [8] may contribute in this process. The Well-
Master database categorizes failures as item failure when the failure is caused by
the item itself. If the failure is caused by another item or some external causes,
the failure is classified as non-item failure. This would typically be the case if an
SCSSV fails to open because of a control line rupture, or fails to close due to scale
build-up. Non-item failures that include failures of other items should be modeled
separately in a quantitative analysis, i.e., the control line and the valve should be
modeled as separate items. However, the most significant part of the non-item fail-
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ures are physical properties that do not directly degrade the valve parts, but prevent
the valve from functioning (scale, hydrates, sand, debris) or due to stress failures.
The observed distribution between item failures and non-item failures found in
WellMaster are 45% and 55%, respectively, and shows that many failures are re-
ported as failures not directly caused by the valve itself. This shows that the well
conditions and operations in the well highly influence the reported failure rate and
should be considered when designing a new well.
5 SCSSV restoration
The time after a failure is detected is important when considering safety unavail-
ability, since the situation may be dangerous even if it is known that the valve has
failed. NORSOK D010 [9] states that ‘upon confirmation of loss of a defined well
barrier, the production or injection shall be suspended and shall not re-commence
before the well barrier or an alternative well barrier is re-established.’
An SCSSV can be repaired in different ways. For dangerous failures the most
common repair action will be a workover, where the production string is pulled
and the SCSSV is replaced with a new, or redressed, valve of the same type. This
repair is both costly and time consuming. In some cases a through tubing repair
may be sufficient to restore the valve function. If the failure is caused, e.g., by scale
build-up, it may sometimes be possible to inject fresh water, acid or chemicals or
alternatively perform wireline operations to clean the well. The repair times for the
different intervention alternatives are highly influenced by the type of well. For a
platform well the workover and also the wireline operation will be far less time-
consuming than for a subsea well where all interventions must be performed from
a workover vessel.
When a dangerous failure is detected, the important time with respect to safety
is the time from the failure is detected until the well is brought to a safe state.
During a part of the restoration time it will be known that the failure is present,
but the state will still be dangerous, while after some time the valve is still not
repaired but the well is brought to an equally safe or safer state than when the
SCSSV was functioning as normal. Hence, the dangerous repair time is usually
much lower than the actual time used to replace a failed valve. As an example,
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when an SCSSV failure is detected in a platform well, the well will normally be
plugged below the SCSSV and also closed on the X-mas tree. This is considered
safe until the actual repair of the valve is performed. It is also possible to plug a
subsea well, but this requires a workover rig. Therefore, the well is normally closed
on the X-mas tree until a workover to replace the SCSSV is performed. Whether or
not this is safe depends on the distance to the neighboring platform (personnel risk
in case of leak), the additional valves available on the template, etc. The risk of
external damage to the X-mas tree must also be considered. Compensating actions
may be to reduce the vessel activity above the wellhead.
Further in this paper it is assumed that when the well is brought to a safe state,
the remaining repair time will be equally safe or safer than before the SCSSV
failure was detected. This means that the critical time that should be included in
the safety unavailability calculations is the mean time from a failure is detected
until the well is brought to a safe state. This time is called the ‘mean dangerous
waiting time’ (MDWT).
6 Safety unavailability models
In IEC 61508 [5] the probability of failure on demand (PFD) is used to measure the
unavailability of a safety function. If a demand for the SCSSV as a safety barrier
occurs, the PFD denotes the average probability that the SCSSV will not be able to
fulfill its safety function. Since PFD is an average failure probability, it may also
be interpreted as the mean proportion of the time where the SCSSV is not able to
function as a safety barrier. This proportion of time is sometimes called the mean
fractional down-time (MFDT).
In the following, three alternative PFD models are presented. The models are
based on the classification discussed earlier in this paper. We assume that all time
to failure distributions are exponential, which implies that failure rates are assumed
to be constant.
Despite the huge amount of data in WellMaster [8], it has not been possible to
decide with confidence whether or not the SCSSVs have constant failure rates. The
main reason for this is that the data sets are inhomogeneous and represent valves
operated under a variety of environmental conditions. The internal environment in
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each particular oil/gas well also changes during its lifespan. The usual assump-
tion of independent and identically distributed lifetimes therefore does not hold.
However, the exponential distribution is chosen because analysis of WellMaster
data on SCSSV shows a fairly good fit to the exponential distribution. The SCSSV
is usually replaced when a well workover is carried out. The time between well
workovers varies significantly, with an average interval between 8 and 10 years.
The average time in operation for an SCSSV is therefore 8–10 years.
A PFD model for deteriorating valves modeled by a Weibull distribution is sug-
gested and discussed in [14].
Single SCSSV Let τ be the time interval between consequtive tests, and let λD
be the rate of dangerous undetected failures of an SCSSV, i.e., failures that are not
detected by diagnostic testing, and that may - or may not - be detected during peri-
odic testing. For the SCSSV, no failures are supposed to be detected by diagnostic
testing, which means that all dangerous failures are classified as undetected. Note
that λD is the rate of all dangerous failures, be it item or non-item failures, and
independent or common cause.
If we assume that all dangeous failures are revealed in each test, and we assume
the the valve is ‘as good as new’ after each test, then the PFD within the test interval
(of length τ) is (see [13])
PFD =
1
τ
∫ τ
0
e−λDt dt ≈ λDτ
2
(1)
In the WellMaster report [8] the SCSSV reliability is presented as a total mean
time to failure, MTTF, for each of the valve makes presented in the study. The
average MTTF for all SCSSVs was found to be 36.7 well-years, and 55.6% of all
failures were dangerous failures. With this data, the dangerous failure rate λD is
approximately λD ≈ 1.7 · 10−6 (hours)−1. With a test interval of, say, τ = 6 months
= 4380 hours, the PFD is equal to 3.8 · 10−3. This means that we are unprotected
by the valve in approximately 33 hours per year.
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Non-perfect testing Often, the test is not fully realistic. In most cases the SC-
SSV is closed (smoothly) after the flow has been closed by the production wing
valve. In a worst case real demand situation, the SCSSV has to be slam-shut,
meaning that it will be closed against a flowing well. A slam-shut operation will
give high stresses to the valve, and it may fail to close the well even if it passed a
normal test just prior to the slam-shut.
To leak-test the valve the SCSSV has to be closed and pressure built-up on
the downstream side has to be monitored. This test is sometimes imperfect, either
because the crew does not wait long enough for the pressure to build up, or because
of miscalibrated or defect pressure gauges.
The probability that a dangerous failure is present after a test is difficult to
estimate. Let us assume that we, based on engineering judgement and observations,
can estimate the probability θ that a failure persists after a test. The PDF within the
test interval is therefore approximately
PFD ≈
λDτ
2
+ θ (2)
For simplicity, we assume that the probability θ is constant and independent of
time. In the PDS project[4] the probability θ is called the probability of ‘test inde-
pendent failures’ (TIF), or probability of systematic failures (PSF).
Down-time due to testing and repair The testing will, on the average, take the
time MTTI (mean time to inspect). During the testing time the SCSSV is able to
perform its function as a safety barrier if the valve is functioning when the test is
initiated. Otherwise the SCSSV is not able to perform its safety function.
During the repair action the well will be unprotected during a part of the repair
time as discussed in section 5. The unprotected time is denoted MDWT. If we as-
sume that the tests are carried out after intervals of length τ irrespective of whether
or not a failure has occurred, we get the overall PFD (i.e., the average proportion
of time where the well is not protected by the SCSSV or an adequate substitute):
PFD ≈
λDτ
2
+ θ +
1 − e−λDτ
τ
(MDWT + MTTI)
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≈λDτ
2
+ θ + λD · (MDWT + MTTI) (3)
where 1 − e−λD ≈ λDτ is the probability that a dangerous undetected failure is
present when the test is initiated. We also note that λDτ is the frequency of danger-
ous valve failures, i.e., the frequency of valve renewals due to dangerous failures.
If we use the same data as above, and assume that MDWT + MTTI is five
weeks, i.e., 840 hours for a subsea well, then λD · (MDWT + MTTI) ≈ 1.5 · 10−3.
Note that the PFD found by using eq. (1) or (2) is the unavailability of the valve
in normal operation when we thrust that the valve is functioning. The contribution
from λD · (MDWT) in eq. (3) comes from the restoration action, when we know that
we are unprotected by the valve. In some applications it is important to distinguish
between these two contributions. Also note that the contribution from the MDWT
is in the same order of magnitude as the unknown PFD. In the numerical example
above we assumed MDWT to be five weeks for a subsea well. For many fields this
is a rather low estimate and we may often see waiting times 2–3 times as high.
Standby redundancy So far, we have only considered a single SCSSV. Now,
assume that two valves are installed in series. We assume that only one valve is in
operation when the system is started up at time t = 0. The other valve is in standby
position and may be activated by a dedicated mechanism. If the active valve fails,
the standby valve will be activated. The well will not be re-completed until the
second valve has failed. Only dangerous failures are considered. The active valve
is tested at regular intervals of length τ. The standby valve is not possible to test
while in standby position. The mean testing time is MTTI, the same as for a single
valve. The mean dangerous waiting time, MDWT, is also the same as for a single
valve.
The (initially) active valve has constant failure rate λD1. When the active valve
fails, it is locked open and the standby valve is activated. The probability that this
operation is successful is denoted 1− p. The standby valve has constant failure rate
λsD2 in passive state, and failure rate λD2 when activated. Common cause failures
may be disregarded in this case since such failures are incorporated into the total
dangerous failure rates of the two valves.
The survivor function RS (t) for the standby system with respect to dangerous
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failures is given by (see [13], p. 177)
RS (t) = e−λD1t + (1 − p)λD1
λsD2 + λD1 − λD2
(
e−λD2t − e−(λD1+λ
s
D2)t
)
The mean time to the first dangerous system failure is
MTTFS =
1
λD1
+ (1 − p) · λD1
λD2(λD1 + λsD2)
The frequency of dangerous system failures, i.e., renewals due to dangerous system
failures, is therefore
νS ≈
1
MTTFS
The standby system has only one active valve that is tested periodically. The PDF
of the system during the test interval is therefore the same as for a single valve. The
only difference is that the failure rate may change. From the start-up the failure rate
is λD1. If the active valve fails, and the standby valve is activated, the failure rate
will change to λD2. Assume that the time between workovers is t0. The probability
that the active valve survives a workover period is then equal to RD1(t0) = e−λD1t0 .
The ‘average´failure rate is therefore approximately
λS ≈ e
−λD1t0
· λD1 +
(
1 − e−λD1t0
)
· λD2
The PFDS of the standby system is
PFDS ≈
λS τ
2
+ θ + νS (MDWT + MTTI)
Active redundancy Assume now that two SCSSVs of the same type are installed
in series, and that both valves are active and tested at the same time after intervals
of length τ. The total dangerous failure rate of a valve is λD and the two valves are
exposed to common cause failures that can be modeled by a β-factor model. If one
of the valves fails, this valve is left idle and the well is protected by the other valve.
When both valves have a dangerous failure, the valves are renewed.
The survivor function of the valve system with respect to dangerous failures is
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(see [13], p. 220)
RA(t) =
(
2e−(1−β)λD t − e−2(1−β)λD t
)
· e−βλDt
= 2e−λDt − e−(2−β)λD t
The mean time between dangerous system failures is hence
MTTFA =
2
λD
−
1
(2 − β)λD
The frequency of dangerous system failures is therefore
νA ≈
1
MTTFA
When both valves are functioning, the PFD1 within the test interval can be
approximated by (see [13], p. 444)
PFD1 ≈
[(1 − β)λDτ]2
3
+
βλDτ
2
When only one valve is functioning, the PFD2 within the test interval is approxi-
mately
PFD2 ≈
λDτ
2
If we assume that the time between workovers is t0, the probability that both valves
will survive the whole interval without any dangerous failure is
R(t0) = e−2λDt0
The average PFD3 in the test interval is then
PFD3 ≈ e−2λDt0 · PFD1 +
(
1 − e−2λDt0
)
· PFD2
The probability θA of test independent failures for the active redundancy system
will be slightly lower that the corresponding probability θ for a single valve. The
17
mean time to test the system, MTTIA will be somewhat higher than MTTI for a
single valve, and the mean dangerous waiting time, MDWT, will be unchanged.
The total PFDA of the active redundancy system is hence
PFDA ≈ PFD3 + θA + νA(MDWT + MTTIA)
7 Concluding remarks
This article suggests a failure classification in line with IEC 611508 terminology,
discusses the various contributions to the safety unavailability, and describes a
model for calculating the safety unavailability for different SCSSV configurations.
The model is based on the exponential distribution, even if we know that it might
be unrealistic. In this paper we have presented a failure classification that divide
hardware failures into failures influenced by the frequency of testing, failures not
influenced by testing and stress failures. This classification may assist in more
realistic input reliability data.
Several problems were not discussed, including interdependency between the
various failure modes, and time-dependent variations in environmental and oper-
ational stresses. As an example, the presented failure classification suggests that
some failures are influenced by the number of tests performed. This influence is
not reflected in the unavailability model.
The model and approach for determining well specific reliability data requires
access to detailed reliability data bases. Access to databases like the WellMaster
project are, however, often restricted. Only publicly available information was used
in this article.
Many of the ideas presented in the paper should also be applicable for other
type of equipment like x-mas tree valves and subsurface controlled annulus safety
valves (SCASV).
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